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ABSTRACT
GENDER AND RACIAL INEQUALITY IN U.S. CREDIT MARKETS
Outstanding household debt in the U.S. has grown dramatically since the 1980s, and house-
holds’ borrowing activity is on track to return to levels unseen since the 2008 Financial Crisis.
There has been limited research in economics on how patterns of credit use reflect and reproduce
inequality by gender and race. In this study, I apply an intersectional feminist lens to household
finance with four empirical investigations of women’s position in credit markets. The papers are
situated in an historically informed theoretical framework positing that women have been subject
to three interconnected phenomena as consumers of credit: stigmatization, conditional inclusion,
and exclusion. Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between borrowing from friends or family
and financial exclusion, motivated by work in sociology suggesting that such informal borrowing
has long-run costs and may be disproportionately used by women. I find that Black women are
two to three times more likely than White respondents to plan on using informal borrowing as their
primary coping strategy in the case of an emergency expense. Unobserved factors such as access
to bank branches appear to link financial exclusion and informal borrowing. Chapter 3 explores
differences by gender and race in U.S. high school students’ aversion to borrowing for college
and in the impacts of debt aversion. Female students and Black students are more likely to have
a low but positive willingness to borrow for college than other groups. Moderate debt aversion is
linked to lower levels of college enrollment, less borrowing, and lower costs of attendance, while
strong debt aversion reduces the probability of enrolling in college for men only. Chapters 4 and
5 identify gendered and racialized trends in the growth of household debt surrounding the 2008
Financial Crisis. The results provide mixed evidence that high-cost mortgage lending targeted
women or Black or Hispanic respondents. These groups experienced greater growth in consumer
debt levels and debt burden relative to income than other groups post-crisis.
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1.1 Growth of household borrowing in the U.S.
Since the 1980s, households have experienced a dramatic increase in outstanding mortgage and
consumer debt. These trends have been driven in part by the progressive deregulation of investment
and commercial banks, rising housing prices, and greater marketing and use of consumer credit
products such as credit cards (Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013; Guttmann and Plihon 2010;
Watkins 2000). In the aftermath of the housing bubble collapse and the 2008 Financial Crisis, the
consequences of growing indebtedness for macroeconomic volatility and even long-run stagnation
have garnered growing attention. A large and growing literature has established a link between high
household leverage in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis and persistent unemployment driven
by decreased consumption expenditures (e.g., Mian and Sufi 2012). This excessive household
leverage may be a source of ongoing sluggish growth as households pay off existing debt (Krugman
2014).
Beyond these macroeconomic implications, there are equally important concerns about the di-
rect implications of rising leverage on households’ financial stability and social mobility. In this
context, debt is a double-edged sword. The life-cycle theoretical framework predicts that access
to credit allows liquidity-constrained households to engage in welfare-enhancing consumption-
smoothing and to invest in productive assets.1 This is particularly important in regard to educa-
tional debt and human capital investment. Borrowing is often the only means for students to obtain
a college degree and resulting earnings premium, a premium that is even greater at higher-cost in-
stitutions (Thomas and Zhang 2005). There is some evidence, albeit mixed, that credit constraints
serve as a barrier to college attendance (e.g., Belley and Lochner 2007; Cameron and Taber 2004),
1See Browning and Crossley (2001) for a review and assessment of the life-cycle theory literature.
1
and anticipated credit constraints post-graduation may affect the outcomes of recent bachelor’s
degree recipients (Minicozzi 2005; Rothstein and Rouse 2011).
At the same time, over-leveraged households face growing risk of default. This situation can
stem from several sources: a Minskian process wherein strong consumer confidence fuels bor-
rowing (Guttmann and Plihon 2010), external habits and other-regarding preferences (Petach and
Tavani 2019), and growing reliance on debt to cope with income shocks, particularly among low-
income households with few assets (Baker 2014). Figure 1.1 illustrates the growth in credit lia-
bilities on the balance sheets of households and non-profit organizations as a percentage of U.S.
nominal disposable income. Between 1960 and the peak of the 2000s credit expansion in 2007,
outstanding mortgage debt grew from about 36% of total disposable income to nearly 100%. Non-
mortgage consumer debt (credit card, automobile, student loan, non-revolving, and other debt) also
increased substantially during the period, from 14.5% to 24%.
Unlike mortgage debt, other forms of household debt fell only mildly post-recession and have
since continued to increase. Student loan and automobile debt are major components of this trend
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2017). Consumer demand continues to grow for other credit
products as well. As shown in Figure 1.2, the number of credit card accounts per member of the
U.S. non-institutionalized population grew substantially in the 2000s before falling dramatically
with the Financial Crisis. The effects of the post-recession credit crunch and household delever-
aging have begun to reverse, however, with a notable sustained increase in credit card accounts as
job growth and household incomes have recovered.
In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, household finance and credit demand remain critical
and multifaceted issues from a policy perspective. Despite the wide range of work done in this
area, there has been surprisingly little recent attention paid to the role that variation in access to
or use of mortgage and consumer credit may have on inequality across social groups. Since the
credit expansion and crisis, some work specific to mortgage lending has highlighted inequality in
access to quality credit with a focus on minority applicants (Baker 2014; Baradaran 2015; Dymski,
Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013; Wyly and Ponder 2011). Less work has focused on the ways in
2
which gender has interacted with these racialized processes of debt growth or on how male and
female borrowers have been positioned in credit markets more generally (Dymski, Hernandez, and
Mohanty 2013; Fishbein and Woodall 2006). Much of the earlier work on gender and race has
been limited to addressing differences in lender-imposed credit rationing and, to a lesser extent,
self-rationing (e.g., Crook 1999, 2001; Hawley and Fujii 1990, 1991; Jappelli 1990).
This study contributes to the sparse literature by proposing a gendered analysis of household
indebtedness and consumer borrowing that recognizes the complicated role of gender in the context
of industrialized economies where credit is increasingly ubiquitous. Such a lens has yet to be fully
applied in the economics literature and only somewhat in the sociology literature (e.g., Dwyer
2018), yet an expansion of such analyses is well overdue. In the chapters that follow, I argue
that women’s position as consumers in credit markets is best characterized by three interconnected
phenomena: stigmatization, exclusion, and conditional inclusion, as illustrated in Figure 1.3.2 The
historical co-evolution of these forms of inequality are discussed in the remainder of this section,
followed by an overview of the dissertation chapters in the context of the three-part argument.
1.2 Women’s position in credit markets
The obligations for household management faced by both married and single women positioned
them as some of the first consumers of credit. In her survey of historical work on consumer credit
in the U.K., Burton (2008) notes that between the 1300s and 1700s, coverture virtually eliminated
the legal rights of women upon marriage, but the “law of necessities” allowed a married woman to
borrow under her husband’s name. This law recognized the role of women as household managers
whose task it was to ensure the week-to-week survival of the household. As a result, women could
enter into credit agreements in order to procure necessities, and husbands would be legally bound
to repay these debts. Single and widowed women also had access to credit and, in the U.K., access
2A notable omission in this framework is the role of women as lenders of credit. Historical work has largely
debunked the assumption that women were strictly excluded from lending in the early years of consumer credit (Burton
2008; Calder 2009; Lemire, Pearson, and Campbell 2002). Differences in the representation of women among lenders
in modern Western credit markets, such as in venture capital and small business lending, remain an important issue
but are beyond the scope of this study.
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to county courts and other legal resources to enforce repayment of debts. The feminization of
consumer credit accelerated as installment credit was introduced in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries (Calder 2009). By the 1930s, Burton (2008) cites estimates that about 80% of consumer
credit was held by women (37).
Yet the multifaceted inclusion of women into credit markets came tied to social norms reinforc-
ing patriarchal social structures. At the outset, women’s use of borrowed funds was heavily scru-
tinized through the lens of sexual control. Only married women who were thought to be “chaste”
could claim the right to credit through the law of necessities, and the moral standing of single
women who borrowed was particularly questioned, reflecting the Victorian Era link between “fe-
male consumer activity and female sexual transgression” (Burton 2008, 23). Single female debtors
were liable to imprisonment, often with their children. Men’s responsibility for the debts incurred
by wives may have also contributed to later views of women as profligate spenders and irresponsi-
ble borrowers. In some cases, such excessive borrowing did occur, but as a strategy women used
to circumvent their lack of legal power. Records suggest that, in the case of unsatisfactory mar-
riages, upper-class women would accumulate large debts under the guise of the law of necessities,
prompting their husbands to leave them (Burton 2008).
The myth of the “female credit abuser” was fully established with the emergence of installment
credit in the United States (Calder 2009). This image combined growing concerns about the moral
degeneracy of borrowing on credit with the assumption that women, as the primary consumers
of such credit, were financially illiterate and illogical. An 1884 editorial in Scientific American
described women’s “peculiar” reasoning as supposed “psychological fact,” arguing that a woman
would choose to pay more through installment payments to purchase a sewing machine rather than
pay the full sum outright (Calder 2009, 182). An English visitor to New York similarly commented
in 1897 that “In New York, almost everybody lives above his income. Women, many people will
tell you, are especial offenders” (Calder 2009, 218). According to such reasoning, women lacked
an ability to delay gratification and think “economically” as men would. Later popular writing por-
trayed consumer credit as destructive of previous generations’ monetary morality, describing credit
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as an “ally of the devil” and the “great tempter” to whose temptations women were particularly
vulnerable (Calder 2009, 215).
This history sheds light on the relationship between conditional inclusion and stigmatization
that has long characterized women’s position in Western credit markets. When they have been
granted access to credit, it has not been as a right, but as an expectation, given their role as house-
hold manager and, thus, as household consumer. As consumers, they in turn became the target of
marketers as new financial products were developed, from installment credit in the late 1800s to,
as this study will explore, subprime lending today. Yet in being cast in this role, they become the
scapegoat for social anxieties about the consequences of borrowing–the image of the thriftless and
vain borrower who wants to live beyond her means. Evidence suggests that this image remains
prevalent today and has been internalized by women in ways that may influence their borrowing
behavior. Today, women continue to perceive themselves and to be perceived as less financially
literate than men (Chen and Volpe 2002; Danes and Haberman 2007), despite evidence from credit
bureaus that women have equivalent or slightly higher credit scores on average than men (Experian
2013).
How has the stigmatization of female borrowers translated into a seemingly paradoxical status
of exclusion from certain credit markets? At the same time that women were early users of con-
sumer credit, U.S. women’s independent access to credit on the basis of their own income has a
history of being restricted, even after the elimination of explicit restrictions like coverture. Legal
work and Congressional hearings in the early 1970s documented systematic sex discrimination in
lending in the United States (Brown 1973; Gates 1974; Lally 1973). Banks discounted the earn-
ings of married women, assuming that they would leave the labor force to raise children (Lally
1973). Married women also continued to be unable to apply for credit in their own name, lim-
iting their ability to develop an individual credit history (Lally 1973). In line with the myth of
the female credit abuser, banks claimed that these restrictions were in response to women’s lower
creditworthiness, despite little evidence to support such an assertion.
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Since then, such blatant sex discrimination in credit markets has been mitigated by two key
developments. First and most directly, Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
in 1974. The act prevented banks from collecting application data relevant to protected group
identities. These identities included sex and marital status and, starting in 1976, race, national
origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, and the exercise of consumers’ rights as established
in the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Banks were also restricted from treating applicants in these
protected groups less favorably than other applicants unless this lending practice passed the “effects
test” under disparate impact doctrine. To successfully prove discrimination under this doctrine, a
plaintiff must first prove that he or she was treated differently from “otherwise identical” borrowers
(National Consumer Law Center 2013). If the bank can show that the lending practice bears a
substantive relationship to applicants’ creditworthiness, then the burden of proof returns to the
plaintiff, who must present a less discriminatory lending criterion.
Second, a widespread shift towards automated credit scoring has mitigated opportunities for
discriminatory lending. The use of what the ECOA terms “empirically-derived credit scoring sys-
tems” should provide limited scope for direct bias against female borrowers compared to “subjec-
tive systems” (Hsia 1978). Some work has suggested that credit scoring systems in the post-ECOA
context could counter-intuitively lead to reduced borrowing opportunities for women. Chandler
and Ewert (1976) note that the observable characteristics of high and low credit risk borrowers
could differ between men and women. For example, suppose that creditworthy female borrowers
were found to have fewer credit references than the average creditworthy male borrower. If the
sample consists mostly of male borrowers and no distinction between applicants can be made by
gender, the estimated model will lead to the rejection of creditworthy female applicants with few
credit references.
Despite these legal and technological developments, inequities in women’s access to credit
on equal terms remain relevant and substantial. Most generally, the nature of disparate impact
doctrine means that the ripple effects of structural gender inequality can lead to legally permissable
differences in the treatment of male and female borrowers. It is well known that women have lower
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average wages and wealth accumulation than men in the U.S. (Pressman 2003, 1988; Schmidt and
Sevak 2006) and that women are disproportionately represented among bankruptcy filers, in part
due to greater financial distress in the case of divorce (Burton 2008; Calandra 2008). Banks can
legally offer different terms to male and female credit applicants on the basis of these differences in
their current financial situation and financial history. In addition, there is a long literature noting the
redlining of low-income, predominantly minority neighborhoods.3 In these neighborhoods, high-
cost borrowing may be the only feasible possibility, and previous work suggests that households
headed by women of color may be disproportionately affected by these credit constraints (Dymski,
Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013; Wyly and Ponder 2011).
There is also clear evidence of gender differences in credit access within certain segments of
credit markets, most notably venture capital and small business lending. Female small business
owners have been shown to self-ration due to their expectation that they will be rejected credit
(Mijid and Bernasek 2013). New female-owned businesses are also more likely to receive loans
that are smaller than requested relative to new male-owned businesses (Mijid 2015), and female
entrepreneurs on average ask for and receive less financing than male entrepreneurs, pay higher
rates for financing, and have lower credit scores than male entrepreneurs (Hecht et al. 2016).
These studies do not posit a particular source of gender differences in access. Weiler and
Bernasek (2001) argue that women may be excluded from informal networks of entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists, limiting their access to funds. There is also some evidence that the stigmatiza-
tion of women regarding financial and business literacy plays a limiting role as well. Kanze, Huang,
Conley, and Higgins (2018) find that investors tend to ask male entrepreneurs “promotion-related”
questions (i.e., as stated in the title of the article “ask[ing] men to win”), while they ask female en-
trepreneurs “prevention-related” questions (i.e., asking “women not to lose”). Prevention-related
questions are found to in turn result in lower levels of funding. The divergence between these
questions appears to reveal an underlying gender bias: the assumption that female entrepreneurs
will fail unless they manage to prevent it. The internalization of these messages of female financial
3See Hillier (2003) for an empirical investigation and a survey of this literature.
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ineptitude may contribute to the likelihood of these business owners to self-ration. In fact, some
evidence suggests that self-rationing is a more relevant form of credit constraint for women than
bank rejection in a broader set of borrowing contexts outside of venture capital (e.g., Hawley and
Fujii 1991).
Examples like these point to how these interconnected forms of credit market inequality con-
tinue to operate for female borrowers. Stereotypes surrounding women’s financial literacy may
serve to restrict their access to certain types of credit or credit at reasonable terms. This exclusion
may sometimes be externally imposed (as in venture capital) and in others may be self-imposed
through discouragement (deciding not to apply for credit due to predicted rejection). Some work
has further argued that women have been excluded from traditional credit products only to become
“superincluded” in others (Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013). The marketing of high-cost
credit to vulnerable households, particularly female-headed households in low-income neighbor-
hoods, perpetuates the historical pattern in which new forms of credit are marketed to women
with few alternative options. Moreover, images of women in popular media continue to portray
womanhood as being associated with both household management and the maintenance of an ideal
self (physical appearance, dress, etc.). As a result, consumption to meet these dual goals create a
space in which “compulsive consumption” funded by debt remains gendered, serving as a “major
leisure activity and a form of self-expression” (Burton 2008, 39-40). This in turn sets the stage for
continued stigmatization of the supposedly irresponsible female borrower.
Any analysis of gender-based credit market inequality would be incomplete without meaning-
fully engaging intersectional identities. Race-based inequities have a particularly long history in
U.S. credit markets (Baradaran 2015; Hillier 2003). It is well known that Black communities were
and continue to be systematically excluded from equal access to mortgage credit and low-cost con-
sumer credit, leaving such communities more likely to rely on high-cost lending (Carr and Schuetz
2001; Morgan-Cross and Klawitter 2011). When consumer credit grew in popularity–particularly
among White women–during the late 1800s and early 1900s, Black families had more limited
access to store credit than installment credit (Olney 1998). The former relied heavily on relation-
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ship lending, while the latter relied on collateral. Olney (1998) suggests that merchants’ prejudice
against and stereotypes of Black families may have limited their willingness to lend to these fam-
ilies, citing comments by national trade groups expressing doubt about the financial literacy of
Black borrowers.
Black women were at the forefront of attempts to expand access to credit for Black families in
the U.S., addressing inequities at the intersections of class and race. During the 1960s “Welfare
Movements,” activists demanded that major retailers such as Sears extend store credit to predom-
inantly female, Black and African-American recipients of income support (Kornbluh 2016). The
activists noted that restrictions on welfare recipients’ access to credit empowered White lenders in
Black neighborhoods to charge extortionate financing fees. The experiences of these women point
to the larger role that exclusion from credit access has played for women of color than for White
women, the importance of class in mediating both reliance on and access to credit, and the impact
of stigmatization on perceived creditworthiness.
This analysis of U.S. credit market inequality draws on two theoretical foundations. On one
hand, it draws from the political economy tradition and from stratification economics specifically
(Darity Jr., Hamilton, and Stewart 2014). Discrimination in economic analysis is often seen as the
direct or indirect result of idiosyncratic preferences. Stratification economics suggests that racial
(and, by extension, gender and intersectional) inequality results from the exercise of power by
dominant groups in order to maintain their group benefits. In many of the empirical chapters that
follow, I follow authors such as Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty (2013) in arguing that financial
actors were often able to extract rents from predominantly minority communities and from female-
headed households by leveraging and maintaining existing economic inequality.
At the same time, it is clear that modern credit markets and women’s position within those
markets are complicated. In many segments of those markets, lending may be largely “gender
blind,” and all forms of inequality will not be salient for all women in all contexts. Moreover,
I do not assume that individual agency is completely eclipsed by gender hierarchies. In these
senses, I draw heavily from the “structures of constraint” approach of Folbre (1994). Folbre argues
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that the effects of gender, race, and other group memberships in society cannot be understood
from either a purely individualistic perspective (e.g., neoclassical economic theory) nor a purely
structural perspective (e.g., Marxian theory). Group membership does not place members in iron-
clad roles, but instead places them within certain structures of constraint–combinations of norms,
assets, preferences, and rules that limit the ways in which members can exercise their agency. The
empirical work in this study is premised on this middle ground. While the motivating theories
often draw implicitly or explicitly on the individualistic framework of static or dynamic utility
optimization, I discuss where structures of constraint may enter into the analysis by influencing
perceived costs, benefits, or choice sets. Such an approach is critical to recognizing the role of
variations in social power without attributing to women only a passive role in their own economic
lives.
1.3 Overview of the study
In the three chapters that follow, I present an empirical analysis of these forms of gender in-
equality in specific credit markets. Each chapter roughly corresponds to one of the three stages,
although the recursive relationship makes a full distinction between stages somewhat artificial and
incomplete.
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of exclusion from banking services on households’ financial
coping strategies and explores variation in this impact by gender and race. Beginning in the 1990s,
rapid growth in alternative financial services such as payday lending prompted greater interest
in identifying households without bank accounts and bringing them into the financial mainstream.
Much of this work assumes that alternative financial services are the only short-term borrowing op-
tions available to unbanked households. However, borrowing from friends and family, or informal
borrowing, is one widely used alternative to high-cost finance that has been underexamined in the
financial exclusion literature. Informal borrowing can incur long-run costs in terms of households’
financial security. Evidence from the sociology literature suggests that the use of such borrowing
and its costs may in turn be unequally distributed by gender, race, and class. This study uses data
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on individuals’ strategies for coping with an emergency expenditure to identify predictors of infor-
mal borrowing use and to investigate whether informal borrowing is related to financial exclusion.
The direct and latent relationships between these two outcomes are estimated using a recursive
bivariate probit model. Respondents who are younger, have lower levels of education, and have
larger households are more likely to use informal borrowing. After controlling for these charac-
teristics, Black women are twice as likely as White respondents to use informal borrowing as their
sole coping strategy, and similar gaps exist for other women of color. The results also suggest that
reliance on informal borrowing is jointly determined with financial exclusion. This latent relation-
ship varies with income and by race and ethnicity. Lower relative costs of informal borrowing in
communities with limited bank access may help explain this variation.
Chapter 3 focuses on educational borrowing in the United States and seeks to better understand
variation in high school students’ hesitancy to take on student loan debt, known as “debt aversion.”
The explosive increase in tuition costs since the 1970s and declines in grant-based financial aid
have made student borrowing a key requirement and, therefore, potential barrier to college enroll-
ment. In the study, I explore the determinants and impacts of debt aversion, where debt aversion is
measured using an ordinal willingness to borrow variable, unlike previous work. I apply a propen-
sity score matching strategy to estimate the effects of debt aversion on the college choices of high
school students independent of factors affecting students’ valuation of college and their ability to
pay for college. More debt-averse students are less likely to enroll in college, borrow less if they do
enroll, and generally attend lower cost colleges. The second half of the analysis splits the sample
by gender and by race and ethnicity. Despite a long-run trend of growing female enrollment in
U.S. universities, the results suggest that women and Black students are more likely to report a
low willingness to borrow than other similarly-situated students. Strong debt aversion results in
lower college enrollment only for men and White students, while women and Black and Hispanic
students appear to respond by reducing borrowing more than other groups. For women, this re-
duction may result from greater parental financial support, but the same does not appear to be the
case for Black and Hispanic students. The debt aversion that is observed among female students
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and students of color in the sample may have important implications for their college outcomes, as
some of these students may be accommodating their debt preferences in ways that are more or less
conducive to college success.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I broaden my focus to gendered trends in both mortgage and educational
lending. As discussed in Section 1.1, the period between approximately 2002 to 2008 was char-
acterized by a dramatic increase in household indebtedness that was driven largely by the housing
bubble and a corresponding expansion of subprime lending. At the same time, households were
increasingly taking on educational debt, with an acceleration of that growth during the recession
and early recovery. While such trends were seemingly widespread, these two studies test the hy-
pothesis that female-headed households as well as households with Black or Hispanic household
heads may have experienced greater growth in debt during the credit expansion period and greater
persistence in that debt post-crisis. Variation in household financial fragility is an underexamined
dimension of economic inequality and increasingly relevant as consumer borrowing returns to pre-
crisis levels. Evidence suggests that deregulated mortgage lenders may have targeted economically
marginalized households as part of efforts to increase originations of high-cost loans, while grow-
ing reliance on borrowing to cope with market risk may have driven rising consumer indebtedness
among these households post-crisis. In Chapter 4, published in the Forum for Social Economics,
I use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to test for evidence of differential trends, with
specific focus on female- and male-headed households. Chapter 5 expands this analysis to address
differences by race and ethnicity and to incorporate additional measures of financial fragility us-
ing data from the PSID. While the evidence of predatory mortgage lending is mixed, results from
both datasets suggest that consumer debt–in levels and relative to income–rose more post-crisis for
female-headed households and for households with Black household heads. This disparity appears
to be primarily driven by rising student debt.
These four chapters address at times disparate areas of credit markets with two goals in mind.
First, the results seek to shed light on a broad landscape of women’s borrowing experiences that
have heretofore gone relatively unexplored in the economics literature. No single description of
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women’s position in credit markets holds for all types of borrowing, each of which has a different
institutional structure. Second, these chapters also seek to be of interest for the broader household
and educational finance literatures. The policy recommendations that come out of these studies are
intended to be relevant not only to women but to all consumers. For instance, a better understanding
of the implications of debt aversion can inform whether student outcomes would benefit from a
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Figure 1.1: Household and non-profit organization consumer credit and mortgage liabilities as percentage
of U.S. disposable income


















































Figure 1.2: Average number of credit card accounts per capita (non-institutionalized population)
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED Economic Data
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Figure 1.3: Interconnected forms of gender inequality in credit markets
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Chapter 2
The Relationship between Informal Borrowing and
Financial Exclusion: Locating the Invisible
Unbanked at the Intersections of Race, Gender, and
Class
2.1 Introduction
Without access to mainstream banks and credit unions, the unbanked end up using
fringe financial service entities to conduct routine transactions... Without traditional
credit, individuals are vulnerable to exploitation by abusive lenders offering high-cost
mortgages, high-interest short-term loans, and very expensive rent-to-own products.
–Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, May 2, 2002, Bringing More Unbanked Americans into
the Financial Mainstream: Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, a dramatic expansion in the volume of check cash-
ing outlets, payday lenders, and other alternative financial services prompted growing interest in
financial inclusion (Carr and Schuetz 2001). Policymakers and researchers sought to identify “un-
banked” households, or households that do not own bank accounts, and to bring these households
into the financial mainstream. Despite misgivings about the value of bank services to low-to-
moderate income households following the 2008 Financial Crisis (Servon 2017), financial inclu-
sion continues to be recognized as an important policy goal (Weissman 2018). Advocates for such
policies note that unbanked households that rely on alternative financial services incur larger fees
per transaction and face higher interest rates than those with access to bank services.4
In this discourse on financial inclusion, the options available to households are framed as a
choice between bank and alternative financial services, as the above quote from Senator Sarbanes
illustrates. This dichotomy is a reasonable description of the market for transactions services: Most
4There is some debate over the actual cost of alternative financial transaction services for consumers, as discussed
in more detail in Section 2.2.1. Some authors note that competition has led to the emergence of new and lower-cost
services, such as free check cashing at grocery stores (Dunham 2001; Stanley and Bhattachara 2008).
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households without bank accounts must rely on check cashing services and money orders to cash
payroll checks and pay bills, either through fringe lenders or at grocery stores and other businesses
that increasingly provide transaction services.
However, households’ options for short-term credit are more complicated than a choice be-
tween bank and alternative sources. In particular, this overlooks borrowing from friends and
family–also called “informal borrowing”–as a means of satisfying short-term credit needs.5 In-
formal borrowing is far from being an infrequently used coping strategy. By some estimates, as
many as 95% of low-to-moderate income households lend to or borrow from friends and family
over the course of a year (Morduch and Schneider 2015), and households without sufficient sav-
ings are as likely to rely on kin and extended networks in an emergency as to use alternative or
bank credit (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 2011).
As a result, a sizable group of unbanked and other liquidity-constrained individuals who rely
neither on alternative nor on formal banking services are “invisible” in policy debates (Lusardi et
al. 2011). This omission matters because, like alternative finance, reliance on informal borrowing
incurs significant long-run costs, including the effects of limited credit histories and lack of access
to secure savings instruments (Barr, 2004). Informal borrowing may also incur costs at the level of
the family or community. The sociology literature points to restrictions on social mobility within
neighborhoods or kinship networks as a result of reciprocal support expectations similar to those
that often accompany informal borrowing and lending (Bond and Townsend 1996; Domínguez and
Watkins 2003).
Moreover, evidence suggests that informal credit use is characterized by both racial and gender
gaps. Informal borrowing has been most commonly documented within immigrant communities
and communities of color (Bond and Townsend 1996; Morduch and Schneider 2015; Stack 1974),
and women and female-headed households are more likely to use network resources to cope with
5Some work on financial inclusion refers to any use of non-bank transaction or credit services–including alterna-
tive financial services–as “informal finance” (e.g., Stanley and Bhattachara 2008). In this paper, “informal borrowing”
will be used to refer exclusively to borrowing from friends and family as in Bond and Townsend (1996), Chase,
Gjertson, and Collins (2011), and Lee and Persson (2016).
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economic shocks, especially when “disconnected” from formal support systems such as cash as-
sistance programs (Domínguez and Watkins 2003; Edin and Lein 1997; Hogan, Hao, and Parish
1990; Seefeldt and Sandstrom 2015; Semuels 2015). These gaps represent important forms of in-
equality in access to financial services and may reproduce existing economic inequality, such as
low levels of wealth accumulation among women and Black and Hispanic households (Darity Jr.,
et al. 2018; Schmidt and Sevak 2006).
This paper contributes to a growing body of work that attempts to paint a clearer picture of
low-to-moderate income households’ financial strategies and their relationship to financial exclu-
sion (Lusardi et al. 2011; Morduch and Schneider 2015; Rhine et al. 2006). I pool data from
four recent waves of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking,
which elicits information on households’ financial situation and on the coping strategies that they
would use to deal with an unexpected emergency expense, including formal credit products, al-
ternative credit, non-loan options, and informal borrowing. Using this data, I investigate which
households are most likely to use informal borrowing in the case of an emergency expenditure 1)
as their sole substitute for other coping strategies and 2) as a complement to other coping strate-
gies. Households that rely solely on informal borrowing may do so because they have few other
low-cost coping strategies available, such as savings or traditional bank credit. At the same time,
if friends and family have funds to lend, informal borrowing is often a preferable alternative to
high-cost strategies such as selling assets or using a payday loan.
I also examine whether unbanked households are more likely to use informal borrowing as
a coping strategy, both as a direct result of being unbanked and as a result of latent constraints,
perceptions, or neighborhood characteristics that influence both outcomes. I follow Rhine et al.
(2006) and Stanley and Bhattachara (2008) in modeling the household decision to use informal
borrowing and its bank account ownership status as jointly determined using a recursive bivariate
probit analysis. If use of informal borrowing is directly or latently linked to unbanked status,
then informal borrowers represent a group of unbanked households that are underexamined in the
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current work on financial inclusion yet that incur many of the same long-run costs as households
that rely on alternative finance, in addition to possible effects at the community level.
The results suggest that households that make use of informal borrowing with or without other
coping strategies are younger, are more likely to be single, have lower levels of education, and
have lower household income on average. These factors as well as not being a homeowner and
having high income volatility are predictive of being unbanked. Black and Hispanic respondents
are disproportionately likely to be unbanked even after controlling for observable characteristics.
Exclusive reliance on informal borrowing to cope with an emergency expenditure is more strongly
correlated with certain measures of economic disadvantage (e.g., low levels of educational attain-
ment) than use of informal borrowing in combination with other strategies.
My analysis also brings attention to the unbanked and informal borrowers at intersections of
identity that have been previously underexamined in order to understand how financial exclusion
may reflect and reproduce structural inequality. Black women and other Non-Hispanic, Non-White
women specifically are most likely to plan on using informal borrowing as their primary emergency
expenditure coping strategy. Specifically, Black women are about twice as likely to rely on infor-
mal borrowing exclusively, compared to White respondents, and they are more than three times
more likely to jointly be unbanked and rely on informal borrowing than White respondents. These
gaps primarily exist among lower income households, and there is suggestive evidence that women
of color in higher income groups are disproportionately likely to be unbanked.
Interestingly, unbanked households are no more likely to rely solely on informal borrowing
than banked households, ceteris paribus. In fact, the majority of individuals who would solely use
informal borrowing in the case of a $400 expense have a savings or checking account. This result
suggests that there is a large and unrecognized group of the “underbanked” among informal bor-
rowers, a finding that challenges the conventional understanding of the underbanked as those who
use high-cost alternative finance despite having bank accounts. Unbanked households are more
likely to use informal borrowing as a complement to other coping strategies than banked house-
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holds, possibly because households with fewer mainstream financial resources such as savings and
bank credit are more likely to bundle strategies of any kind.
By contrast, I find statistically significant latent correlation between sole use of informal bor-
rowing and unbanked status. This correlation points to the presence of unobserved variation in
constraints or preferences that make households more likely both to rely on informal borrowing
and to be unbanked. This latent correlation is primarily accounted for by Black respondents in
the survey and by lower income households. Importantly, accounting for discouragement (a re-
spondent’s belief that she would be rejected for bank credit if she were to apply) as a proxy for a
respondent’s subjective view of banks does not explain this latent correlation. After considering
alternative explanations such as variation in financial literacy, I argue that this latent variation may
reflect lower social costs of or greater access to network resources in low-income communities,
which at the same time have more limited access to bank branches.
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin by presenting a brief overview of the theory and qualita-
tive evidence on financial exclusion and informal borrowing from economics and sociology. I then
introduce the dataset, describe the empirical strategy, and present summary statistics that are sug-
gestive of gender and racial gaps in informal borrowing use. Regression results, robustness checks,
and discussion follow. I conclude by considering the implications of the results for research and
policy.
2.2 Background and literature review
2.2.1 Financial exclusion and alternative financial services
The literature on financial exclusion conventionally identifies three groups of households. The
“unbanked” consist of households that have neither a checking nor a savings account at a formal
financial institution such as a bank, thrift, or credit union–generally referred to using “bank” as
an umbrella term (FDIC 2009). The “underbanked” may have a checking and/or savings account
but continue to make use of alternative financial services such as check cashing services, payday
lenders, and title lenders (high-cost lending that uses the borrower’s vehicle title as collateral). The
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remaining households are considered “fully banked”: They have a checking or savings account
and do not use alternative financial services.
The exact proportion of American households that are unbanked and underbanked varies greatly
by demographic and socioeconomic group. Recent estimates suggest that about 7% of households
are unbanked and another 20% are underbanked, but the proportion of unbanked households ranges
from only 3% of White household to 18% of Black households (FDIC 2015). Younger households
are also disproportionately likely to be unbanked (FDIC 2015). These figures have fallen since the
1990s and early 2000s, when as many as 9% of households were unbanked (Rhine et al. 2006).
Legislative actions that sought to reduce the number of unbanked and underbanked households may
have contributed to this decline. The Electronic Funds Transfer provision of the 1996 Debt Col-
lection Improvement Act required most federal government payments to occur electronically and
thereby encouraged participation in the financial mainstream (Prescott and Tatar 1999). Similarly,
the Community Reinvestment Act provided incentives for banks to lend in low-income communi-
ties that had previously been regarded as unprofitable customer bases (Kroszner 2008).
Since the 2008 Financial Crisis, the discourse around financial inclusion in the U.S. has shifted.
The central role played by mainstream banks and financial institutions in subprime lending, ques-
tionable underwriting practices, and opaque fee structures have all raised questions about the value
of bank services to low-to-moderate income households (Baradaran 2015; Rexrode and Gross-
man 2014). Waning confidence in banks may have contributed to a temporary decline in account
ownership following the 2008 Financial Crisis that was only partly explained by the effects of
the Financial Crisis on household incomes and employment (FDIC 2015; Servon 2017). A grow-
ing body of recent work thus calls for changes to bank practices (e.g., Baradaran 2015; Dymski,
Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013; Morduch and Schneider 2015), and some see alternative financial
services as the lesser of two evils (Servon 2017).
Surveys suggest that households which choose to operate without bank accounts generally do
so in order to minimize short-run costs. Although the costs per transaction for check cashing and
money orders are typically higher than the costs for the same services at a bank, consumers who
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face a high probability of overdrafts and who risk falling below minimum account balance require-
ments may prefer these predictable fixed costs (Morduch and Schneider 2015; Servon 2017). As a
result, households with low or volatile incomes are the most unlikely to hold bank accounts (Carr
and Schuetz 2001; FDIC 2015; Servon 2017; Stanley and Bhattachara 2008). Non-pecuniary costs
and distrust of conventional financial service providers also discourage account ownership. Nearly
11% of respondents in a 2015 FDIC survey responded that they are unbanked primarily because
they “don’t trust banks” and another 3.4% cited privacy concerns. The same report suggests that
a disproportionate number of unbanked households feel that banks are not “interested in serving
households like theirs” (FDIC 2015, 3).
Other households face constraints that make it difficult or impossible to be banked. Households
with accounts previously closed for reasons such as insufficient funds may simply be prevented
from opening accounts (Barr 2004), and the paucity of branches in low-income areas is well-
documented (Avery et al. 1997; Baradaran 2015). Bank closures after the 2008 Financial Crisis
may have contributed to growth in the number of unbanked households (Morgan 2016). Despite
the growing use of online banking services, about 28% of bank account owners continue to access
their accounts primarily by visiting a bank branch (FDIC 2015).
Unbanked households and households with poor credit histories or low incomes have limited
access to bank services. Alternative financial services provide non-bank substitutes, generally at
higher prices than the equivalent bank services. Unbanked and underbanked households are more
likely to use alternative financial services, although the relationship varies by the type of service
(Barr 2004; Morgan-Cross and Klawitter 2011; Rhine et al. 2006; Stanley and Bhattachara 2008).
Alternative financial transaction services are those that facilitate payments and receipts, including
check cashing and money order services (Morgan-Cross and Klawitter 2011). As many as 45%
of unbanked households that receive income via check or money order make use of non-bank
institutions such as check cashers to cash checks, and 35% of unbanked households use money
orders to pay bills (FDIC 2015). Alternative credit services provide high-cost, short-term credit.
These services include payday lenders as well as pawnshops and title lenders, and their use is
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much more common among unbanked and underbanked households. About 32% of underbanked
households use credit that is made up exclusively of non-bank credit or a mix of bank and non-bank
credit (FDIC 2015). Unbanked households cannot make use of certain alternative credit services
that require a bank account (e.g., payday loans). Despite this restriction, the use of other forms of
alternative credit remains high among the unbanked. About 16% of unbanked households (about
67% of all unbanked households with some credit) hold exclusively non-bank credit compared to
14.4% of the underbanked (20% of all underbanked households with credit) (FDIC 2015).
The evidence on the total costs of alternative financial services is mixed. By some estimates,
alternative credit and transaction services together cost households hundreds of dollars per year for
services that are often offered for free to bank account holders. Some work suggests that check
cashing and bill-paying fees alone can cost $250 to $500 per year, and the APR for alternative
credit can exceed 400% (Barr 2004; Carr and Schuetz 2001; Snarr Jr. 2002). The overall costs
of alternative financial services have been estimated at up to $15,000 over a lifetime (Stanley
and Bhattachara 2008). Others suggest that the costs of alternative financial transaction services
are much lower than generally believed. Using data from a survey of low-to-moderate income
neighborhoods in two urban areas, Dunham (2001) reports that only 17% of unbanked households
spent more than $100 per year for check cashing and money order services. The relative costs
of alternative financial transaction services may be falling as the supply of these services have
increased and as conventional bank fees have continued to grow (Servon 2017).
Notwithstanding the debate over the financial costs of alternative financial services, concerns
remain that the unbanked and underbanked may face additional costs. Most importantly, those who
rely on non-bank credit have no opportunity to develop a credit history (Barr 2004; Stanley and
Bhattachara 2008). Using credit cards to regularly pay for purchases allows consumers to develop
a credit history, while paying rent or utility bills on time is not reported in credit scores. Even if
customers can meet their short-term credit needs through alternative sources of credit, long-run
credit for large investments such as homes generally requires a bank loan and a robust credit score,
and credit scores are often used in employment and leasing decisions.
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2.2.2 Informal borrowing
In the literature on financial inclusion, informal borrowing–or borrowing from friends or family–
occupies an unusual space. It is frequently mentioned as a coping mechanism in the case of an
emergency expenditure, alongside other alternatives such as savings, bank borrowing, and alterna-
tive credit services. Yet informal borrowing is rarely subject to systematic empirical analysis in
the same way as these other options. For instance, in the 2015 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked
and Underbanked Households, the analysis of household credit use includes data on “bank credit”
and “non-bank credit” but excludes informal borrowing.
Informal borrowing is a broadly defined, fluid, and highly heterogenous financial tool, which
may help explain its omission from empirical analysis. Most applied uses of the term include
both friends and family as possible lenders, although empirics suggest that the latter is much more
common overall (Lusardi et al. 2011). Informal borrowing can be unstructured, with little in the
way of credit terms. Informal loans often have no set date of repayment and no interest fees,
blurring the line between lending and gift giving (Morduch and Schneider 2015). On the other
hand, more structured informal borrowing systems exist. The most prominent in the U.S. are
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), in which a group of participants contributes
periodically to a pool of funds and each person take turns borrowing from it (Leyshon and Thrift
1996). Expectations of repayment are strict and enforced through social proximity (Besley, Coate,
and Loury 1993; Morduch and Schneider 2015; Mushinski 1999).
Despite the multiplicity of forms which informal borrowing may take, its prevalence as a tool
for short-run borrowing is one reason that it deserves close attention alongside others like alter-
native financial services. In fact, survey data suggest that informal borrowing of all types is quite
common, particularly in certain communities. One survey of low-to-moderate income households
finds that 9% of respondents participated in a ROSCA, primarily migrant households, and a re-
markable 95% of respondents reported engaging in informal borrowing, lending, or both over the
past year (Morduch and Schneider 2015). In an examination of household coping strategies when
faced with a $2,000 emergency expense, Lusardi et al. (2011) find that a third of respondents who
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say they could cope with the expense would do so by borrowing from friends or family, making it
the second most widely cited coping mechanism after drawing on savings. Such borrowing is also
common among those who would rely on a combination of strategies (e.g., savings plus informal
borrowing).
An important pre-condition for adopting informal borrowing as a coping strategy is the ex-
istence of a network through which funds are available. These networks have received formal
attention primarily in the sociology literature, where they are broadly termed “survival networks”
(Domínguez and Watkins 2003) or “private safety nets” (Seefeldt and Sandstrom 2015). In addi-
tion to borrowed (or gifted) funds, survival networks provide other forms of social support, such as
childcare services and access to information or job opportunities (Domínguez and Watkins 2003;
Edin and Lein 1997). Larger networks mean that more resources are available for sharing (Högnäs
2010), and the strength of kinship ties can also be a determining factor of the existence of support
networks (Sarkisian and Gerstel 2004). Social networks sometimes extend to geographically ex-
tensive spaces through kinship networks, but most of the literature has associated them with dense,
urban communities. One notable exception is Nelson (2000), who finds qualitative evidence of
reliance on extensive social networks among low-income women in rural Vermont.
Consistent with the fluid terms of informal borrowing discussed above, survival networks are
characterized by what Högnäs (2010) terms “generalized exchange” rather than dollar-for-dollar or
strictly in-kind repayment expectations. Givers and receivers tend to share an understanding that
some form of support will be rendered in the future in return for the loan or service provided–i.e.,
when the current giver is in need. The social proximity of lenders and borrowers in these networks
enables the screening of potential recipients and the enforcement of reciprocity (Högnäs 2010).
Conditional on funds being available from friends or family, theory and empirics point to sev-
eral reasons why households might turn to informal borrowing rather than or in addition to other
borrowing methods. First, informal borrowing has lower financial costs than both alternative and
bank credit–even zero in some cases. As a result, banked households that have access to bank
credit may turn to informal borrowing, similar to “underbanked” households that use alternative
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financial services. Many borrowers turn to friends and family even when they have not exhausted
credit cards and other credit products (Morduch and Schneider 2015). On the other hand, bor-
rowers may lack access to bank credit because they are unbanked, have used all available bank
credit, or are discouraged from applying for additional credit, believing that they will be rejected.
Reliance on informal borrowing is associated with various measures of “economic disadvantage,”
including low wealth accumulation, unemployment, and low educational attainment (Lusardi et
al. 2011), factors that are also linked to unbanked status (FDIC 2015; Rhine et al. 2006). One
long-acknowledged strength of informal borrowing, especially in the development literature, has
been its ability to deal with asymmetric information (Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981; Lee and Persson
2016). Households that are poor credit risks on paper may in fact be creditworthy based on behav-
iors observed only by friends and family. Informal lenders can also leverage the effects of social
proximity and pressure to ensure repayment, as has been widely recognized in the development
literature on microcredit (Besley, Coate, and Loury 1993).
Despite the advantages, informal borrowing is not typically costless. Like borrowers who rely
on alternative finance, those who rely exclusively on informal borrowing have few opportunities
to develop or improve their credit history. Moreover, informal borrowing may create network
effects that reproduce poverty within low-to-moderate income neighborhoods. The sociology liter-
ature has debated whether the short-run support provided by survival networks outweighs potential
harm (e.g., see Domínguez and Watkins 2003; Freeman and Dodson 2014). Engaging in informal
borrowing creates reciprocal expectations of support that later put strain on the same households
that benefited from network funds (Högnäs 2010). Chiteji and Hamilton (2002) document these
tangible economic costs of financial assistance within kinship networks. They find that part of
the persistent wealth gap between Black and White individuals in the U.S. can be explained by
differences in the provisioning of financial support to lower income family members by race and
ethnicity.
Interviews have suggested that psychological costs can also accompany the lack of privacy
that comes with asking friends or family for borrowed funds, compared with the more impersonal
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process of applying for bank credit. Nelson (2000) describes subjects in her study as experiencing
self-reported “shame and humiliation” in the course of making use of support systems (313). In
the context of small business borrowing, Lee and Persson (2016) argue that informal financial
arrangements are less common than their low financial costs would lead one to expect partly due
to the uncomfortable social proximity of lenders. Business owners who borrow from friends or
family are more risk averse and have greater fear of failure due to the heightened emotional and
relational costs of failure.
Finally, there are limits to the availability of informal borrowing. Much as alternative credit
services cater mostly to short-run rather than long-run credit needs, friends and family are more
often able to provide small loans, not the larger loans needed to invest in, for example, a home,
car, or other large expense. The Morduch and Schneider (2015) study of low-to-moderate income
households finds that the median household in most of their survey areas borrowed about $1,500
a year from family and friends, a finding supported by other case studies (Bond and Townsend
1996).
2.2.3 Race, gender, and financial informality
With few exceptions (e.g., Bond and Townsend 1996; Lusardi et al. 2011), the economics lit-
erature provides scant evidence on how reliance on informal borrowing varies by race and gender
in the United States. By contrast, research has repeatedly shown that race and ethnicity are rele-
vant predictors of other indicators of financial exclusion even after controlling for other relevant
characteristics such as socioeconomic status. Black and Hispanic households are more likely to
be unbanked (Dunham 2001; FDIC 2015; Rhine et al. 2006) and to use alternative financial ser-
vices with or without a bank account (Carr and Schuetz 2001; Morgan-Cross and Klawitter 2011).
Low banked rates in communities of color may result from limited access to bank branches, ex-
pectations of discrimination, and documentation concerns (e.g., Rhine et al. 2006; Stanley and
Bhattachara 2008). To the extent that financial inclusion is beneficial to financial security, these
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trends by race and ethnicity may help explain pervasive economic inequality by race, such as low
wealth accumulation among Black households (Darity Jr., et al. 2018).
Less attention has been paid to gender in the existing literature on financial exclusion, and the
work that does exist has generally found few differences in outcomes. Most evidence suggests that
women are no more likely than men to be unbanked or use alternative financial services (Klawit-
ter and Fletschner 2011; Rhine et al. 2006), although Klawitter and Fletschner (2011) find some
heterogeneity in the determinants of unbanked status by gender within households. The paucity
of gender differences in financial inclusion is somewhat unexpected: Women have significantly
higher poverty rates and lower levels of wealth accumulation than men (Schmidt and Sevak 2006;
Stevens 2011), and their greater responsibilities for care may increase the transaction costs (e.g.,
time) associated with accessing a local bank branch (Turner and Grieco 1998).
However, many studies do not consider inequality in access to financial services at the intersec-
tion of race and gender, and the sociology literature gives good reason to believe that intersectional
inequalities may be particularly prevalent among those who rely on informal borrowing as an al-
ternative to bank credit. Lusardi et al. (2011) find that women are more likely to use friends and
family as a coping strategy, no more likely to rely on alternative finance, and less likely to sell
belongings. It is not clear whether these results hold for both White women and women of color.
Social networks have repeatedly been found to be an important resource in low-income commu-
nities and particularly for women in these communities, possibly serving to facilitate their use of
informal borrowing. In a seminal ethnographic study on the topic, Stack (1974) argues that low-
income African-American families are more likely to rely on a support system in which norms of
reciprocity provide insurance against income shocks. Edin and Lein (1997) examine the coping
strategies of single mothers in the context of 1996 TANF welfare reform. They find that these
female-headed households would cope with low income flows and shrinking welfare benefits in
part by seeking out assistance from friends and family.
Sarkisian and Gerstel (2004) investigate differences in network support among Black and
White men and women, while critiquing both sides of what they term the “superorganization vs
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disorganization” debate regarding Black family structure. They note that researchers have tended
to argue either that extensive kinship networks are particularly robust and important support sys-
tems for Black families or that these networks are weak and ineffective. These extremes either
“romanticize or pathologize” Black families and paint an exceedingly homogeneous picture of
Black family ties (815). Empirical work by Sarkisian and Gerstel (2004) points to a more com-
plicated story in which Black family ties are more conducive to certain forms of non-monetary
support (e.g., child care) than White families but less conducive to monetary or emotional support.
Equally importantly, the authors find that gender differences are significant both within and across
race, with Black women being more likely to provide child care, transportation, and household
work support than White women.
Independent of differences in use of network resources by race and gender, existing structural
inequalities may push women of color into non-bank alternatives of which informal borrowing is
one option. It has been widely documented that women and single women specifically experience
greater financial insecurity. They are more likely to report difficulties coping with an unexpected
expenditure (Lusardi et al. 2011), have lower wealth accumulation and savings (Schmidt and Sevak
2006), higher rates of poverty (Pressman 2003; Stevens 2011), and greater exposure to expendi-
ture shocks such as caregiving responsibilities (Bahn and Weller 2017). These factors together
suggest that women are more likely to experience an unexpected expenditure and to rely on coping
strategies beyond savings.
2.3 Data and methods
2.3.1 Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking
In this analysis, I pool data from the 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017 Surveys of Household Eco-
nomics and Decisionmaking (SHED) conducted by the Federal Reserve.6 The survey includes less
detailed financial information about households than the longer-running and more widely used Sur-
6The 2014 survey omits a key control variable of interest (income volatility) and is subsequently omitted from the
analysis.
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vey of Consumer Finances (SCF). However, the SHED offers significant advantages over the SCF
for the research questions of interest due to its novel sampling design and survey questions that
elicit information about respondents’ household head status as well as credit use and borrowing
decisions.
The 2013 SHED sampling design produced a nationally representative sample with weights to
provide correction for non-response bias. Subsequent survey waves were not nationally representa-
tive due to purposeful oversampling and the rotating panel design. Each new sample included 1) a
fresh random sample of respondents, 2) a re-interview sample, and 3) a “lower income oversample”
(consisting of households with annual household income of less than or equal to $40,000). There
is no overlap between the oversample in one year and the re-interview group in the next year. The
lower income oversample makes the SHED a valuable dataset for understanding a broader range
of financial decision-making in comparison to the SCF, which oversamples higher income house-
holds. Sample weights are applied in all regressions and analyses using Stata 14’s Svy module in
order to account for the SHED’s rotating panel structure and oversampling.7
The SHED questionnaire also provides more information on gender variation in credit use than
previous surveys. The ability to make gender inferences is limited in most household finance
surveys. For instance, the SCF defines the household head using fixed rules based on household
structure, gender, and (in the case of same-sex couples) age. For households with two cohabiting
or married opposite-sex adults, the household head is defined as the male by default. At the same
time, all data on borrowing outcomes are defined at the household level in the SCF, so gender can
only be meaningfully related to outcomes for single-headed households.
The SHED therefore differs from the SCF in two important ways. First, respondents are not
necessarily household head. This introduces potential variation in the relationship between respon-
dent demographics and household financial choices. Second, the definition of household head is
left completely open to respondents. As a result of these two characteristics of the survey, the un-
7I do not explicitly use clustered standard errors in the analysis. Instead, the effect of repeated observations of the
same sampling unit (households that appear multiple times in the rotating panel) is accounted for with the Stata 14
Svyset command. The “Case ID” of each individual is used to specify the primary sampling unit.
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weighted sample pooled across all four survey years is approximately 50% female. Women are less
likely to report being married or cohabiting than male respondents (56.5% compared to 64.6%) and
among this group, 87.3% of women consider themselves “household head,” compared to 92.4%
of men. Surprisingly, there is greater variation in household head status among respondents who
report being neither married nor cohabiting (i.e., widowed, divorced, separated, or never married).
More than a quarter of these respondents do not consider themselves head of household (27.1% of
men and 23.6% of women).
The question of how respondents interpret the term “household head” is an important one that
may be relevant to the meaning of the regression results. Given that respondents are asked to com-
plete a survey on household finances, respondents may assume that household head status implies
self-perceived responsibility for financial decision-making. The 2013 SHED Survey includes ques-
tions eliciting the respondent’s self-reported responsibility for financial decision-making in two
specific areas: “paying monthly bills” and “managing the household’s savings and investments.”
As shown in Table 2.1, household head status appears to be related to financial decision-making
responsibility, although there is some asymmetry in the effects. Household heads are generally
much more likely to report having “all or almost all” the financial responsibility, while non-heads
are more likely to report that these responsibilities are “shared equally” or that they have “none or
almost none” of the responsibility. Single, widowed, or separated respondents show the clearest
distinctions in financial responsibility by household head status.
As a result of the substantial variation in household head status across household structures, I
include both dual- and single-headed households in the main analytical sample, allowing for male
and female household heads in each category. The literature surveyed above suggests that gender
variation may be more meaningful in the context of single-headed households, but I do not impose
this restriction. However, as a robustness check, I consider specifications that restrict the sample
to respondents who consider themselves head, regardless of household structure or marital status.
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2.3.2 Variables of interest
In each survey year, the SHED includes a question that elicits respondents’ plans for coping
with a hypothetical emergency expense. Respondents are asked the following and provided with
the following non-exclusive options:
Suppose that you have an emergency expense that costs $400. Based on your current
financial situation, how would you pay for this expense? If you would use more than
one method to cover this expense, please select all that apply.
1. Put it on my credit card and pay it off in full at the next statement
2. Put it on my credit card and pay it off over time
3. With the money currently in my checking/savings account or with cash
4. Using money from a bank loan or line of credit
5. By borrowing from a friend or family member
6. Using a payday loan, deposit advance, or overdraft
7. By selling something
8. I wouldn’t be able to pay for the expense right now
9. Other8
I aggregate and label these options as follows:
• Options 1, 2, 4: Respondent would use a bank credit product.
• Option 3: Respondent would use savings.
• Option 5: Respondent would rely on informal borrowing.
8The freeform comments entered by respondents who selected this option is not available in the public version of
the SHED dataset. While it is not clear what respondents mean when they select “other,” one notable omission that is
included as an option in other empirical papers is “working additional hours” (Lusardi et al. 2011).
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• Option 6: Respondent would use an alternative credit product.9
• Option 7: Respondent would sell an asset or possession.
• Option 8: Respondent would be unable to cover this income shortfall.
• Option 9: Respondent would use any other coping strategy.
About 15% of the full sample selects Option 8: They would be unable to pay for the emergency
expenditure. This proportion is greater among Black respondents (28.7%), Hispanic respondents
(19.2%), and the lowest-income households (44.7% of households earning less than $15,000 per
year). Option 8 should imply a negative response to all other options, but many respondents who
report that they would be unable to cover the expense do select other options. The fewest (about
2% of all “unable” respondents) indicate that they would take out a bank loan, while the largest
portion (18%) would use informal borrowing. Respondents who are unable to cope with a shock
presumably face constraints such that they cannot choose between coping mechanisms, and theory
does not provide a clear indication of how to interpret contradictory responses. As a result, I
omit all respondents who selected Option 8 from the final analysis.10 I test a specification in
Section 2.5.1 which includes respondents who would be unable to cover this income shortfall as a
robustness check.
Each survey year also includes information on the banked status of the respondent’s household.
The SHED asks respondents whether the household (“you and/or your spouse/partner”) currently
has a checking, savings, or money market account. Although money market accounts are not
typically considered in the determination of banked status, it is unlikely that a household would
lack a checking or savings account but hold a money market account. I consider all households
that indicate that they do not have a checking, savings, or money market account to be “unbanked.”
9Option 6 conflates strategies that are traditionally termed alternative credit products (payday loans and deposit
advances) with strategies that would fall under the definition of a bank service (overdraft). Despite this aggregation, I
label the option “alternative credit products” to the extent that the options included are all high-cost relative to formal
credit products.
10I also designate respondents who responded negatively to all of the available options as being unable to cope with
the emergency expenditure.
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2.3.3 The “pecking order” of household coping strategies
In the context of mutually non-exclusive choices, it is important to distinguish between re-
spondents who indicate that they would rely exclusively on a single strategy to deal with a $400
emergency expenditure and respondents who indicate that they would use this strategy in com-
bination with one or more others. As discussed in Lusardi et al. (2011), households that choose
one coping strategy when faced with an expenditure shock differ in systematic ways from those
who choose several. Choosing one strategy can be associated with financial security. For instance,
households can choose to simply spend out of savings if they have sufficient savings on hand,
while more financially insecure households may have to use a bundle of alternative strategies to
cope with a single shock (Lusardi et al. 2011). On the other hand, using one strategy alone can also
be symptomatic of constraints, as in a liquidity-constrained household who can only sell assets in
the case of a shock.
Lusardi et al. (2011) find evidence of a “pecking order” of choices that reflects the influence of
constraints, costs, and benefits on households’ financial choices. When households are asked how
they would cope with an unexpected expense of $2,000 to be paid within 30 days, savings appear
to be the preferred option. While the survey does not elicit rankings, the authors note that “sav-
ings is the most commonly used coping method overall, it is the coping method most commonly
used in isolation, it is associated with greater certainty in being able to cope, and it is associated
with greater economic and demographic advantage and stability” (18). The second-most common
coping strategy is bank credit for certain households and informal borrowing for others. The au-
thors conclude that some households find bank credit to be costlier or less readily accessible than
informal borrowing (e.g., financial costs, credit rationing, etc.), while others consider informal bor-
rowing more costly or difficult to obtain than bank credit (e.g., stigma or lack of social networks).
Other strategies such as selling possessions or alternative borrowing are much less common, tend
to be used by economically disadvantaged households, and are infrequently used as the sole cop-
ing strategy. Respondents who use bundles of strategies more generally are less likely to express
confidence in their ability to cope with the emergency expenditure.
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The lessons from this empirical work can be applied to informal borrowing in the current
analysis. Respondents who rely exclusively on informal borrowing likely differ in their financial
constraints and opportunities from those who use informal borrowing as just one strategy in a
bundle of strategies. On one hand, households that are liquidity-constrained and/or unbanked
will have limited options for coping with expenditure shocks. If formal credit and savings are
ideal but unavailable, informal borrowing may be preferable to relatively high-cost options such
as alternative credit or selling an asset. This reliance on networks as the only feasible, lowest-cost
option is reminiscent of the literature on single mothers who are “disconnected” from both work
and TANF benefits and rely on social networks for resources (Edin and Lein 1997; Loprest and
Nichols 2011; Seefeldt and Sandstrom 2015). Yet this use of networks is conditional on friends
and family having funds to lend and being willing to do so. From a policy perspective, respondents
who rely on informal borrowing are most likely to experience the long-run costs associated with
informal borrowing, such as fewer opportunities to develop a credit history. It is also more likely
to be a response to financial exclusion in light of the pecking order described above: If savings
were available, households would seemingly avail themselves of those savings rather than entail
the social costs of borrowing from friends and family.
Bundles that include informal borrowing alongside other strategies are more difficult to place
in the pecking order. Taking the Lusardi et al. (2011) pecking order as given, these bundles may
indicate a variety of situations. If informal borrowing is used together with savings, the household
is presumably able to use savings to cover only part of the expense and would need to supplement
that strategy with informal borrowing. If informal borrowing is bundled with a strategy such as
bank credit, the household may face a binding constraint for either bank credit or informal bor-
rowing. It is not clear a priori that all households would prefer bank credit to informal borrowing.
The implications for household financial wellbeing of using informal borrowing as a complement
to other strategies are therefore somewhat ambiguous. When bundled with certain strategies (e.g.,
bank credit), informal borrowing may not indicate financial exclusion or long-run costs. If bundled
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with high-cost options, informal borrowing is more likely to be related to financial exclusion and
the long-run costs that accompany it.
Following Lusardi et al. (2011), Table 2.2 presents the proportion of respondents who selected
each coping strategy by the number of total strategies adopted, conditional on being able to cope
with the emergency expense. The use of bank credit and savings are the most widely adopted
strategies for dealing with the emergency expense (57.9% and 52.6%, respectively). Informal
borrowing follows, being used by 10.8% of respondents. Among households that report only
one coping strategy, bank credit remains the preferred option, followed by savings and informal
borrowing. Options such as selling assets or using high-cost forms of bank and non-bank credit
are rarely used except among those who would use the greatest number of different strategies.
Informal borrowing also becomes a more common strategy among households that select two or
more options. These findings are reminiscent of the pecking order of Lusardi et al. (2011), but
the use of savings is not as clearly favored as it is in their results. Informal borrowing is also less
prevalent than in their analysis, where they found that nearly one-third of respondents would use
informal borrowing. One reason for this difference may be the size of the emergency expense
($400 in the SHED questionnaire compared to $2,000 in Lusardi et al.). With a relatively small
expense, the fixed costs of approaching friends or family for a loan may outweigh the financing
costs of borrowing on a credit card.
These overall results conceal substantial heterogeneity by race and ethnicity. Bank credit is
preferred over savings among White respondents, and almost 50% of respondents select at least
one of these two options. By contrast, Black and Hispanic respondents are much more likely to use
alternative strategies, and bank credit and savings are used by only 35% to 45% of respondents.
Nearly 20% of Black respondents and 17% of Hispanic respondents would use informal borrowing,
and this figure is nearly unchanged or increases when focusing on those respondents who would
only use informal borrowing (compared to 8.2% of White respondents).
One particularly striking result is that Black respondents are the only group that is more likely
to use savings than bank credit. Only 46.0% of all Black respondents and 35.4% of those who
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would use one strategy report that bank credit would be (one of) their chosen strategies, lower than
both White households and Hispanic households. This gap is surprising in light of the extensive
literature documenting lower average wealth among Black households, regardless of income or
education (Darity Jr., et al. 2018; Weller and Hanks 2018). These data suggest that Black respon-
dents in the sample are subject to greater constraints or perceived costs of formal borrowing that
lead them to prefer other coping strategies, such as informal borrowing.
Selected coping strategies are then cross-tabulated by bank account ownership. Much of the
aforementioned variation by race and ethnicity appears to be driven by the banked rather than the
unbanked. Informal borrowing rates are greater among banked Black and Hispanic respondents
than banked White respondents, but this gap narrows among unbanked respondents. About 34.7%
of this group would use informal borrowing, making this the most common coping strategy for
the unbanked. Alternative borrowing (including overdrafts) would only be used by 4.6% of the
unbanked, and 25.2% would sell an asset.
These summary statistics are suggestive of several important trends in informal borrowing use
that will be explored in more detail below. First, informal borrowing is a quantitatively important
coping strategy for the unbanked and for those without sufficient savings to deal with the expendi-
ture shock. This provides evidence in support of the notion that financial inclusion policies focus-
ing on alternative finance miss a large portion of the unbanked. Second, informal borrowing is also
very prevalent–even as the sole coping strategy–among banked Black and Hispanic respondents.
In particular, almost one in ten Black or Hispanic respondents would prefer informal borrowing
over all other options as their primary coping strategy, and about 18% of banked Black and His-
panic respondents would use informal borrowing either alone or in a bundle with other strategies.
The prevalence of informal borrowing among banked Black and Hispanic respondents points to
an “underbanked” community relying primarily on informal credit arrangements. For these house-
holds, informal borrowing appears to rank higher in the pecking order of options or to be more
readily available than bank credit or savings. This finding is consistent with high perceived costs
of formality, credit constraints, and/or low non-pecuniary costs associated with accessing network
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resources. This is in contrast to White respondents, for whom the link between financial exclusion
and informal borrowing use–exclusively or in combination with other strategies–is stronger.
Finally, women of color are disproportionately represented among those who use informal
borrowing, particularly when they fall outside of the financial mainstream, as shown in Figure 2.1.
There is no evidence of gender gaps in informal borrowing use among most banked respondents,
with the exception of Black respondents and other Non-Hispanic respondents. Black women who
report that their household has a bank account are about twice as likely as Black men and more
than twice as likely as White respondents to choose informal borrowing as their primary coping
strategy. Unbanked status is associated with significant jumps in the use of informal borrowing as a
primary coping strategy, particularly for Non-White and Hispanic women. As many as one quarter
of Hispanic, unbanked women report informal borrowing as their only coping strategy in the case
of an emergency expense. There is less evidence of a consistent gender gap among unbanked
respondents regarding informal borrowing as a complement to other coping strategies. As noted in
the sociology and economics literature, unbanked women may have more access to social support
networks than men while also being less likely to have access to other coping strategies such as
savings or bank credit.
2.3.4 Empirical strategy
To formally test the relationship between being unbanked and informal borrowing, I develop a
model informed by consumer choice theory in which each decision–to own a bank account and to
use informal borrowing–can be seen as an observed discrete choice resulting from a latent decision-
making process.11 For example,
11Importantly, framing unbanked status as a “decision” risks suggesting that external constraints such as a paucity
of local bank branches are not relevant to this outcome. The model acknowledges the important role of household
agency in selecting between making use of banking services, but it does not eliminate the possibility that some house-










1 if InfBorrow∗j > 0
0 otherwise
∀j ∈ exc, comb
where InfBorrow∗exc (or InfBorrow∗comb) is the net perceived benefit to the respondent of us-
ing informal borrowing exclusively (or in combination with other options). InfBorrowexc = 1 (or
InfBorrowcomb = 1) if the respondent plans to use informal borrowing exclusively (or in combi-
nation with other options), and InfBorrowj = 0 otherwise. Let Unbanked∗ analogously represent
the net perceived benefit of being unbanked, Unbanked = 1 the outcome of being unbanked,
and Unbanked = 0 the outcome of being banked. If constraints on bank access (and/or informal
borrowing use) are binding, I assume that this also results in observing Unbanked = 1 (and/or
InfBorrowj = 0).
The two decisions can then be modeled as
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where Xi is a set of covariates, Φ(·) is the CDF of the normal distribution, and ǫ1 and ǫ2 are the
errors terms of the latent decision-making processes associated with Unbanked and InfBorrowj ,
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respectively. In the informal borrowing equation, unbanked status is allowed to have a direct effect
on the probability of using informal borrowing in the case of an emergency expense. Note that for
each type of informal borrowing use–exclusively or in combination with other options–the model
is estimated excluding individuals who would make use of informal borrowing in the other way.
For example, when estimating the probability that a respondent would exclusively use informal
borrowing, all respondents who would instead use informal borrowing in combination are omitted
from the estimation.
As discussed in Section 2.2, inequalities in access to and use of formal banking across race have
been well-documented, and there is mixed evidence suggesting that women–particularly women
of color–may be overrepresented among informal borrowers. In the specification above, RaceEth
is a set of race and ethnicity covariates (Black, Hispanic, or other racial self-identification12, where
White is the reference category) and Female is the corresponding gender dummy. I also test
specifications in which the model is estimated conditional on race and ethnicity, allowing for het-
erogeneous effects of the covariates on both outcomes of interest. These specifications are limited
to White, Non-Hispanic respondents only and Black, Non-Hispanic respondents only.13
Following Rhine et al. (2006), I use a bivariate probit model to estimate the determinants of
respondents’ plans to use informal borrowing and their unbanked status while allowing for the
possibility that these decisions are jointly determined.14 That is, the error terms of the two estima-
tion equations may be jointly normally distributed with tetrachoric correlation coefficient ρ. If ρ
is statistically different from zero, then estimating a bivariate probit model is more efficient than
12The SHED does not provide more detailed information on the “Other, Non-Hispanic” category of respondents
except to distinguish between “Other, Non-Hispanic” and “2+ Races, Non-Hispanic.” I collapse these two categories.
13Parameter estimates and standard errors cannot be determined for Hispanic and Other Non-Hispanic respondents
due to small sample size, a low proportion of unbanked and informal borrowers, and many sparse indicator variables
among the fixed effects. These factors lead to multicollinearity and cause the variance-covariance matrix to be highly
singular.
14As noted in Greene (2003) and Rhine et al. (2006), a recursive bivariate probit that includes an endogenous right-
hand side variable can be consistently estimated using the same maximum likelihood function as the non-recursive
model.
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estimating two univariate probits. If not, the two equations can be estimated separately (Greene
2003).
This latent relationship ρ is in addition to the direct relationship between being unbanked and
informal borrowing captured by the coefficient α in the model above.15 A positive and statistically
significant estimate of α would be consistent with evidence that being unbanked leads households
to have less access to bank credit. On the other hand, a positive and statistically significant estimate
of ρ would capture the effect of constraints, perceptions of banks, neighborhood characteristics, or
other latent factors that are associated with a greater probability of both being an informal borrower
and being unbanked, independent of the respondent’s actual banking status. In their study of the
household’s decision whether to use check cashing outlets and to hold bank accounts, Rhine et al.
(2006) observe that ρ is statistically different from zero for Black and Hispanic respondents, but not
for White respondents. They attribute this result to unobserved variation in the perceived relative
price of banks and alternative financial services, distrust of banks due to histories of discrimination,
and liquidity preferences. Stanley and Bhattachara (2008) use a similar approach to model the
relationship between banking choices and the decision to send remittances in a U.S. Hispanic
community and also find evidence of unobserved correlation that they attribute to similar sources
as Rhine et al. (2006).
It is expected that the magnitude and direction of ρ as well as the direct effect of unbanked
status may vary based on whether informal borrowing is chosen as the exclusive coping strategy or
as a complement to other coping strategies. If unbanked status is associated with few opportunities
to save and more limited access to bank credit, then unbanked households will determine which
coping strategy or strategies to choose based on 1) the availability of alternatives and 2) the ranking
of each strategy in the “pecking order” discussed in Section 2.3.3. To the extent that informal
15Importantly, the signs of ρ and α may differ. In a regular bivariate probit model, the parameter ρ is equivalent
to the conditional tetrachoric correlation of the two outcome variables of interest. However, in a recursive bivariate
probit, the parameter no longer has this meaning. Instead, if the model is properly specified, it allows the researcher to
separate the “structural” component of the effect from the “spurious” component contained in the residuals (the effect
of an omitted variable). See Filippini, Greene, Kumar, and Martinez-Cruz (2018) and Arendt and Larsen (2006) for
more details.
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borrowing is preferred in the short-run to other alternatives, unbanked households may be more
likely to rely on informal borrowing as much as possible. However, some households may be
unable to do so or may face high social costs, leading them to prefer other bundles of coping
strategies. The relative costs, benefits, and availability of these bundles (with or without informal
borrowing) can be difficult to identify in this analysis a priori. I predict unbanked status to be a
positive and significant predictor of exclusive use of informal borrowing, while the relationship
may be less clear regarding informal borrowing as part of a bundle of strategies.
In this dataset, novel information on consumer perceptions allows me to more directly assess
which unobserved factors may influence ρ. While the SHED does not provide full information
on households’ perceptions of banks, it does elicit information on whether households were “dis-
couraged borrowers” at some point in the past year. Discouraged borrowers are those who did not
apply for credit on at least one occasion because they thought they were likely to be rejected credit.
This indicator may be a useful proxy for unobserved factors in the model. First, it may reflect re-
spondents’ credit scores and other unobserved, objective characteristics that are relevant to credit
access. It is likely that households that are discouraged from borrowing do on average face greater
credit constraints, conditional on having positive credit demand. However, respondents’ percep-
tions of their credit scores are likely far from a mirror image of their actual creditworthiness. As a
result, discouragement may pick up a second source of variation in bank credit use: overall percep-
tions of and trust in banks. As noted previously, about 10% of households that are unbanked report
distrust of banks as a primary reason for not having a bank account (FDIC 2015). Therefore, an
additional specification of the model will incorporate discouragement as a covariate to determine
whether it explains unobserved correlation between the outcomes.16 If it does not, then variation in
16In every year except 2013, the SHED asks two sets of questions related to discouragement. First, respondents
who report having applied for credit in the last year are asked whether, at some point in that time, he/she or his/her
spouse were turned down for credit, did not receive as much credit as requested, or “put off applying for credit
because [he/she] thought [he/she] might be turned down.” Second, respondents who report that they did not apply for
credit are asked whether they had desired credit at some point in the past year. A follow-up question then identifies
the subset of this group that was discouraged (“Was this [decision not to apply for credit made] because you thought
that you might be turned down or denied credit?”).
The 2013 survey does not make this distinction. Instead, all individuals (regardless of whether they ultimately
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financial literacy, bank access, or access to network resources may be more probable explanations
of financial exclusion than household perceptions.
2.3.5 Controls and summary statistics
Three sets of control covariates are used in the model described above: Some that are expected
to influence both unbanked status and informal borrowing, some that are expected to have a direct
influence only on informal borrowing, and others that should affect only unbanked status. In all
three cases, I draw on theoretical and empirical insights from the literature on financial inclusion
and support networks and from Rhine et al. (2006) and Stanley and Bhattachara (2008) specifically.
In addition to race and gender, age and education controls are common to both equations. Pre-
vious work has found that younger individuals and individuals with lower levels of educational
attainment are more likely to be unbanked (FDIC 2015). Moreover, younger individuals have
had fewer opportunities to develop a credit history, leading them to rely more on non-bank credit
sources such as informal lending. Married or cohabiting individuals have more non-borrowing
opportunities to insure themselves against risk than single, widowed, or separated individuals
(e.g., multiple income sources), and single-headed households are also more likely to be unbanked
(Klawitter and Fletschner 2011). State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed effects are also included
in both equations.
Two variables are hypothesized to primarily affect a household’s probability of owning a bank
account. First, following Rhine et al. (2006), homeownership is used as a proxy for wealth and as
a predictor of having previously acquired a mortgage loan from a bank. Second, the influence of
income volatility on a household’s decision to own a bank account is widely documented in the
financial inclusion literature. Households with incomes that vary substantially month-to-month are
more likely to incur overdraft fees which may ultimately be costlier than the fixed fees associated
with alternative financial services. Recent work has suggested that income volatility is common
applied for credit) are asked whether they experienced discouragement at some point in the past year, using the same
wording as the survey question above. Due to this inconsistency in survey instruments, I combine both discouraged
credit applicants and non-applicants.
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even at relatively high levels of income. Morduch and Schneider (2015) find that households with
incomes greater than two times the local poverty line experienced spikes and dips in their monthly
income over the course of the year equal to on average 45% of their average monthly income (30).
Others suggest that this volatility and changing bank practices have encouraged many with even
moderate levels of income to leave banks entirely (Servon 2017). It is less clear that volatility
would push households into informal borrowing specifically among the other options available.
Households that experience substantial income volatility may turn to bank credit, savings, or al-
ternative credit instead. Of course, other observable and unobservable characteristics of these
households may play a role in restricting their set of feasible choices.
Household income has been used in previous work as a determinant of the use of non-bank
financial services, independent of the effect of being unbanked itself (Rhine et al. 2006). I follow
this work by including income only as a determinant of informal borrowing use.17 As reviewed
in Section 2.2.2, the literature on support networks suggests that low-income communities are
more likely to make use of such networks (e.g., Högnäs 2010). Therefore, households with lower
incomes may be more likely to rely on networks for borrowing rather than higher-cost alternative
or bank credit. Low-income households are also more likely to be unbanked. However, income is
strongly correlated with other covariates in the unbanked equation, including homeownership and
income volatility. Given this ambiguity, I test whether the econometric results vary across income
groups in Section 2.5.1.
The total number of children and adults in the household is used to control for household
expenditures in the informal borrowing equation: Large households spend a greater portion of
their income on necessities and are more financially fragile than a smaller household with the
same income. In addition, household size is a proxy of the size of kinship networks. Households
that include many extended family members or parents may do so in part because kinship ties are
stronger than those of other households. Finally, household head status is included in the informal
17Income is defined in the SHED as the pre-tax income from all sources that is earned by the respondent and his or
her spouse/partner, if present.
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borrowing equation. While it is not possible to determine exactly how households interpret the
“head of household” question, as discussed in Section 2.3.1, this status should have more of an
impact on financial planning (i.e,. the respondent’s planned use of informal borrowing versus
other coping strategies) than on unbanked status, which is reported at the household level, after
accounting for other household characteristics. For instance, a respondent who considers him- or
herself household head may feel more pressure to fit into a “breadwinner” role for the household
and face greater stigma in asking friends and family for financial assistance.
Overall summary statistics for the controls by bank account ownership and informal borrow-
ing use are presented in Table 2.3. In addition to the demographic trends noted previously, both
unbanked respondents and those who choose informal borrowing as a coping strategy are younger,
more likely to be single, and have lower degrees of educational attainment than other respondents,
consistent with previous literature (e.g., FDIC 2015; Klawitter and Fletschner 2011). Substantial
income volatility is also associated with being unbanked, with 23.3% of this group experiencing
significant changes in income from month to month, compared to 7.6% of banked respondents.
Those with a higher yearly income are on average more likely to be banked and less likely to use
informal borrowing, but the latter relationship is less clear. For instance, about the same propor-
tion of those who would use informal borrowing and those who would not report incomes between
$40,000 and $99,000 (41.1% and 40.5%). Respondents in this income range are nearly twice as
likely to be banked as unbanked, however, suggesting that there is far from a one-to-one corre-
spondence between reliance on informal borrowing and access to formal banking services.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Exclusive use of informal borrowing
Parameter estimates for the baseline specification where informal borrowing is defined as us-
ing informal borrowing exclusively are presented in Table 2.4, and average marginal effects are
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presented in Table 2.5.18 Separate regressions are run for the full sample as well as the sample
restricted to White, Non-Hispanic respondents and Black, Non-Hispanic respondents.
The controls in each equation behave largely as expected. Older respondents, married respon-
dents, and respondents with higher levels of education are the least likely to be unbanked. Greater
wealth as proxied by homeownership as well as low income volatility are associated with being
banked. Among the categorical covariates, higher levels of educational attainment have the largest
negative effect on the probability of being unbanked: Individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree
are 10 percentage points less likely to be unbanked, relative to a sample mean of about 3.4%.
In the baseline specification, Black and Hispanic respondents are 3.4 percentage points and
2.4 percentage points more likely, respectively, to be unbanked relative to White respondents.
This result is in line with the literature on the unbanked (Barr 2004; FDIC 2015; Morgan-Cross
and Klawitter 2011; Rhine et al. 2006). Gender does not have a statistically significant effect
on the probability of being unbanked. However, the gender coefficient is positive and larger in
magnitude when the model is estimated on the subsample of Black respondents, although it remains
statistically insignificant.
As with the likelihood of being unbanked, respondents who are younger, are single, and have
lower levels of educational attainment are generally more likely to report informal borrowing alone
as their sole method of dealing with an emergency expense. Lower income and larger households
are also more likely to report plans to use only informal borrowing, as are those who report that
they are not the head of household.
18Ai and Norton (2003) note that the calculation of marginal effects for interaction terms differs from that which
is appropriate for a single variable. The marginal effect should be calculated as the cross-derivative of the predicted
probability with respect to the two interacted variables, rather than the derivative of the predicted probability with
respect to the interaction term. If calculated correctly, the marginal effect will vary across the values of each interacted
variables, and the incorrectly calculated marginal effect can be misleading. The average marginal effects reported
in this analysis do not take account of this correction for two reasons. First, the entire range of possible marginal
effects are essentially explored in the graphs of the predicted joint probabilities that follow (see Figure 2.2). Second,
alternative specifications in which there are no interaction terms present qualitatively equivalent and quantitatively
similar results. That is, the results do not change if I remove the restriction that Black women experience an effect of
being Black and of being female that is shared with Black men and White women.
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Consistent with the evidence from the sociology literature, there are statistically and economi-
cally significant differences in reliance on informal borrowing at the intersection of race and gen-
der. Black, Hispanic, and Non-Hispanic women with a racial self-identification other than White
are more likely to report that they would rely on informal borrowing. This result holds for Black
women when the sample is limited to Black respondents. While the average marginal effect is
about 6.3 percentage points for Black women, this represents a large effect size relative to the sam-
ple mean: Only 4.1% of respondents in the full analytical sample indicate that informal borrowing
would be their sole means of coping with an emergency expenditure. The effect size of this inter-
sectional difference is similar to that of having yearly income of less than $40,000 compared to an
income of more than $100,000.
Surprisingly, plans to primarily use informal borrowing are not directly correlated with un-
banked status. The estimate is negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero, although the
magnitude of the estimate is much larger and positive for White respondents than Black respon-
dents. Theory would suggest a positive and statistically significant relationship between being
unbanked and relying on informal borrowing because the unbanked generally have fewer opportu-
nities to use bank credit or to draw from savings.
As noted in Section 2.3.3, the correlation coefficient ρ measures the latent correlation between
each equation’s error term. A value of ρ that is statistically distinguishable from zero would point to
unobserved variation (e.g., differences in perceived costs/benefits, constraints, or preferences) that
influences both the conditional probability of being unbanked and of using informal borrowing,
suggesting that the outcomes are jointly determined. As shown in Table 2.4, the estimate of ρ is
positive and statistically significant. Rhine et al. (2006) report a similar result in their analysis
of the use of check cashing at currency exchanges among the banked and unbanked, but they
find ρ to be significant only for Black and Hispanic respondents. I find similar heterogeneity
by race. The magnitude of ρ is much greater for Black respondents than for White respondents,
although both estimates are insignificant. The overall result appears to be driven by the sample
of Black respondents (and possibly other Non-White and Hispanic respondents), considering the
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small and insignificant estimate of ρ for White respondents. This result is suggestive of constraints,
discouragement, or network effects that lead respondents away from formal banking entirely and
towards informal borrowing as a substitute for bank credit. I conduct further analysis of ρ in
Sections 2.4.4 and 2.5.1.
2.4.2 Informal borrowing in combination with other options
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 report the parameter estimates and average marginal effects, respectively, of
the specifications in which the dependent variable equals one if the respondent indicated that they
would use informal borrowing as one strategy within a bundle of at least one other coping strategy
(e.g., bank credit, alternative credit, savings, etc.).
Because the sample is largely unchanged, the estimates on the unbanked equation are virtually
identical. However, there are important differences in the determinants of using informal borrow-
ing in combination with other strategies as compared to the determinants of reliance on informal
borrowing alone. Education has a much weaker relationship with informal borrowing use in this
context: Only attaining a post-secondary degree is associated with a reduction in the probabil-
ity of using informal borrowing of about 3 to 6 percentage points compared to 5 to 8 percentage
points for exclusive use of informal borrowing. This difference in effect sizes is economically
more meaningful relative to sample means of 7.3% for informal borrowing in combination with
other coping strategies and 4.1% for exclusive informal borrowing. Income exhibits a qualitatively
similar but stronger effect on informal borrowing use as part of a bundle. The highest income
households are 10 percentage points less likely to use informal borrowing combined with other
strategies than the lowest income households, possible preferring coping strategies such as savings
or bank credit. This represents about a 1.3 times lower probability of using informal borrowing
relative to the sample mean, which is very similar to the relative effect of income on exclusive use
of informal borrowing.
Gender is not a statistically significant predictor of using informal borrowing among other
strategies. Again, the gender coefficient is positive and of twice the magnitude for Black respon-
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dents, but the result is statistically insignificant. Black respondents are more likely to use informal
borrowing in a bundle of other strategies, and characteristics such as marital status, age, and ed-
ucation are not significant predictors of informal borrowing among Black respondents. Income
remains a significant predictor of informal borrowing use across race and ethnicity.
Unlike the previous specification, being unbanked has a positive effect on the use of informal
borrowing, but only among White respondents. At the same time, the correlation coefficient ρ
is negative and marginally significant for White respondents. This suggests that the unobserved
factors that appear to encourage both financial exclusion and primary use of informal borrowing
(particularly among Black respondents) are actually associated with more (or less) financial ex-
clusion and less (or more) use of informal borrowing as part of a bundle of strategies. Possible
interpretations of this result are discussed in Section 2.6.
2.4.3 Joint outcomes by race and gender
A motivating question for this analysis was whether informal borrowing is one of many coping
strategies used by a wide range of households (in addition to bank credit, savings, etc.) or whether
it is disproportionately used by households “disconnected” from formal finance. This disconnected
group would be likely to incur more of the long-run costs associated with financial informality and
has been largely overlooked in policy discussions surrounding financial inclusion.
Summarizing the results from Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, Figure 2.2 presents predicted proba-
bilities for four joint probabilities relevant to this research question, disaggregated by race and
gender. The first two graphs represent the probabilities of a respondent indicating that they would
use informal borrowing exclusively (top) or in a bundle (bottom) and being banked. The second
two graphs present analogous joint probabilities for each type of informal borrowing and being
unbanked.
These predicted joint probabilities point to two important conclusions: First, informal borrowing–
and even complete reliance on such borrowing to cope with an emergency expense–is not limited
to the unbanked. In fact, given the low probability of being unbanked overall, very few households
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are likely both to plan on using informal borrowing and to be unbanked (about 2 to 4 percent)
compared to being banked informal borrowers (about 5% would use only informal borrowing and
about 8% would use informal borrowing as one of several strategies). This suggests that there is
an important portion of respondents who are “underbanked” despite not being included in the tra-
ditional definition of the term: They turn to friends and family for funds when faced with liquidity
constraints rather than bank or alternative credit.
Second, women of color are the most likely to use informal borrowing as their primary coping
strategy both when banked and unbanked. Race and gender gaps in the use of informal borrowing
with other strategies remain insignificant after controlling for other variables, whether banked or
unbanked, but these gaps do exist in reliance on informal borrowing as a sole coping strategy. Black
women are more likely than both Black men and White men and women to primarily use informal
borrowing, whether banked or unbanked. They are about 1.8 times more likely to be banked but
use informal borrowing than White respondents (predicted probabilities of 7.5% and about 4.0%,
respectively) and more than three times more likely to be unbanked and use informal borrowing
exclusively (predicted probabilities of 2.3% and 0.7%, respectively). The predicted probabilities
are suggestive of similar gaps among other women of color, although the estimates are imprecise.
This result is consistent with the sociology literature on survival networks and identifies one key
group that may fit into the “disconnected” group of policy interest as discussed above.
2.4.4 Results with discouragement control
As previously noted, the measure of cross-equation correlation ρ was found to be statistically
significant in models that focused on exclusive reliance on informal borrowing, while being nega-
tive and statistically significant regarding informal borrowing as a complement to other strategies.
I also find suggestive evidence that these correlations differ by race and ethnicity. The presence of
latent correlation between the equations suggests that unobserved constraints, preferences, neigh-
borhood effects, or costs that are associated with a higher probability of being unbanked are also
associated with a greater probability of relying on informal borrowing and a lower probability of
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using informal borrowing as one of several strategies. Rhine et al. (2006) suggest that unobserved
correlation between unbanked status and the use of check cashing outlets may be linked to greater
perceived costs of using formal banking services, the need for immediate liquidity, or broader
distrust of banks. Several similar factors could be relevant in the context of informal borrowing.
These may include neighborhood effects (e.g., a paucity of bank branches lead to neighborhood-
wide reliance on informal finance) or credit constraints.
I test one of these possibilities by incorporating a control for discouragement in the baseline
specifications. As described in Section 2.3.4, discouraged borrowers are prospective borrowers
(i.e., individuals with positive credit demand) who nonetheless do not apply due to the existence
of transaction costs combined with a sufficiently high subjective probability of rejection. To the
extent that discouragement captures both credit constraints and respondents’ belief that banks are
uninterested in serving them, then it may explain some of the unobserved correlation. If it does not
account for the unobserved correlation, then the relationship between financial exclusion and infor-
mal borrowing may instead be linked to constraints to bank access. For example, neighborhoods
with few bank branches may have low demand for bank loans and develop alternative mechanisms
for coping with short-term credit needs such as alternative credit and informal borrowing.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 present marginal effects for these specifications. Discouragement is a sta-
tistically and economically significant predictor of informal borrowing (both primarily and within
bundles), but not of being unbanked in the full sample. It also has a minimal effect on the other
relationships of interest and on the correlation coefficient ρ. Interestingly, discouragement is a
marginally significant predictor of unbanked status when the sample is disaggregated by race and
ethnicity. Discouraged White respondents are about 0.7 percentage points more likely to also be
unbanked, while discouraged Black respondents are 3 percentage points less likely to be unbanked,
although the latter result is not robust to minor changes in the sample across informal borrowing
regressions.19
19Parameter estimates available upon request.
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These results provide suggestive evidence that neighborhood-level constraints explain more of
the unobserved correlation than subjective beliefs about banks. Many White respondents may have
positive demand for credit but choose not to hold bank accounts and do not plan on applying for
bank credit out of a high predicted probability of rejection–possibly linked to the sentiment that
“banks are not interested in serving them.” This may not be a causal relationship, of course: Not
holding a bank account could also result in discouragement. However, the relationship between
discouragement and bank account ownership is the opposite for Non-White households. The liter-
ature on financial inclusion has noted the lack of physical access to banks in certain low-income,
predominantly minority communities (e.g., Barr 2004). In these communities, credit demand may
be low given limited access to banks or high costs of bank credit (e.g., financing charges). An indi-
vidual who has no a priori demand for bank credit cannot be discouraged from applying, leading
to a negative relationship between the outcomes.
2.5 Robustness checks
2.5.1 Alternative analytical subsamples
As noted in Section 2.3, several groups have been included or excluded from the analysis,
choices that may introduce bias into the estimation results. In this section, I estimate several alter-
native specifications to assess the sensitivity of the results. First, a surprising number of respon-
dents report that they are not head of household, including as many as 65% of single, separated,
or widowed respondents. While it is clear that household head status captures some unobserved
characteristics of households, there is evidence that household head status is related to financial
decision-making responsibility (see Table 2.1). Household heads also appear less likely in most
specifications (1.5 to 3 percentage points) to report that they would use informal borrowing. Given
these results, it is important to assess whether the results hold among household heads alone. If
non-heads are less likely to actually make financial decisions for the households, including non-
heads in the estimation may attenuate estimates of the effect of demographic and other individual
characteristics on the chosen coping strategies.
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Second, the baseline specifications exclude respondents who indicate that they would be un-
able to cope with the emergency expense. The analytic sample is narrowed in this way to fit the
consumer choice framework. Individuals who would be unable to cope with an emergency expense
must have no coping mechanisms from which to choose. However, to the extent that respondents
who can cope with the expense differ in systematic ways from those who would be unable to cope,
excluding this group leads to selection bias in the estimates. Moreover, as discussed in Section 2.3,
the respondents who indicated that they would be unable to pay for the expense include some who
also indicate that they would use informal borrowing or other options. In the preferred specifica-
tion, these households are counted as if they only indicated “unable” as a response. (For example,
a respondent who selects only “unable” and “informal borrowing” would be excluded from the
sample.) An additional robustness check would be to check whether the results hold when all
“unable” respondents are included in the analysis.
Additional models are thus estimated conditional on the respondent being household head,
regardless of whether the respondent indicated that they could cope with the emergency expense.20
The variables of interest and the correlation coefficient ρ behave in qualitatively similar ways
to the baseline results. Estimates using this alternative sample suggest that, as in the preferred
specification, Black women are more likely to use informal borrowing as their primary coping
mechanism. The magnitudes of effect sizes are also comparable across specifications.
2.5.2 Results for other coping strategies
Table 2.10 reports marginal effects for the same bivariate probit model where the outcome
variables of the second estimation equation are exclusive use of bank credit or savings rather than
informal borrowing. If unbanked status, race, or gender were to have counterintuitive relationships
with these other outcomes, the previous results may be suspect.
The results of Table 2.10 are broadly consistent with the theory and previous empirical re-
sults. Unbanked households and Black respondents are less likely to use bank credit as their sole
20Results available upon request.
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response to an emergency expense. There is no evidence of variation in bank credit use by race
and gender. Similarly, exclusive reliance on savings is less common among unbanked households.
The direction of causality is unclear, but this relationship may reflect the lack of secure savings
instruments for the unbanked. Black respondents are more likely to rely on savings, reiterating the
surprising result from the summary statistics and pointing again to the lack of access to bank credit
as a coping strategy.
The measure of latent correlation ρ is significant and positive for both the exclusive use of bank
credit and of savings, although the coefficient is larger in magnitude and more precisely estimated
for bank credit. These results are not necessarily contradictory to the corresponding result for
informal borrowing. While theory suggests that the availability of social networks is a key omitted
variable in the case of informal borrowing, other factors may lead to a positive latent correlation
for these other coping strategies. For instance, the level of liquid wealth held by households is not
captured in the model. Low levels of wealth may be common among both those who are unbanked
(for the reasons discussed above) and those who rely on credit cards instead but are not in fact
unbanked. This same variable would work in the opposite direction for exclusive use of savings,
explaining the less positive ρ coefficient.
2.5.3 Income disaggregations
A final set of robustness checks include the role of income. Income has been found in previous
work to be an important predictor of both unbanked status and the use of informal and alternative
borrowing. Yet, it is difficult to determine whether income should be common to both equations
or a predictor of one outcome in particular. Theory suggests that income volatility is more relevant
to the household choice to be unbanked than to use informal borrowing, and Rhine et al. (2006)
argue that neighborhood income is a stronger predictor of unbanked status than household income
(while also likely being correlated with household income). Neighborhood income is not available
in the public SHED data, although state and metro fixed effects are used to account for some of
this geographic variation at a coarser level.
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Given this uncertainty about how to model the effects of income, it is important to identify
whether the results are sensitive to alternative approaches to controlling for income, such as dis-
aggregating the sample by income group. In addition, theory and previous empirical work suggest
that the impact of factors such as income volatility or race and gender may vary by income for
substantive reasons of interest. Higher income households may have a greater ability to save than
lower income households or live in communities with different levels of access to financial ser-
vices. To better understand whether and to what extent there is heterogeneity in trends by income,
I conduct regressions by income category. I aggregate the original 21 income categories into two
categories roughly corresponding to those above and below the median of the income distribu-
tion, approximately $60,000. I then run the same models as the baseline specification, omitting
income controls, separately for each category of respondents. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 present these
estimates.21
There is important heterogeneity in the determinants of unbanked status. Part of the motivation
for the preferred specification–in which income only appears in the informal borrowing equation–
was evidence suggesting that greater income volatility is associated with being unbanked, even
at higher levels of income. Consistent with this argument, income volatility is an important pre-
dictor of unbanked status in both income groups (results not shown). Moderate income volatility
is actually a stronger and more economically significant predictor of unbanked status for higher
income households. It is associated with a 2.5 to 3 percentage point increase in the probability of
being unbanked for higher income households relative to a weighted sample mean of about 1.7%.
The analogous effect for lower income households is only 1.4 to 1.8 percentage points relative
to a weighted sample mean of 6.8%. Consistent with the baseline findings, lower income Black
and Hispanic respondents are also more likely to be unbanked, although these results suggest that
women of color in higher income categories may be more likely to be unbanked than other groups.
21I also omit state fixed effects from these regressions due to reduced sample size and problems introduced by sparse
indicator variables in estimating the variance-covariance matrix. In the baseline regressions, results were qualitatively
unchanged when state fixed effects were omitted.
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The previously identified gender and racial gaps in use of informal borrowing as the primary
coping strategy appear to be most prevalent among households with incomes below the median of
the sample distribution. To the extent that similar gaps appear regarding the use of informal bor-
rowing as part of a bundle of strategies, they are more prevalent among higher income households.
These results are largely consistent with previous work and the baseline estimates.
The direct and indirect links between unbanked status and informal borrowing use are also
heterogeneous across income groups. Unbanked households at the low end of the income distribu-
tion are less likely to use informal borrowing as their only coping strategy, although the parameter
estimate is not statistically significant, and unbanked households with above-median income are
more likely to use informal borrowing as part of a bundle of coping strategies. At the same time,
the estimate of latent correlation ρ between unbanked status and the use of informal borrowing
shows the opposite trend. The correlation is positive and significant for those with below-median
income when the outcome of interest is exclusive use of informal borrowing, and the correlation is
negative and marginally significant for higher income households when the outcome of interest is
use of informal borrowing in a bundle of coping strategies. The fact that the unobserved constraints
are positive and marginally significant for the lower income group is broadly consistent with an in-
terpretation of ρ that emphasizes restrictions to bank access. These results are interpreted in more
detail in Section 2.6.
To test an alternative income-based disaggregation, I run the same specification on groups
defined by the federal poverty line: those with income of less than 100% the federal poverty line,
100% to 200% of the poverty line, and more than 200% of the poverty line.22 Because the poverty
line is based on household size, this approach better captures variation in purchasing power than
a single income figure. However, it also leads to challenge for the purposes of inference. Each
group no longer includes a similar number of observations. Instead, approximately 80% of the
22Due to the categorical nature of the income data, these poverty line-based categorizations are approximate. I
define the low-income groups conservatively: For a poverty line of x corresponding to a household of size y, a
household of size y must fall into an income category with a maximum income level of less than x to be considered
below that poverty line. For a household to have income of 100% to 200% of the poverty line, it must fall into an
income category with a maximum income level of less than 2x.
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sample falls above 200% of the poverty line, only 12% are between 100% and 200% of the poverty
line, and the remaining 8% are below the poverty line. The small samples of the last two groups
significantly reduce the power of statistical tests for these regressions.
With these caveats acknowledged, Tables 2.13 and 2.14 present marginal effects for the poverty
line-based disaggregations. Across all income groups, Black and African American women are
more likely to plan on using informal borrowing exclusively as seen in the preferred specification,
and the relationship is of a similar magnitude for each income group. However, the result is only
statistically significant for respondents with household incomes of 200% or more above the poverty
line, possibly due to the small sample size of the low-income groups. The correlation coefficient ρ
is positive for all income groups but is greater in magnitude for the two lowest income groups, and
it is statistically significant only for households earning 100% to 200% of the poverty line.
Surprisingly, respondents from unbanked households in this group are less likely to be informal
borrowers based on the recursive element of the model. A behavioral explanation for this result
is not obvious. The very large coefficient magnitudes suggest that the model–particularly the
structural and latent estimates of financial exclusion’s impacts–is sensitive to changes in the size
of the sample. The effect of the variables of interest on the expected use of informal borrowing in
combination with other strategies is consistent with the previous income disaggregation. Unbanked
status and demographics are linked to informal borrowing as part of a bundle primarily for higher
income households.
2.6 Discussion
The results from Sections 2.4.1 through 2.5.1 raise important questions of interpretation in
the context of the literature on support networks, financial exclusion, and the pecking order of
household coping strategies. These questions cannot be conclusively answered with the present
data and point to important areas of future research. Nonetheless, possible interpretations of the
results that are consistent with the existing evidence are presented in this section:
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(1) Why are women of color disproportionately represented among those who would primarily
use informal borrowing after controlling for income, household size, unbanked status, and other
observable characteristics? As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the literature on support networks has
associated these networks with women and female-headed households in low-income, predomi-
nantly minority neighborhoods. Women appear more likely to be able to borrow from friends and
family and may face lower social costs to do so–e.g., if men are expected to hold “breadwinner
roles” that stigmatize reliance on others for financial assistance. At the same time, the SHED data
allow for at best imprecise measurement of household wealth, so the intersectional gaps in infor-
mal borrowing may also reflect women’s lesser access on average to savings, which Lusardi et al.
(2011) find to be households’ preferred coping mechanism when feasible.
It is worth noting that the literature on support networks and informal borrowing has focused
on Black and Hispanic individuals, but the results of this analysis were suggestive of equally large
differences in informal borrowing among other, Non-Hispanic women. Unfortunately, SHED data
do not allow for a detailed disaggregation of this group. One possibility is that some immigrants
may be disproportionately represented in this group, and the use of informal borrowing networks
has been shown to be more common in immigrant communities (e.g., Morduch and Schneider
2015). While more work is needed in this area, there is some evidence that gender gaps in support
networks would also be expected within many immigrant communities. Kibria (1990) cites the
importance of kin and extended networks among communities of Vietnamese immigrants living
in the United States in the 1980s. Resources were frequently exchanged within kin networks. In
addition, “women’s groups” connecting female neighbors and family members were widespread
and influential, despite women’s overall lack of economic power. Kibria writes that membership in
such groups “signified an obligation to participate in exchange activities with others in the group
and connecting network” and compared the reciprocity expectations to those of “low-income, ur-
ban, Black communities,” citing Stack’s (1974) work (14).
(2) Why are unbanked respondents more likely to use informal borrowing as part of a bundle of
other strategies but no more likely to use informal borrowing exclusively? According to Lusardi et
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al. (2011), borrowing from friends and family tends to rank higher in the pecking order of coping
strategies than financially high-cost strategies such as selling assets or alternative borrowing. All
else equal, this would suggest that households that 1) do not have the means to cope with an
emergency expenditure through savings or bank credit but 2) can rely on friends and family will
primarily use informal borrowing. Of course, not all unbanked respondents have access to friends
and family, while some banked respondents may still lack the savings needed to cope with an
emergency expenditure. Therefore, being unbanked is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition
for using informal borrowing as the main means of coping with an expenditure shock. By contrast,
informal borrowing as part of a bundle of strategies would be expected to be disproportionately
common among the remaining unbanked respondents (those who would not solely use informal
borrowing) if all bundles are more common among unbanked respondents. Lusardi et al. (2011)
associate the use of multiple coping strategies with greater financial insecurity and lower certainty
about being able to deal with an emergency expenditure. As long as the unbanked are no less
likely to use informal borrowing, the result of being unbanked would be a greater likelihood of
using bundles that happen to include informal borrowing. Moreover, given that informal borrowing
appears to be preferred to other high-cost coping strategies such as selling assets, bundles including
informal borrowing are likely preferred (if available) to other bundles.
(3) Which unobserved variables could make respondents both more likely to be unbanked and
more likely to plan on exclusively using informal borrowing? Broadly speaking, latent variables
that explain this trend in a consumer choice framework would need to link high perceived costs (or
low perceived benefits) of banking formality with low perceived costs (or high perceived benefits)
of informality in borrowing arrangements. High costs could come in the form of constraints that
limit bank access, a possibility explored further below. Another possibility is that low perceived
benefits of banking formality could be linked to low financial literacy, which previous work has
shown to be a key reason why many households rely on high-cost alternative borrowing (Lusardi
and Scheresberg 2013). Unbanked households may be unaware that banks offer low-cost financial
services or underestimate the long-run benefits of having bank accounts. Similarly, respondents
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with lower financial literacy may turn to informal borrowing to avoid the short-term costs associ-
ated with account ownership but overestimate those short-term costs or underestimate the long-run
costs of such an approach. The evidence does not suggest that this the case, however. Households
appear to be aware of the relative costs and benefits of banks (Dunham 2001), and the effects of
variation in financial literacy would not exhibit the heterogeneity by race and ethnicity and income
that are observed.
Rather than focusing on characteristics of individuals, it is possible that neighborhoods in
which access to banking is low differ in systematic ways that influence access to informal bor-
rowing. Specifically, the sociology literature on social support networks has documented these
networks primarily in low-to-moderate income, urban neighborhoods. These same neighborhoods
are also more likely to have fewer accessible bank branches (Avery et al. 1997; Baradaran 2015).
In fact, Vermilyea and Wilcox (2002) find that living in a predominantly Black or Hispanic neigh-
borhood is associated with being unbanked, while the race and ethnicity of the individual is not a
predictor of unbanked status. In this analysis, the estimates only account for geographic variation
at the state level, making it likely that the effects of neighborhood characteristics are at best impre-
cisely accounted for. Therefore, the positive and statistically significant estimate of ρ–primarily
accounted for by Non-White individuals in the sample–may mean that the social costs associated
with informal borrowing are lowest for individuals in the same neighborhoods in which traditional
bank services are the least accessible.
(4) Which unobserved variables could make respondents both more likely to be unbanked and
less likely to use informal borrowing as part of a bundle of coping strategies, particularly among
White respondents? This result (see Table 2.6) appears to contradict the previous finding and inter-
pretation. It suggests that–conditional on not planning to use only informal borrowing–respondents
perceive high costs (or low benefits) of banking formality and high costs (or low benefits) of infor-
mal borrowing as part of a broader coping strategy conditional on banked/unbanked status. One
possibility is that there are differentials in the social costs of informal borrowing for unbanked
individuals based on race and ethnicity due to neighborhood characteristics. It is well documented
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that poverty tends be more highly concentrated in communities of color. One recent study finds
that 26.1% of poor White individuals lived in high-poverty neighborhoods between 2005 and 2009,
compared to 33.0% of Hispanic individuals and 49.2% of Black individuals (Lichter, Parisi, and
Taquino 2012). As noted previously, high-poverty neighborhoods are more likely to be charac-
terized by support networks. The inverse may also be true: In neighborhoods where poverty is
less concentrated, financial distress for the individual–such as being unbanked–may be associated
with high social costs because such distress is less common and may be more often a source of
stigma. In that case, the latent variable of social support availability is negatively related to the
joint outcomes: More social support is associated with greater informal borrowing independent of
unbanked status, but being unbanked in the context of less concentrated poverty makes households
hesitant to access social networks. This would be most relevant among White households to the
extent that poverty is less concentrated among White households. The negative and statistically
significant estimate of ρ–this time accounted for by White individuals in the sample–may mean
that the social costs associated with informal borrowing are greatest for individuals in the same
neighborhoods in which traditional bank services are the most accessible.
Why would this latent relationship differ based on whether informal borrowing is used ex-
clusively or as part of a bundle of strategies? The results may be influenced by selection bias.
Respondents with the greatest access to network resources (low social costs) would be more likely
to exclusively rely on informal borrowing rather than combine it with high-cost alternatives that
appear to come lower in the pecking order of household coping strategies. Similarly, respondents
who have equally low social costs for informal borrowing but would not use informal borrowing
exclusively presumably do so because they have preferable alternatives (e.g., savings) that are less
common among the unbanked. Therefore, social network support is more likely to be related to
informal borrowing in the context of exclusive reliance on informal borrowing.
As noted in Section 2.5.1, robustness checks suggest that these heterogeneous relationships
between informal borrowing use and unbanked status are systematically related to income. High-
income households account for the positive direct relationship and negative latent relationship be-
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tween unbanked status and informal borrowing in combination with other strategies. Low-income
households account for the negative or insignificant direct relationship and positive latent rela-
tionship between unbanked status and informal borrowing reliance. These findings are broadly
consistent with the interpretations above. Unbanked status for low-income households may rep-
resent limitations to bank access while unbanked status is more likely to represent an adverse
financial shock for high-income households, and the social costs of relying on informal borrowing
as a response may vary according to each situation.
2.7 Conclusions
This analysis used data from the Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking to iden-
tify households that plan to make use of or rely on informal borrowing as an emergency coping
strategy and to determine whether such use is linked to financial exclusion. While informal bor-
rowing has short-run benefits for liquidity-constrained households, it also risks incurring long-run
costs. Some of these are shared with alternative finance, such as fewer opportunities to develop a
credit history. Others are unique to informal borrowing. There may be community-wide effects on
social mobility if the use of funds within the support network is not accompanied by opportunities
to accumulate wealth or even works at cross-purposes to those efforts. There has been limited
systematic analysis of informal borrowing in economics beyond the development literature. As a
result, those who are disproportionately represented among informal borrowers may be missed in
U.S. policy debates surrounding non-bank credit options and financial inclusion.
The results provide evidence that a broad cross-section of households–especially but not exclu-
sively those with lower income and educational attainment–are likely to use informal borrowing in
some way. For some households, borrowing from friends and family represents only one of many
coping strategies. Consistent with the existing literature, the bundling of several coping strategies
including informal borrowing is associated with lower income, lower educational attainment, and
financial insecurity more broadly (Lusardi et al. 2011). However, others report that friends and
family would be their only financial tool for dealing with an emergency expense. Women of color
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are disproportionately represented in this group, even after controlling for income and other house-
hold characteristics: Black women and other Non-White, non-Hispanic women are about two to
three times more likely to report plans to use informal borrowing as their sole coping strategy than
White men and women.
These intersectional gaps persist among those who would conventionally be termed “banked”
as well as the unbanked. However, unobserved factors appear to simultaneously push many indi-
viduals away from banks and to encourage reliance on informal borrowing. An extension of the
baseline model incorporating a measure of discouragement suggests that exclusionary constraints
such as minimal physical access to banks and other neighborhood effects play an important role
in explaining this relationship. Specifically, unbanked households in low-income communities–
which also tend to have fewer bank branches–may experience lower social costs associated with
informal borrowing compared to unbanked households in relatively high-income communities.
Reliance on networks for short-run borrowing needs thus appears to be associated with financial
exclusion while also being characteristic of many respondents who would traditionally be consid-
ered banked.
The data used for this analysis provide important insights on household coping strategies and
credit use, but there are also several limitations for the purposes of this paper. First and foremost,
the key variable of interest captures respondents’ planned coping strategies rather than their actual
behavior. Bond and Townsend (1996) find important discrepancies between preferences regarding
bank and non-bank credit given a hypothetical borrowing situation and their actual use in their
study of a predominantly Hispanic Chicago neighborhood. However, their results suggest that
respondents tended to underestimate their actual reliance on friends and family. Therefore, the
results of the current analysis may actually understate the extent of informal borrowing, although
discrepancies in the other direction are possible as well.
Second, the results of this analysis are limited to household coping strategies for a short-term
emergency expense of a relatively small amount ($400). While my results are broadly consistent
with work that has focused on coping strategies in response to a larger expense ($2,000 in Lusardi
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et al. [2011]), there are still limits to the generalizability of these results. Households that plan
to rely on friends and family for a $400 expense may still use bank or alternative credit for much
smaller or much larger expenses.
Finally, an important policy question would be to directly estimate whether underbanked and
unbanked households are more likely to turn to informal finance or to alternative financial services.
The SHED data preclude an analysis of this sort, however, by combining plans to use fringe lenders
with plans to use (high-cost) bank services such as overdraft fees and by limiting fringe lenders to
payday lenders. Households may in fact plan on using other alternative credit sources such as title
loans, but this is only captured under “other.”
Households relying solely on friends and family for emergency expenses fall well short of the
ideal of financial inclusion that is referenced in the literature. Policies that seek to use financial
inclusion to address the substantial and pervasive economic inequality that exists–especially along
the lines of race and gender–should expand the notion of the underbanked to include those who
fall outside of all paid credit services, whether provided by banks or fringe lenders. The question
of which policies would be most effective merits further research. Possibilities include initiatives
like the Mission Asset Fund, which seeks to bridge community resources with opportunities to
build a credit score and participate in formal financial markets, or postal banking, a long-discussed
concept that has recently been reintroduced to U.S. policy debates (Weissman 2018). In addition,
these results suggest that constraints to bank access continue to play an important role in pushing
respondents away from bank credit and towards non-bank options, of which informal borrowing
is an underexamined option. Further research is needed to understand the extent to which both
these constraints and the availability of support networks influence households’ financial choices.
Interviews and other qualitative work are important potential avenues to better understand the
latent factors that can only be indirectly assessed in this quantitative analysis. Ensuring that bank
account ownership and low-cost credit products are available to low-income consumers should be
an ongoing policy priority.
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2.8 Tables and figures
Table 2.1: Responsibility for financial decision-making by household head status and marital status
Single, widowed, Married or cohabiting
Responsibility for... or separated
Paying bills Not head Head Not head Head
None or almost none 34.4% 3.7% *** 14.4% 11.4%
Some 23.7% 4.4% *** 14.2% 9.2% *
Shared equally 17.6% 6.8% *** 38.8% 29.7% **
Most 6.0% 4.5% 9.1% 11.9%
All or almost all 18.3% 80.6% *** 23.5% 37.9% ***
Savings and investments
None or almost none 54.3% 7.7% *** 19.4% 9.7% ***
Some 10.2% 3.2% *** 11.8% 9.2%
Shared equally 14.4% 6.9% *** 39.3% 37.2%
Most 5.6% 4.6% 11.0% 15.0%
All or almost all 15.6% 77.6% *** 18.4% 28.9% ***
Proportion of households: 65.5% 36.6% 34.5% 63.4%
Source: 2013 Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking
Notes: All proportions are calculated using sample weights. “Proportion of households” is proportion of
respondents with given marital status who are head/not head. Asterisks indicate statistically significant
difference in means at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels.
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Table 2.2: Selected coping strategies by number selected and bank account ownership
Number of strategies selected
All One Two ≥ Three Banked Unbanked
All respondents
Bank credit 57.9% 48.6% 85.6% 76.9% 58.8% 34.0%
Savings 52.6% 42.0% 83.7% 78.1% 53.9% 20.8%
Informal borrowing 10.8% 5.2% 16.1% 74.0% 9.9% 34.7%
Alternative credit 1.9% 0.7% 2.2% 19.8% 1.8% 4.6%
Sale of assets 6.9% 1.7% 10.9% 68.8% 6.2% 25.2%
Other 1.8% 1.8% 1.6% 3.6% 1.6% 7.6%
N 24228 17587 5507 1134 23509 719
White, Non-Hispanic
Bank credit 59.3% 49.6% 88.7% 81.0% 59.9% 35.5%
Savings 54.4% 43.5% 87.9% 78.8% 55.2% 21.9%
Informal borrowing 8.4% 3.9% 12.3% 70.5% 7.7% 37.5%
Alternative credit 1.1% 0.3% 1.1% 14.5% 1.0% 4.2%
Sale of assets 5.7% 1.3% 8.4% 72.0% 5.3% 22.2%
Other 1.5% 1.4% 1.5% 4.3% 1.4% 6.6%
N 18668 13640 4283 745 18333 335
Black, Non-Hispanic
Bank credit 46.0% 35.4% 70.6% 77.0% 47.6% 28.2%
Savings 53.6% 46.3% 69.8% 78.7% 57.2% 15.0%
Informal borrowing 18.2% 9.2% 30.3% 76.3% 16.6% 34.9%
Alternative credit 5.6% 2.1% 8.8% 32.7% 5.4% 7.4%
Sale of assets 10.2% 3.4% 18.8% 56.7% 8.5% 28.4%
Other 2.9% 3.5% 1.6% 1.6% 2.3% 9.7%
N 1817 1269 412 136 1639 178
Hispanic
Bank credit 54.1% 46.1% 79.8% 66.5% 55.5% 37.6%
Savings 47.5% 38.1% 72.4% 74.6% 49.6% 22.2%
Informal borrowing 17.5% 9.1% 24.2% 79.3% 16.2% 33.3%
Alternative credit 3.8% 1.4% 3.0% 27.4% 3.8% 3.3%
Sale of assets 11.1% 2.6% 18.5% 72.0% 10.0% 24.9%
Other 2.6% 2.8% 2.0% 1.8% 2.2% 7.7%
N 2293 1650 469 174 2135 158
Source: 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017 Surveys of Household Economics and Decisionmaking
Notes: All proportions are calculated using sample weights. N is unweighted number of observations for





















































































































































































































































































































(d) White, Non-Hispanic respondents
Figure 2.1: Informal borrowing rates by gender, race/ethnicity, and bank account ownership
Source: 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017 Surveys of Household Economics and Decisionmaking.
Notes: Proportions are calculated using sample weights and omit respondents who indicated they would be
unable to cope with the emergency expense.
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Table 2.3: Household characteristics by banked status and informal borrowing
By bank account ownership By informal borrowing use
Variable Banked Unbanked Would not use Would use
Race and ethnicity
White, Non-Hisp. 68.7% 40.2% 69.5% 52.3%
Black, Non-Hisp. 9.3% 22.2% 9.0% 16.5%
Hispanic 14.0% 30.3% 13.5% 23.6%
Other, Non-Hisp. 8.0% 7.4% 8.0% 7.5%
Female 51.2% 52.8% 50.9% 54.5%
Age 48.9 (17.3) 39 (14.1) 49.6 (17.3) 39.2 (14.622)
Marital status
Married 59.5% 30.5% 61.3% 34.5%
Widowed 4.5% 3.2% 4.6% 3.6%
Divorced 9.4% 14.2% 9.3% 11.7%
Separated 1.1% 5.2% 1.1% 2.5%
Never married 19.9% 37.4% 18.4% 38.6%
Living with partner 5.6% 9.5% 5.3% 9.1%
Household size 2.65 (1.4) 2.93 (1.4) 2.6 (1.4) 3.14 (1.473)
Educational attainment
Less than high school 4.8% 21.9% 4.6% 11.9%
High school/GED 26.5% 41.1% 26.4% 32.4%
Some college 18.5% 18.4% 17.6% 25.9%
Certificate/associate’s 13.4% 9.0% 13.3% 12.7%
Bachelor’s degree 21.3% 6.4% 21.8% 11.9%
Master’s degree 9.9% 1.9% 10.3% 3.8%
Professional or doctoral 5.6% 1.3% 5.9% 1.4%
Homeowner 69.9% 33.3% 72.6% 35.6%
Monthly income volatility
Roughly the same 72.0% 45.6% 72.5% 58.1%
Varies some months 20.5% 31.1% 20.1% 26.7%
Varies quite a bit 7.6% 23.3% 7.3% 15.2%
Yearly income
Less than $14,999 5.1% 34.6% 5.1% 15.1%
$15,000 to $39,999 17.8% 24.3% 16.9% 28.1%
$40,000 to $99,999 41.0% 29.8% 40.5% 41.1%
More than $100,000 36.1% 11.3% 37.5% 15.7%
Household head 82.2% 57.4% 83.8% 60.1%
Lives in metro 86.3% 82.2% 86.3% 85.0%
N 23509 719 21978 2250
Source: 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017 Surveys of Household Economics and Decisionmaking.
Notes: All proportions are calculated using sample weights.
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Table 2.4: Exclusive use of informal borrowing and unbanked status: parameter estimates
All White Respondents Black Respondents
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.0325 -0.0255 -0.0534 0.0111 0.114 0.525***













Age -0.0135*** -0.0157*** -0.0147*** -0.0216*** -0.0105** -0.00981*
(0.00223) (0.00202) (0.00300) (0.00273) (0.00483) (0.00545)
Widowed 0.329** 0.282** 0.528*** 0.246* -0.617* 0.686**
(0.135) (0.122) (0.136) (0.138) (0.352) (0.292)
Divorced 0.440*** 0.367*** 0.488*** 0.325*** 0.0613 0.479***
(0.0858) (0.0834) (0.105) (0.104) (0.230) (0.177)
Separated 0.765*** 0.522*** 0.828*** 0.891*** 0.908*** -0.0346
(0.145) (0.170) (0.258) (0.225) (0.264) (0.361)
Never married 0.121 0.271*** 0.0660 0.313*** 0.156 0.172
(0.0863) (0.0740) (0.131) (0.0916) (0.168) (0.173)
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Living with partner 0.233** 0.123 0.256* 0.144 0.0176 -0.250
(0.103) (0.113) (0.140) (0.140) (0.234) (0.330)
High school/GED -0.390*** -0.279*** -0.595*** -0.186 -0.307 -0.365
(0.0983) (0.105) (0.146) (0.152) (0.214) (0.266)
Some college -0.725*** -0.362*** -0.898*** -0.284* -0.703*** -0.548*
(0.110) (0.114) (0.159) (0.163) (0.233) (0.293)
Certificate/associate’s -0.826*** -0.462*** -0.905*** -0.375** -1.121*** -0.673**
(0.123) (0.126) (0.181) (0.179) (0.283) (0.329)
Bachelors -1.098*** -1.010*** -1.190*** -0.894*** -1.301*** -1.255***
(0.122) (0.134) (0.172) (0.185) (0.278) (0.394)
Masters -1.140*** -0.865*** -1.307*** -0.944*** -1.046*** -0.717*
(0.152) (0.155) (0.191) (0.207) (0.325) (0.384)
Professional or doctoral -1.126*** -1.042*** -1.165*** -0.853*** -0.987*** -1.429***
(0.175) (0.203) (0.238) (0.283) (0.364) (0.448)
Homeowner -0.351*** -0.292*** -0.557***
(0.0734) (0.105) (0.149)
Moderate income volatility 0.326*** 0.305*** 0.310**
(0.0613) (0.0817) (0.148)
High income volatility 0.548*** 0.419*** 0.627***
(0.0713) (0.103) (0.168)
Household size 0.0620*** 0.0572** 0.136***
(0.0166) (0.0237) (0.0408)
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$15,000 to $39,999 -0.101 -0.148 -0.0814
(0.0776) (0.100) (0.177)
$40,000 to $99,999 -0.334*** -0.424*** -0.341*
(0.0838) (0.111) (0.205)
More than $100,000 -0.655*** -0.825*** -0.648**
(0.104) (0.135) (0.260)
Unbanked -0.00204 0.706 -0.0727
(0.245) (0.569) (0.460)
Household head -0.374*** -0.336*** -0.498***
(0.0657) (0.0835) (0.161)
Rho (ρ) 0.267** 0.00357 0.302
N 22689 17716 1598
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would use informal borrowing in combination
with another coping strategy. Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would exclusively use informal borrowing and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed
effects not shown. All parameter estimates are calculated using sample weights.
Reference Group: Male, White (Non-Hispanic), married, less than high school education, not a homeowner, low income volatility, less than
$15,000 household income, banked, not household head.
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Table 2.5: Exclusive use of informal borrowing and unbanked status: average marginal effects
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.00252 -0.00224 Some college -0.0830*** -0.0442***
(0.00584) (0.00554) (0.0162) (0.0160)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.0339*** -0.00505 Certificate/associate’s -0.0893*** -0.0533***
(0.0103) (0.0113) (0.0163) (0.0167)
Hispanic 0.0244** -0.00126 Bachelors -0.102*** -0.0845***
(0.00988) (0.0105) (0.0158) (0.0156)
Other, non-Hispanic 0.0130 -0.0150 Masters -0.103*** -0.0788***
(0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0161) (0.0163)
Female#Black 0.0110 0.0628*** Professional or doctoral -0.103*** -0.0856***
(0.0124) (0.0234) (0.0164) (0.0164)
Female#Hispanic 0.0132 0.0280 Homeowner -0.0272***
(0.0126) (0.0172) (0.00591)
Female#Other 0.0146 0.0447 Moderate income volatility 0.0257***
(0.0195) (0.0291) (0.00544)
Age -0.00104*** -0.00137*** High income volatility 0.0504***
(0.000184) (0.000189) (0.00835)
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Widowed 0.0265** 0.0241** Household size 0.00544***
(0.0131) (0.0122) (0.00146)
Divorced 0.0383*** 0.0333*** $15,000 to $39,999 -0.0121
(0.00874) (0.00880) (0.00955)
Separated 0.0826*** 0.0525** $40,000 to $99,999 -0.0346***
(0.0220) (0.0224) (0.00965)
Never married 0.00841 0.0230*** More than $100,000 -0.0560***
(0.00602) (0.00660) (0.00973)
Living with partner 0.0175** 0.00941 Unbanked -0.000179
(0.00835) (0.00917) (0.0214)
High school/GED -0.0538*** -0.0357** Household head -0.0362***
(0.0159) (0.0153) (0.00712)
Sample mean: 3.4% 4.1% N 22689
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would use informal borrowing in combination
with another coping strategy. Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would exclusively use informal borrowing and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed
effects not shown.
Reference Group: Male, White (Non-Hispanic), married, less than high school education, not a homeowner, low income volatility, less than
$15,000 household income, banked, not household head.
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Table 2.6: Use of informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and unbanked status: parameter estimates
All White Respondents Black Respondents
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.0358 0.0408 -0.0391 0.0491 0.168 0.152
(0.0723) (0.0444) (0.0700) (0.0454) (0.123) (0.102)












Age -0.0119*** -0.0136*** -0.0112*** -0.0166*** -0.0105** -0.00588
(0.00222) (0.00141) (0.00283) (0.00170) (0.00468) (0.00402)
Widowed 0.227 0.218** 0.317** 0.215* -0.297 0.290
(0.146) (0.0970) (0.146) (0.117) (0.363) (0.249)
Divorced 0.412*** 0.289*** 0.446*** 0.288*** 0.183 0.00744
(0.0861) (0.0584) (0.103) (0.0683) (0.221) (0.153)
Separated 0.622*** 0.278** 0.571*** 0.503*** 0.865*** -0.584
(0.137) (0.137) (0.214) (0.157) (0.291) (0.359)
Never married 0.118 0.230*** 0.113 0.204*** 0.112 -0.00851
(0.0817) (0.0551) (0.117) (0.0674) (0.171) (0.140)
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Living with partner 0.174* 0.301*** 0.183 0.228** 0.243 -0.222
(0.102) (0.0764) (0.142) (0.0951) (0.206) (0.196)
High school/GED -0.405*** -0.139 -0.453*** -0.222* -0.272 -0.178
(0.0973) (0.0878) (0.153) (0.130) (0.214) (0.198)
Some college -0.755*** -0.0713 -0.818*** -0.223* -0.736*** 0.300
(0.107) (0.0912) (0.168) (0.133) (0.225) (0.199)
Certificate/associate’s -0.780*** -0.208** -0.809*** -0.217 -0.920*** -0.124
(0.116) (0.0947) (0.174) (0.136) (0.274) (0.223)
Bachelors -1.087*** -0.287*** -1.063*** -0.375*** -1.122*** 0.0504
(0.122) (0.0952) (0.184) (0.137) (0.264) (0.237)
Masters -1.098*** -0.402*** -1.153*** -0.522*** -0.895*** -0.163
(0.148) (0.107) (0.196) (0.150) (0.314) (0.264)
Professional or doctoral -1.105*** -0.481*** -1.021*** -0.577*** -0.947** -0.569*
(0.176) (0.127) (0.240) (0.176) (0.386) (0.327)
Homeowner -0.368*** -0.325*** -0.665***
(0.0670) (0.0885) (0.155)
Moderate income volatility 0.299*** 0.256*** 0.321**
(0.0622) (0.0837) (0.138)
High income volatility 0.551*** 0.462*** 0.527***
(0.0727) (0.0984) (0.169)
Household size 0.0885*** 0.0834*** 0.113***
(0.0136) (0.0174) (0.0350)
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$15,000 to $39,999 -0.0602 -0.177** -0.00614
(0.0616) (0.0759) (0.142)
$40,000 to $99,999 -0.393*** -0.560*** -0.398**
(0.0644) (0.0794) (0.158)
More than $100,000 -0.746*** -0.918*** -0.806***
(0.0772) (0.0936) (0.197)
Unbanked 0.308 0.828*** 0.616
(0.243) (0.320) (0.567)
Household head -0.120** -0.170*** -0.331***
(0.0493) (0.0606) (0.123)
Rho (ρ) -0.110 -0.231* -0.307
N 23517 18258 1696
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would exclusively use informal borrowing.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would use informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed effects not
shown. All parameter estimates are calculated using sample weights.
Reference Group: Male, White (Non-Hispanic), married, less than high school education, not a homeowner, low income volatility, less than
$15,000 household income, banked, not household head.
77
Table 2.7: Use of informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and unbanked status: marginal effects
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.00260 0.00571 Some college -0.0807*** -0.0117
(0.00528) (0.00621) (0.0152) (0.0154)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.0265*** 0.0303** Certificate/associate’s -0.0822*** -0.0318**
(0.00920) (0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0154)
Hispanic 0.0266*** 0.00728 Bachelors -0.0959*** -0.0420***
(0.00951) (0.0122) (0.0151) (0.0153)
Other, non-Hispanic 0.0112 0.0153 Masters -0.0963*** -0.0551***
(0.0113) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0158)
Female#Black 0.0145 0.0105 Professional or doctoral -0.0965*** -0.0630***
(0.0121) (0.0174) (0.0156) (0.0168)
Female#Hispanic 0.00334 0.00290 Homeowner -0.0266***
(0.0105) (0.0160) (0.00502)
Female#Other 0.00800 -0.00784 Moderate income volatility 0.0218***
(0.0166) (0.0190) (0.00508)
Age -0.000862*** -0.00190*** High income volatility 0.0484***
(0.000170) (0.000206) (0.00814)
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Widowed 0.0163 0.0298** Household size 0.0124***
(0.0121) (0.0148) (0.00191)
Divorced 0.0338*** 0.0413*** $15,000 to $39,999 -0.0122
(0.00836) (0.00922) (0.0127)
Separated 0.0592*** 0.0396* $40,000 to $99,999 -0.0673***
(0.0176) (0.0224) (0.0124)




Living with partner 0.0120 0.0433*** Unbanked 0.0501
(0.00750) (0.0124) (0.0456)
High school/GED -0.0530*** -0.0221 Household head -0.0174**
(0.0152) (0.0147) (0.00742)
Sample mean 3.2% 7.3% N 23517
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would exclusively use informal borrowing.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would use informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed effects not
shown.
Reference Group: Male, White (Non-Hispanic), married, less than high school education, not a homeowner, low income volatility, less than
$15,000 household income, banked, not household head.
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Figure 2.2: Predicted probabilities of joint outcomes by race, gender, and informal borrowing outcome
Notes: Bars indicate predicted probability of joint outcome. Probabilities estimated using average marginal
effects. Brackets indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Table 2.8: Discouragement’s relationship to the exclusive use of informal borrowing and unbanked status:
average marginal effects
All White Respondents Black Respondents
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.00193 -0.00237 -0.00155 0.000567 0.0133 0.0463***
(0.00591) (0.00562) (0.00282) (0.00329) (0.0138) (0.0149)












Discouraged 0.00518 0.0550*** 0.00780* 0.0284*** -0.0329* 0.0521***
(0.00656) (0.00935) (0.00422) (0.00423) (0.0182) (0.0185)
Unbanked -0.000988 0.0271 0.000670
(0.0209) (0.0289) (0.0539)
Rho (ρ) 0.301*** 0.0966 0.293
N 22183 17373 1541
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would use
informal borrowing in combination with other strategies. Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would
exclusively use informal borrowing and 0 otherwise. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the * 10%,
** 5%, and *** 1% levels. Controls not shown.
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Table 2.9: Discouragement’s relationship to the use of informal borrowing in combination with other
strategies and unbanked status: average marginal effects
All White Respondents Black Respondents
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.00250 0.00633 -0.00134 0.00495 0.0174 0.0147
(0.00533) (0.00625) (0.00267) (0.00438) (0.0133) (0.0175)












Discouraged 0.00283 0.126*** 0.00687* 0.0638*** -0.0223 0.123***
(0.00568) (0.0116) (0.00403) (0.00600) (0.0154) (0.0191)
Unbanked 0.0427 0.0734** 0.119
(0.0438) (0.0305) (0.0867)
Rho (ρ) -0.0920 -0.230* -0.324
N 22977 17894 1630
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would
exclusively use informal borrowing. Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would use informal borrow-
ingăin combination with other strategies and 0 otherwise. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the *
10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. Controls not shown.
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Table 2.10: Exclusive use of bank credit and savings: average marginal effects
Bank Credit Savings
Unbanked BankCrexc Unbanked Savingsexc
Female -0.00224 0.000820 -0.000173 0.00601
(0.00617) (0.0109) (0.00647) (0.0107)
Black, non-Hisp. 0.0330*** -0.117*** 0.0390*** 0.0835***
(0.0112) (0.0268) (0.0113) (0.0279)
Hispanic 0.0247** 0.0207 0.0259** 0.0163
(0.0103) (0.0238) (0.0106) (0.0232)
Other, non-Hisp. 0.0171 0.0634** 0.00557 -0.0651**
(0.0152) (0.0316) (0.0121) (0.0290)
Female#Black 0.0159 0.00887 0.0129 -0.0228
(0.0140) (0.0377) (0.0136) (0.0348)
Female#Hispanic 0.0132 -0.0395 0.0114 -0.0325
(0.0139) (0.0326) (0.0135) (0.0313)
Female#Other 0.0132 -0.00419 0.0220 -0.00103
(0.0214) (0.0411) (0.0229) (0.0417)
Unbanked -0.268*** -0.339***
(0.0668) (0.0393)
Rho (ρ) 0.324*** 0.338**
N 18040 18179
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would use
bank credit/savings in combination with other strategies. Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would
exclusively use bank credit/savings and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed
effects not shown.
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Table 2.11: Exclusive use of informal borrowing and unbanked status regressions by income group
Less than $60,000 $60,000 or greater
Parameter Estimates Marginal Effects Parameter Estimates Marginal Effects
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.0448 0.0354 -0.00415 0.00418 -0.102 -0.116 -0.00567 -0.00806
(0.0842) (0.0712) (0.00784) (0.00836) (0.128) (0.106) (0.00718) (0.00745)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.577*** 0.0915 0.0630*** 0.0111 -0.497** 0.137 -0.0211** 0.0109
(0.130) (0.154) (0.0178) (0.0198) (0.253) (0.248) (0.00948) (0.0208)
Hispanic 0.401*** 0.161 0.0388*** 0.0205 -0.0400 -0.240 -0.00237 -0.0150
(0.126) (0.128) (0.0140) (0.0175) (0.201) (0.203) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Other, non-Hispanic -0.0139 -0.253 -0.000998 -0.0245* 0.289 -0.180 0.0217 -0.0116
(0.201) (0.158) (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.209) (0.275) (0.0182) (0.0163)
Female#Black 0.0725 0.452*** 0.00696 0.0673** 0.956*** 0.476 0.0972* 0.0420
(0.163) (0.168) (0.0162) (0.0303) (0.345) (0.304) (0.0561) (0.0334)
Female#Hispanic -0.0134 0.205 -0.00123 0.0270 0.564** 0.388 0.0438 0.0329
(0.161) (0.160) (0.0147) (0.0230) (0.264) (0.283) (0.0277) (0.0288)
Female#Other 0.295 0.543** 0.0324 0.0863* 0.127 0.154 0.00761 0.0117
(0.259) (0.231) (0.0333) (0.0474) (0.295) (0.364) (0.0193) (0.0302)
Unbanked -0.502 -0.0458* 0.595 0.0559
(0.357) (0.0271) (0.570) (0.0726)
Rho (ρ) 0.588** 0.0254
N 10529 12160
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would use informal borrowing in combination
with another coping strategy. Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would exclusively use informal borrowing and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistically significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed
effects not shown. All parameter estimates are calculated using sample weights.
85
Table 2.12: Use of informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and unbanked status regressions by income group
Less than $60,000 $60,000 or greater
Parameter Estimates Marginal Effects Parameter Estimates Marginal Effects
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female 0.0213 0.0477 0.00184 0.00868 -0.168 0.0250 -0.00906 0.00286
(0.0854) (0.0558) (0.00736) (0.0101) (0.122) (0.0699) (0.00670) (0.00802)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.528*** 0.166 0.0521*** 0.0317 -0.339 0.428*** -0.0151 0.0559**
(0.129) (0.115) (0.0156) (0.0234) (0.254) (0.143) (0.00999) (0.0222)
Hispanic 0.459*** 0.113 0.0430*** 0.0210 -0.0914 0.200 -0.00491 0.0227
(0.127) (0.105) (0.0140) (0.0202) (0.202) (0.129) (0.0105) (0.0158)
Other, non-Hispanic 0.0288 0.0302 0.00195 0.00534 0.266 0.190 0.0187 0.0214
(0.185) (0.131) (0.0127) (0.0235) (0.199) (0.152) (0.0160) (0.0188)
Female#Black 0.0455 0.135 0.00403 0.0263 0.798** 0.00182 0.0708 0.000209
(0.160) (0.139) (0.0145) (0.0287) (0.323) (0.187) (0.0437) (0.0215)
Female#Hispanic -0.213 -0.0711 -0.0165 -0.0125 0.530** 0.0691 0.0391 0.00819
(0.162) (0.136) (0.0112) (0.0231) (0.259) (0.175) (0.0254) (0.0214)
Female#Other 0.163 -0.0268 0.0156 -0.00482 0.111 -0.0624 0.00632 -0.00693
(0.249) (0.181) (0.0262) (0.0321) (0.291) (0.218) (0.0179) (0.0235)
Unbanked -0.0389 -0.00696 1.123** 0.223
(0.291) (0.0510) (0.510) (0.151)
Rho (ρ) 0.106 -0.418*
N 11092 12425
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would exclusively use informal borrowing.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would use informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistically significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed effects
not shown. All parameter estimates are calculated using sample weights.
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Table 2.13: Exclusive use of informal borrowing and unbanked status regressions by income relative to poverty line
< 100% of Poverty Line 100% to 200% of Poverty Line > 200% of Poverty Line
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.000573 0.0265 -0.0127 -0.0186 -0.00542 -0.00365
(0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0141) (0.0182) (0.00591) (0.00630)
Black, non-Hisp. 0.141*** 0.0665 0.0519* 0.0347 -0.000387 -0.000824
(0.0485) (0.100) (0.0286) (0.0357) (0.00945) (0.0148)
Hispanic 0.0896** -0.0237 0.0102 -0.00975 0.0132 0.00139
(0.0405) (0.0570) (0.0191) (0.0255) (0.00981) (0.0121)
Other, non-Hisp. -0.0123 -0.0149 0.0184 -0.0136 0.0123 -0.0192
(0.0441) (0.0625) (0.0416) (0.0384) (0.0123) (0.0124)
Female#Black -0.00885 0.0328 -0.00589 0.0690 0.0357 0.0561*
(0.0404) (0.0579) (0.0263) (0.0546) (0.0254) (0.0301)
Female#Hispanic -0.0229 0.119 -0.000456 0.0568 0.0190 0.00955
(0.0379) (0.0837) (0.0261) (0.0470) (0.0159) (0.0180)
Female#Other 0.110 0.135 -0.0129 0.0458 0.00432 0.0356
(0.109) (0.137) (0.0390) (0.0714) (0.0162) (0.0351)
Unbanked -0.107 -0.113*** 0.0648
(0.116) (0.00825) (0.0623)
Rho (ρ) 0.729 1.000** 0.0165
N 1702 2721 18266
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would exclusively use informal borrowing.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would use informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistically significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed effects
not shown. All parameter estimates are calculated using sample weights.
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Table 2.14: Use of informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and unbanked status by income relative to poverty line
< 100% of Poverty Line 100% to 200% of Poverty Line > 200% of Poverty Line
Equation: Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal Unbanked Informal
Female -0.00390 -0.0102 -0.000940 0.0214 -0.00639 0.00563
(0.0246) (0.0298) (0.0140) (0.0218) (0.00531) (0.00681)
Black, non-Hisp. 0.0781** 0.0166 0.0648** 0.0515 -0.00175 0.0460**
(0.0398) (0.0565) (0.0314) (0.0540) (0.00890) (0.0186)
Hispanic 0.0961** -0.00577 0.0152 0.0646* 0.00980 0.0113
(0.0418) (0.0496) (0.0202) (0.0388) (0.00934) (0.0144)
Other, non-Hisp. -0.0287 -0.0119 0.0311 0.0460 0.0115 0.0141
(0.0338) (0.0626) (0.0398) (0.0631) (0.0115) (0.0163)
Female#Black 0.0235 0.0263 -0.0267 0.0461 0.0462* 0.00323
(0.0449) (0.0640) (0.0176) (0.0656) (0.0256) (0.0191)
Female#Hispanic -0.0290 -0.0122 -0.0173 -0.0653* 0.0107 0.0175
(0.0339) (0.0572) (0.0231) (0.0355) (0.0132) (0.0209)
Female#Other 0.106 0.0837 -0.0165 -0.0784 0.00103 -0.00391
(0.0960) (0.102) (0.0327) (0.0508) (0.0142) (0.0216)
Unbanked -0.0985 -0.133 0.246*
(0.0824) (0.101) (0.131)
Rho (ρ) 0.289 0.489 -0.380**
N 1825 2933 18759
Notes: Excludes respondents who would be unable to cope with emergency expenditure or who would exclusively use informal borrowing.
Dependent variable equals 1 if respondent would use informal borrowing in combination with other strategies and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistically significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State, year, and metro/non-metro fixed effects
not shown. All parameter estimates are calculated using sample weights.
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Chapter 3
Student Debt Aversion and Implications for College
Choices: A Propensity Scoring Approach
3.1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, the cost of a four-year college degree has increased steeply, while federal
grant-based financial aid packages have remained largely unchanged in real dollar terms. Aver-
age tuition at public four-year institutions increased by 271% between 1976 and 2016 ($2,650 to
$9,840, in 2017 dollars), while average Pell Grant awards only increased by 17% in the same time
period ($3,200 to $3,740, in 2016 dollars) (College Board 2017a,c). As a result, students and their
families have increasingly turned to educational borrowing to fill the gap between the rising cost
of attendance and their ability to pay.
The potential consequences of rising student debt have garnered attention in recent years. Much
of this empirical work has addressed whether heavily indebted professional school graduates are
less likely to choose public-service or generalist careers with lower pay (e.g. Kornhauser and
Revesz 1995; Rosenthal, Marquette, and Diamond 1996) and whether undergraduate debt leads
students to sacrifice amenities or long-term wage growth for higher initial wages (Minicozzi 2005;
Rothstein and Rouse 2011). Others have explored the impact of high indebtedness on the proba-
bility of graduate school enrollment (e.g. Fox 1992; Millett 2003) and on the timing or probability
of marriage and homeownership (Addo 2014; Andrew 2010; Baum and O’Malley 2003).23
While the effects of borrowing on post-graduation outcomes are of clear relevance to educa-
tional policy, it is equally important to understand the determinants and effects of not borrowing
for education. Economists often argue that the impact of a college degree on future earnings out-
weighs the costs of moderate educational debt for many students (Avery and Turner 2012), yet it
is clear that college is not necessarily a prudent investment for all students. In particular, indebted
23See Choi (2014) for a review of the literature concerning student debt, labor market outcomes, and human capital
investment.
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students who do not successfully complete their degree would bear a debt burden without receiv-
ing the college earnings premium. These students consequently have higher default rates on their
student debt (AAUW 2017).
At the same time, prospective students may be hesitant to take on educational debt for psy-
chological or cultural reasons that extend beyond the cost-benefit analysis of obtaining a degree.
Students who are unfamiliar with the financial system, college, or educational lending may not
know whether borrowing for college is worthwhile. For the marginal student who is indifferent
between enrolling or not enrolling in college, this “debt aversion” will lead the student to elect not
to enroll in college when doing so may have long-run benefits or to make debt-minimizing college
choices that may threaten their chances of success in college.
Identifying characteristics associated with debt aversion will help policymakers better under-
stand its role as a barrier to college enrollment and develop targeted grant-based (rather than loan-
based) assistance or financial information. Previous work has suggested that between 5% and
20% of high school and college students are debt averse, although measures of debt aversion vary
(Boatman, Evans, and Soliz 2017). Characteristics such as household income and parental educa-
tion have been found to be related to the magnitude of student indebtedness and possibly to debt
aversion (Burdman 2005; Institute for Higher Education Policy [IHEP] 2008).
In this limited literature, there is at best mixed evidence regarding differences in willingness
to borrow by student gender or by race and ethnicity. The direction or existence of such gaps is
not clear a priori. On one hand, rapid growth in the enrollment of women and students of color
suggest that these groups are more willing to borrow on average than their male counterparts. The
proportion of college students who are female increased from 48% in 1976 to 57% in 2014, and
women hold about two-thirds of total student debt (American Association of University Women
[AAUW] 2017). Black and Hispanic students are also among the most rapidly growing groups
of college students. Black women in particular bear the greatest debt burdens to attend college
(AAUW 2017).
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However, these mean differences conceal other observable characteristics that are known to
vary by demographics and are likely linked to their willingness to take on debt. The data used in
this study support the stylized fact that female high school students on average exhibit superior
overall high school performance (Buddin 2014). Among the college student population, women
and students of color are also more likely to be non-traditional students with lower ability to pay
and thus greater reliance on borrowing (AAUW 2017). Evidence from the psychology, labor eco-
nomics, and household finance literatures point to additional factors that may result in greater aver-
sion to borrowing for women and Black and Hispanic students, including average differences in
financial risk aversion (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998), subjective expectations of success (Beyer
and Bowden 1997), and experience with or confidence regarding the use of financial services (Chen
and Volpe 2002; FDIC 2015; Institute for Higher Education Policy 2008).
This paper estimates the determinants of student debt aversion and its effects on the enrollment
and college choices of high school students. The analysis makes several contributions to the ex-
isting debt aversion literature. First, I use a dataset that has not yet been applied to this topic, the
High School Longitudinal Survey of 2009. Whereas most previous studies rely on cross-sectional
survey data and observed borrowing, this survey directly elicits students’ willingness to borrow,
and I can link these preferences to their later college outcomes. The richness of the data on student
attitudes allows me to separate variation in the expected net pecuniary benefit of education and
other confounding factors from variation in psychological debt burden using a propensity score
matching approach (Field 2006). Second, unlike previous work, these data allow for an ordinal
rather than binary measure of debt aversion. Finally, I am attentive to heterogeneity in the impacts
of debt aversion by race and gender. While the limited sample size of this dataset precludes a
truly intersectional analysis, attention to both race and gender can provide suggestive evidence of
outcomes for women of color.
The results suggest that students who report no willingness to borrow for college are about
five percentage points less likely to enroll in college than students with a moderate willingness to
borrow. Students who have a high willingness to borrow enroll in colleges with higher net costs of
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attendance, and there is suggestive evidence that moderately debt-averse students attend colleges
with a lower net cost as a debt-minimizing measure. The propensity scoring model also points to
demographic differences between more and less debt-averse students. Women as well as Black,
Non-Hispanic students are significantly more likely to be moderately debt averse, while men and
White students are more likely to be on the extremes of the debt aversion distribution.
Students also respond differently to their debt preferences by gender and by race and ethnicity.
Female and Black and Hispanic students with zero willingness to borrow are no less likely to
attend college than less debt-averse students, but they appear to cut borrowing by more than other
students conditional on enrollment. For women in this group, this appears to be partially offset
by higher net cost of attendance, which may reflect greater parental contributions towards college
costs. Meanwhile, similarly debt-averse male students are seven to eight percentage points less
likely to attend college.
These results suggest that debt aversion narrowly defined (in addition to cost aversion more
broadly) has real impacts on students’ college choices and that these impacts vary by race and
gender. Men are most deterred from college enrollment as a result of debt aversion, possibly
playing a role in the underrepresentation of men on college campuses. At the same time, the
disconnect between the stated preferences and observed enrollment behavior of women and some
students of color points towards several interpretations. First, these groups may hold an overriding
preference for college enrollment linked to gender norms or unobserved college benefits that lead
them to attend college but simultaneously make debt-minimizing choices to avoid indebtedness.
These choices may not be conducive to student success. Second, some women may report low
willingness to borrow because parents are more likely to contribute to their education, pointing to
an asymmetry in men’s and women’s access to college.
The paper begins with a brief review of the literature on debt aversion, followed by a theoretical
model describing how students’ and parents’ expectations may influence their willingness to bor-
row. Section 3.4 describes the data and empirical methods, and results are presented in Section 3.5.
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I conclude by discussing possible interpretations, noting limitations to the study, and suggesting
avenues for future research.
3.2 Background and literature review
3.2.1 Defining debt aversion
Student debt aversion is ambiguously defined in the literature. In its broadest sense, debt aver-
sion overlaps significantly with cost aversion and low monetary valuation of college enrollment.
For example, the Institute for Higher Education Policy (2008) identifies “risk aversion” and “short-
sighted loss aversion” as factors contributing to debt aversion (10). A more risk averse individual
will perceive a lower expected payoff of a risky project such as pursuing a degree. Loss averse
students will perceive the loss of future income to repay student loans as greater than future gains
of equivalent discounted value. Other factors that are expected to influence willingness to borrow
include expected returns to education and predicted probability of degree completion (see Section
3.3). Generally the returns to a college education over a lifetime are greater than the costs (Avery
and Turner 2012), but high discounting may also lead to lower willingness to borrow if repayment
must occur before equal benefits accrue.
All of these factors also affect overall willingness to pay. Whether educational costs are paid
from current income or paid out of future income, students are funding a risky project where the
expected returns to education, attitudes towards risk, discounting, and loss aversion will play a
role. The only factors that can lower willingness to borrow specifically must be those linked to the
additional perceived costs or risks associated with debt, namely the pecuniary costs of servicing
debt, future credit constraints due to indebtedness (e.g., lower credit score [Minicozzi 2005]), and
any psychological burden of holding debt (Field 2006). The educational financing decision and the
influence of debt aversion specifically will be addressed in more detail in Section 3.3.
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3.2.2 Literature
Three approaches to identifying debt aversion and the determinants of debt aversion are preva-
lent in the limited empirical literature. A first pass identifies groups of enrolled undergraduates
with lower student debt and infers that these differences are primarily driven by differences in
willingness to borrow. An (Institute for Higher Education Policy 2008) report finds that students
from low-income and unbanked households, students from the highest-income households, and
those enrolled in community colleges are the least likely to borrow. There is also evidence of
variation by race and ethnicity and by parent immigrant status. The report notes that students who
borrow less use a wide range of alternative strategies to fund their education. They are more likely
to live at home, more likely to work, more likely to attend school part-time, and more likely to at-
tend low-cost institutions. However, many of these same strategies seem to result in lower college
persistence rates, pointing to an important trade-off between probability of completion and cost of
attendance.
A second approach closer to the method used in this analysis is to elicit attitudes about borrow-
ing for education directly. These data may provide clearer insight into the role of debt in student
decision-making. In the first study of this type, Mortenson (1988) uses Federal Reserve System
survey data regarding respondents’ attitudes towards debt in general, including student debt. The
surveys, administered periodically between 1959 and 1983, asked respondents whether they felt it
was “all right for someone like [themselves] to borrow money to finance educational expenses,”
among a list of other possible investments and purchases. Mortenson uses cross-tabulations to
look for suggestive trends rather than identify treatment effects. The results suggest that lower
income respondents were least likely to view borrowing for education favorably but also saw the
greatest increase in favorability during the sample period. Hispanic respondents were found to
respond more favorably than other racial groups in the 1977 survey, but their rate of favorability
falls dramatically to be lower than that of other groups by 1983.
However, this analysis is also outdated, lacks controls, and only captures respondent attitudes.
As the author notes, the social psychology literature suggests that attitudes do not correlate per-
94
fectly with behavior. This is doubly concerning because the survey question is a hypothetical,
rather than being posed to students facing a real borrowing decision. The question also places the
decision to borrow for education in contrast to borrowing for other purchases often deemed by re-
spondents to be less legitimate (e.g., buying furs and jewelry). This framing may elicit a different
response than more neutral questions about willingness to borrow (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
More recently, researchers have turned to survey work targeting specific populations, including
high school students, undergraduates, and adults. Callender and Jackson (2008) conducted a survey
of undergraduates at an English university. Respondents were asked whether concerns about cost
affected the type or location of university chosen or their living situation during college. The
survey instruments are novel in that they attempt to distinguish clearly between heterogeneity in
cost aversion, the perceived financial and social benefits of college, and pure debt aversion. They
assess debt aversion by asking students whether borrowing is wrong, in contrast to questions that
elicit a pecuniary cost-benefit analysis (e.g, “Borrowing money to pay for a university education
is a good investment” [414]). The authors find that debt aversion is associated with educational
choices that lower cost or increase expected benefits, including choosing a university in a city
with good employment prospects or low cost of living. These effects are mediated by household
income level. Like the observational approach, this survey is limited by its sample of already
enrolled students, precluding any analysis of the effects of debt aversion on enrollment.
Boatman, Evans, and Soliz (2017) conduct a survey with high school students as well as com-
munity college students and adults who are not enrolled in college. This survey points towards
the challenges of capturing debt aversion in a qualitative fashion. Three debt aversion questions
were asked. One set of questions elicited attitudes towards debt and borrowing (e.g., agreeing
or disagreeing with the statement “Owing money is basically wrong.”). A second set followed
Mortenson (1988) by asking whether borrowing for college specifically is acceptable, and a third
set prompted respondents to make a series of choices between cash-based and loan-based financial
aid packages to reveal debt preferences. The authors note that these measures of debt aversion
were not strongly correlated overall. This suggests that individuals may or may not be debt averse
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for a variety of reasons and depending on context. The approach of the present analysis–to isolate
the effect of debt aversion on an ordinal measure of willingness to borrow–may help address this
concern by making fewer assumptions about the sources of debt aversion, instead controlling for
sources of variation in willingness to pay.
Burdman (2005) supplements this quantitative evidence by interviewing students, university
administrators, and counselors on their attitudes towards student borrowing. Responses suggest
that low willingness to borrow can result from students’ perceptions of poor job prospects (low pe-
cuniary benefits of college) as well from negative past family experiences with credit, overall lack
of integration with the consumer financial system, and cultural aversion to borrowing. High school
counselors and university staff often advise students to avoid taking on debt altogether. Burdman
suggests improved communication, finance-focused retention programs, and no-loan programs as
potential means of mitigating debt aversion.
Finally, a few studies have used experiments to isolate the effects of debt aversion. In one ran-
domized experiment by Field (2006), students who applied to the NYU Law School were offered
one of two financial aid packages of equivalent financial value, varying only in the level of debt
burden. In the treatment group, students were given a partial tuition waiver, and the remaining
tuition costs could be funded by borrowing. In the control group, students were given no tuition
waiver, but all tuition costs could be funded by borrowing. In both cases, if students chose and
remained in a public interest law career, all debts would be paid off by NYU Law School over a
ten-year period following graduation. If students in the treatment group chose a private law ca-
reer, the tuition waiver would be converted into debt for which the student was liable. The results
confirmed the hypothesis that students experience a psychological burden of indebtedness that is
independent of the cost of servicing debt or the financial value of the loan-based financial aid. This
psychological cost led more students in the control group than the treatment group to choose a
higher paying private law career over a public interest law career.
Eckel, Johnson, Montmarquette, and Rojas (2007) reach a different conclusion about debt
aversion in a Canadian experiment. Participants were offered a series of choices between cash
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payments or subsidized educational provision via various possible funding methods (grants, loans,
matched savings, and income-sensitive repayment loans).They structured the choices so as to indi-
rectly elicit differences in time preference and risk aversion, supplemented by survey information
on debt aversion, financial literacy, attitudes towards the value of education, and demographics and
family background. They conclude that while many observed characteristics are correlated with
willingness to invest in education, there is no evidence of an effect of debt aversion and therefore no
reason to be concerned that exclusively loan-based financial aid packages will reduce educational
investment.
The contradiction between these two sets of experimental results may be partially tied to the
different context of each experiment. In Field (2006), participants were applying for law school,
attending, and making subsequent career choices, while in Eckel et al. (2007), participants were
members of the general public ranging in age from 18 to 55. The broad sample in the latter
experiment shifts the educational finance decision from an actual decision to a hypothetical one.
There has been relatively little work focused on identifying and explaining potential differ-
ences in willingness to borrow for education among demographic groups. Some of the work cited
above has found differences in debt aversion by race and ethnicity. Hispanic students are generally
less likely than White students to borrow for college or, in some studies, to approve of such bor-
rowing (Boatman, Evans, and Soliz 2017; Institute for Higher Education Policy 2008; Mortenson
1988). The opposite trend or mixed results are found for Black or African-American students.
However, only Boatman, Evans, and Soliz (2017) control for other observable characteristics of
these students, such as family ability to pay.
Some of the general studies reviewed above include gender controls. The results do not indicate
a significant gender difference and are not discussed at length (Callender and Jackson 2008; Eckel
et al. 2007). Mortenson (1988) does find evidence of a gender difference in attitudes towards
debt. He finds that 82% of men reported a favorable attitude towards borrowing for education
compared to 75% of women. The prevalence of favorable attitudes fell among both men and
women during the sample period, with a greater decrease among men. By contrast, Boatman,
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Evans, and Soliz (2017) find that female respondents were less debt averse than men across most
samples and measures.
With the limited literature explicitly discussing gender differences in willingness to borrow,
most of the suggestive evidence comes from other strands of literature and their indirect effect.
These influences will be discussed in the theory section below.
3.3 Theory
The decision whether to pursue a degree and how to fund that investment can be modeled as a
two-stage, intertemporal utility maximization problem solved by the student. It is clear that parents
pay an important role in the college decision-making process. While parents’ financial contribution
is discussed in the baseline model, I discuss a model with endogenous parental contributions and
challenges for implementing such a model empirically in Section 3.3.4 below.
For tractability, I assume that students maximize utility over two periods: a post-high school/college
enrollment period and a post-college period. I further assume that a subjective discount factor of β
between 0 and 1 applies to costs and benefits incurred in the future period.
Students choose to maximize utility U∗ by choosing whether to enroll in college, such that
U∗ = max[U s∗, Un]
where U s∗ is the expected lifetime utility of pursuing a college degree and Un is the exogenous
outside option (e.g., the lifetime value of entering the labor force directly). Students choose to go
to college if U s∗ > Uns.
The expected lifetime utility of not pursuing a degree is assumed to be exogenous:
Un = u(y1) + βu(y2)
where yt is exogenous base income in each period and the utility function is monotonically in-
creasing (u′(ct) > 0).
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The expected lifetime utility of pursuing a degree is itself a nested optimization problem, where
students pick an optimal mode of educational financing in the initial period. The returns to college
are realized in the second period and are probabilistic. Importantly, this probability does not need to
be an accurate probability of success. In line with the literature on subjective expectations (Manski
2004), I do not assume rational expectations or perfect foresight. Instead, I assume that students
have some beliefs about possible outcomes and that these beliefs are the basis for their decision-
making. The student believes that they will successfully complete college with probability p and
benefit from an additive earnings premium α. The student predicts not completing college with
probability 1− p, in which case they receive no earnings premium.
Without loss of generality, the earnings premium and consumption can also be broadened to
include non-pecuniary amenities. This allows for additional variation in the valuation of college
by student background: Even if two students predict similar increases in earnings with a college
degree, they may vary in the non-pecuniary value they attribute to college attendance (e.g., intel-
lectual development, social interaction, etc.).
For simplicity of exposition, I assume that students must finance the entire, exogenous lump
sum cost of attendance, TC, by spending s out of current income y1 or borrowing d at a rate of
interest of 1 + θd, θd > 0. Parents can also finance education through out of pocket expenditure sp
or borrowing dp. Any remaining income in each period is put towards consumption ct.
In addition to the pecuniary cost of borrowing θd, Field’s (2006) experimental results indi-
cate the presence of non-pecuniary, psychological costs associated with holding debt. These non-
pecuniary borrowing costs can be modeled as a source of disutility with utility function v(d|η),
where vd(·) > 0 and η is a vector of fixed observed and unobserved personal and community char-
acteristics corresponding to factors that influence debt aversion, possibly including family income,
race and ethnicity and gender (Institute for Higher Education Policy 2008; Mortenson 1988). I
assume that these psychological costs are incurred in the second period and are subject to the same
discount factor β. The utility function v(·) is assumed to be convex in d (v′′(·) > 0).24
24While little direct evidence exists to support this assumption, it seems reasonable to assume that the psychological
costs of debt are convex. Students should experience less disutility from the first dollar of borrowing than from the ten-
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3.3.1 Educational financing decision
In a simple model of the financing decision, the student solves the following problem:
U s∗ = maxs,d u(c1) + βEu(c2)− βv(d|η)
subject to the period-specific budget constraints









c2 + d(1 + θd)− α with probability p
c2 + d(1 + θd) with probability 1− p
All parameters and choice variables are assumed to be non-negative. 25
Simplifying, the student’s maximization problem can be written as
maxs,d u(y1 − s) + pβu[y2 + α− d(1 + θd)] + (1− p)βu[y2 − d(1 + θd)]− βv(d|η)
s.t. TC = s+ d+ sp + dp
Based on the objective function U s, a student’s probability of pursuing a degree increases with
greater earnings/non-pecuniary amenities premium α and greater subjective probability of success
p. Meanwhile, lower total costs of attendance TC and higher parental contributions sp and dp also
increase the probability of college attendance by lowering the need to pay.
As shown in the appendix, the sources of debt aversion specifically can be understood by exam-
ining the trade-offs between funding educational expenses out of current income versus borrowing.
thousandth dollar of borrowing. At least some of the existing empirical literature appears to support this supposition
as well (e.g., Millett [2003] finds evidence of non-linear effects of undergraduate debt on graduate and professional
school enrollment).
25I also assume the following: 0 ≤ TC − sp − dp ≤ y1 +
y2
1+θd
. This constrains the parental contribution to be
no greater than the total cost of attendance and assumes that total cost can be funded by the student through some
combination of current expenditure and borrowing.
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Given the assumption of a risk averse agent, a student with a greater cost of borrowing θd, lower
discount factor β (higher discount rate), or greater psychological costs associated with the last
dollar of borrowing will prefer relatively lower total borrowing.
3.3.2 Variable educational costs
If total educational costs TC are variable, students may seek lower-cost alternatives to reduce
TC. The literature suggests that α or p may be functions of TC. For example, higher-cost post-
secondary education may lead to a greater skill premium or better employment prospects (Thomas
and Zhang 2005). Similarly, the decision to live at home during college as a cost-saving measure
may reduce student engagement in the campus community and make successful degree completion
more difficult (Institute for Higher Education Policy 2008). The decision to work during school
to minimize borrowing could be modeled as a trade-off between higher current income y1 and
lower probability of success p. Students will choose a combination of cost-saving and/or income-
enhancing measures, out-of-pocket spending, and borrowing to maximize utility. The appendix
illustrates this intuition with an example.
One important implication of this model is that students with higher psychological debt aver-
sion to the next dollar of debt may seek to reduce the total cost of attendance, increase out of
pocket spending, or both in order to reduce total borrowing. In reality, however, many students are
income constrained (so TC − sp − dp > y1), leaving a reduction in the cost of attendance as the
only remaining means of reducing d up to the point where the marginal reduction in the pecuniary
and non-pecuniary costs of debt equal the marginal decrease in the probability of college comple-
tion. Therefore, the model predicts that students who report a lower willingness to borrow but who
have similar preferences and family income levels as other students should be more likely to adopt
cost-saving measures.
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3.3.3 Debt aversion, gender, and race and ethnicity
This model does not directly speak to the role of gender or race and ethnicity on educational
financing choices, but empirical evidence suggests that key parameters in the model may vary
along these dimensions.
In regards to cost aversion broadly, three parameters of particular interest can be considered.
First, women may exhibit greater risk aversion on average, although the literature is somewhat
mixed on this topic. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that women are less likely to express
interest in taking on above average risk in the Survey of Consumer Finances.26 Gender differences
in risk aversion would predict differences in cost aversion through expected utility. An individual
who is more risk averse, all else equal, will report lower expected utility from the same expected
earnings than an individual who is less risk averse. Lower expected utility reduces the incentive to
invest in education.
Second, the perceived probability of successful college completion p may differ by gender or
race and ethnicity on average, although the direction of this difference is unclear a priori. On one
hand, female students in the HSLS dataset used in this study have higher high school GPAs than
male students on average (see Table 3.3), which may be expected to translate into greater college
preparedness. Women–particularly Black and Hispanic women–have higher college graduation
rates conditional on enrollment than their male counterparts (Shapiro et al. 2017). At the same
time, Black and Hispanic students overall have lower graduation rates than White students (Shapiro
et al. 2017).
These outcomes may or may not align with students’ confidence about their ability to complete
college. Beyer and Bowden (1997) find that women are significantly less likely on average to
predict success in a task seen as masculine, whereas men and women’s self-reported probability of
success did not differ for feminine or neutral tasks. These results suggest that, on average, women
may predict a lower probability of successful college completion (if college is seen as involving
26Some work has argued that risk aversion differences are heavily dependent on context (Eckel and Grossman
2008; Schubert, Brown, Gysler, and Brachinger 1999). See Van Staveren (2014) and Charness and Gneezy (2012) for
a review of other risk aversion studies.
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a mix of task “types”), reducing the expected net gain of education and thus female students’
willingness to invest in education for a given α.
Finally, differences in the educational premium α would translate into different outcomes by
gender as well as by race and ethnicity. The direction of this difference is again unclear. On
one hand, female-dominated majors and occupations are well known to be lower paid than male-
dominated occupations on average. For example, according to May 2016 BLS National Occupa-
tional Employment and Wage Estimates, workers in (male-dominated) computer and mathematical
occupations earned an average annual income of $87,890, whereas elementary and middle school
teachers (female-dominated occupations) earned an average annual income of $59,270.
On the other hand, a relevant question is also whether the net benefit of college is greater for
male or female students on average within the same disciplines. Jacob (2002) finds that women’s
greater likelihood of enrolling in college can partly be explained by greater average college pre-
miums (measured by the difference between the median weekly earnings of college and high
school graduates of the same gender, in the same state, and in the same occupation as the re-
spondent). These two factors would both affect α and the expected net gain of education for a
given p, albeit in different directions. Similarly, persistent racial wage gaps have been documented
(Chetty, Hendren, Jones, and Porter 2018), and Black and Hispanic women face greater wage gaps
than White, Non-Hispanic women relative to White men (Institute for Women’s Policy Research
2017a). Therefore, if college education provides a greater net return for Black or Hispanic students,
they should be less cost averse than their White, Non-Hispanic counterparts (or vice versa).
These factors all influence cost aversion generally. As mentioned above, determinants of cost
aversion should not be fully dismissed in the analysis of debt aversion because many students are
income constrained and must borrow to cover at least part of educational expenses. Are there rea-
sons to expect differences regarding aversion to debt specifically among female and male students?
Most researchers have argued that the lifetime income effect of student debt should only be a trivial
source of debt aversion. Even relatively high levels of student debt are low compared to lifetime
earnings and the earnings premium associated with college education (Rothstein and Rouse 2011).
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However, in the short-run, repayment constraints may lead to debt aversion, a mechanism that
is not captured in this theoretical model. Students may fear that their income flow immediately
after college (even if higher than what it would be without a college degree) will be insufficient
to repay their debt while maintaining a desired level of consumption. In the presence of credit
constraints, this could be enough to discourage borrowing (Minicozzi 2005; Rothstein and Rouse
2011). If female students or minority students predict lower levels of earnings post-college than
other students, this concern is more likely to be binding.
Female students may also internalize social cues suggesting that women are less financially
competent and may be more likely to lack self-confidence in regards to borrowing. As noted in
the Introduction, the myth of the “female credit abuser” was widespread when installment credit
was introduced in the United States and may remain prevalent today (Calder 2009). Several studies
have found that women and female college students specifically continue to have less confidence in
their personal financial literacy (Chen and Volpe 2002; Goldsmith, Goldsmith, and Heaney 1997).
Others have cited women’s perceptions of stereotypes portraying women as unfit for financial
decision-making (Danes and Haberman 2007). Consistent with the stereotype threat literature,
this perception that household finances should be managed by men may result in a woman having
lower financial literacy scores (e.g., Carr and Steele 2010). Hamilton and Darity Jr. (2017) argue
that Black and Hispanic individuals are also stereotyped as financially illiterate when discussions
of racial wealth gaps emphasize the role of individual choice.
Female high school students may be particularly susceptible to these social messages if they
observe gender differences in financial decision-making at home. In fact, a study of about 250 un-
dergraduate students found that students more often recalled fathers being responsible for, teach-
ing, and modeling financial tasks more often that women, although the sample disproportionately
represented students from a “traditional” family structure (90% were from two-parent homes, of
which nearly 50% had a single male income earner) (Clarke, Heaton, Israelsen, and Eggett 2005).
This difference in financial confidence and gendered views of financial decision-making could
result in women experiencing greater psychological costs of borrowing. If making financing deci-
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sions is seen as culturally masculine, doing so may be in conflict with young women’s perceived
group identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). In addition, there may be unobserved costs of debt on
the marriage market. Addo (2014) finds gender differences in the relationship between credit card
and student debt and the likelihood of marriage versus cohabitation. Women with educational debt
are more likely to transition into cohabitation rather than marrying, while the same effect does not
hold for men, potentially reflecting a marriage market penalty for indebtedness among women.
In explaining variation by race and ethnicity, previous work on debt aversion has also cited cul-
tural differences in views of debt and concerns about immigrant status that discourage families and
their students from engaging with financial services (Institute for Higher Education Policy 2008).
The financial exclusion literature has documented some of these gaps, with Black and Hispanic
households being two to three times more likely to be “unbanked” (i.e., to not hold checking or
savings accounts) (FDIC 2015).27 Limited familiarity or comfort working with financial services
may be represented in the model as an unobserved, non-pecuniary cost of debt.
Women now represent a majority of U.S. college students and are the primary holders of student
debt. Similarly, Black women are a rapidly growing portion of college students, and they hold the
highest levels of student debt AAUW (2017). These contradictions between observed trends and
debt aversion theory suggest that unobserved variation in other preferences beyond debt aversion
clearly play an important role in college outcomes. In particular, a highly debt-averse female
student may nonetheless be more likely to attend college than a less debt-averse, otherwise similar
male student, if there is some overriding, possibly non-pecuniary preference for college attendance.
Female students or students of color would then be more likely to make other cost-minimizing
choices to accommodate those debt preferences without sacrificing enrollment. This possibility is
discussed in more detail in Section 3.6 below.
27See Chapter 2 for a review of this literature.
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3.3.4 Parental spending and borrowing
In the above models, parental contributions towards the total cost of attendance are assumed
to be exogenous to the student decision, and students are assumed to always choose a total cost
of attendance that is higher than parental contribution. In reality, parents clearly play a role in the
student’s decision-making process and are also influenced by the student’s preferences and beliefs.
In the High School Longitudinal Survey data used in this analysis, 71.8% of students had one or
more conversations with their parents about financial aid by 11th grade, and a plurality of students
(44.8%) cite parents as the main influence on their educational plans after high school.
The basic intuition for a model that endogenizes parental educational spending can be described
informally. Suppose that students’ utility is a weighted sum of utility from their own consumption
and their parents’ utility in both periods and that students divide their second period income be-
tween discretionary consumption and gifts to parents in old age. Parents’ utility is similarly a
weighted sum of their own and their children’s utility. Parents and students simultaneously solve
their respective problems: Students choose total educational expense, funding via debt, funding
via current expenditures, and gifts to parents in the second period. Parents choose funding via debt
and funding via current expenditures. Two channels create an incentive for parents to invest in
their student’s education: the direct benefit to their child’s utility as well as the indirect effects of
educational investment on the probability of student success, which increases the child’s expected
earnings in the second period and thus their optimal contribution to parents, all else equal.
This model also suggests that parents may be less willing to borrow or spend for particular
students. If female students or students of color on average have a lower (or higher) perceived
probability of success p or educational premium α than other students (see evidence above) or
if parents perceive this to be the case, the incentive for parents to invest in a female student’s
education is lower (higher), all else equal. Whether we would expect such a relationship to exist
and its direction are empirical questions as discussed in the previous subsection. Therefore, the
model does not make a clear a priori prediction regarding student gender differences in parental
cost aversion but does speak to the possibility of such differences. Particularly high non-response
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rates regarding parental willingness to borrow and ability to pay for education precludes a full
recursive modeling of the relationship between student and parental willingness to borrow. In the
reduced form specification, controls for family income and education should therefore serve as
proxies for parental contribution (see Section 3.4 below). To the extent that parental perception of
male or female students’ probability of success varies from their children’s perception, their degree
of cost aversion may appear in the empirical analysis as unexplained student debt aversion.
3.4 Data and empirical strategy
3.4.1 High School Longitudinal Survey
The data for this study are drawn from the 2009-2013 waves of the High School Longitudinal
Survey (HSLS), a study conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics. The survey has
a stratified two-stage random sample design. In the first stage, schools were drawn randomly in
proportion to the state’s population from 48 region-school type-locale strata. This stage produced
1,889 eligible schools, of which 944 chose to participate. In the second stage, students were drawn
randomly within four race strata in each school to purposefully oversample some students by race
and ethnicity. This yielded a sample in the base year of 25,206 eligible students, of whom 21,444
students chose to participate.
The survey has a panel structure with four waves conducted so far. In the base year (2009),
all students in the sample were 9th graders. Follow-ups were conducted in 2012 (11th grade),
in 2013 (high school graduation) with high school transcripts added, and finally in 2016 when
students were three years out of high school. Additional follow-ups are planned as part of the
HSLS, including a 2025 follow-up augmented with postsecondary transcripts. The 2009 through
2013 waves are used in the present analysis.
Data are reported at the school and student levels, with questionnaires administered to stu-
dents, parents, school administrators, math and science teachers, and school counselors. The ques-
tionnaires, augmented with transcript data, elicit information on a wide range of topics including
detailed school characteristics, family background, student performance by course topic, student
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expectations and knowledge about college, and student behaviors outside of the classroom (e.g.,
how often the student has read science books). Response rates from school officials and students
are relatively high (between 85% and 95%), but the response rate is significantly lower among
parents (67.5%).
To account for non-response bias and variation introduced by sampling design, the HSLS in-
cludes sampling weights. As discussed in more detail below, sampling weights are used in one
specification to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated. However, because the litera-
ture on propensity score matching does not suggest using weights in the propensity scoring model,
all summary statistics are also presented without the use of sample weights (DuGoff, Schuler, and
Stuart 2014). As a result, caution should be taken before generalizing sample summary statistics
to the population of U.S. high school students. Selected weighted summary statistics are reported
in Appendix 3.1.
For this study, the HSLS has two key strengths. First, it directly elicits information on students’
attitudes about borrowing and their other expectations, such as their expected income with various
degrees. This subjective information allows for direct assessment of willingness to borrow rather
than reliance on observed outcomes. Second, its panel structure allows me to connect student’s ex
ante expectations and preferences with their ex post outcomes.
3.4.2 Variables of interest
The key variable of interest is the student response to the following question from the 2012
follow-up (when students are in 11th grade) about his or her maximum “willingness to borrow”
(WTB):
“What is the maximum amount you [are/would be] willing to borrow per year to pay
for school or college?”
The possible responses are interval-valued. Respondents pick from categories ranging from
“None,” “$1 - $500”, “$501 - $1,000,” up to “More than $35,000.” Importantly, respondents can
also report that they “don’t know” their WTB. A large portion of respondents state that they don’t
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know their WTB (36.9% of student respondents and 44.3% of parent respondents in the subsample
of respondents who have non-missing responses for the variables of interest and controls). All
students are asked this question, and 86.8% of all surveyed students respond.28
The histograms in Figures 3.1 through 3.3 present the unweighted distribution of student re-
spondents’ willingness to borrow conditional on knowing their WTB. Weighted histograms can be
found in Appendix 3.1. Because the dependent variables of interest include both the college enroll-
ment outcome and outcomes that are conditional on college enrollment, separate histograms are
presented for the full analytical sample and the sample of enrolled students. The figure illustrates
that students with lower WTB are less likely to enroll in college, although, for reasons discussed
in more detail below, this is only suggestive of a negative enrollment effect of debt aversion.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present histograms of student respondents’ willingness to borrow condi-
tional on knowing their willingness to borrow by gender and by race and ethnicity.29 Women are
no more likely to respond that they “don’t know” their willingness to borrow (37.2% of women
and 36.63% of men, with p = 0.601 for the difference of means) despite being significantly more
likely to have searched for college information (see Table 3.3 below). The gap by race and ethnic-
ity is larger: 38.2% of White students and 33.9% of Black or Hispanic students do not know their
willingness to borrow (p = 0.002).
The figures provide suggestive evidence that there are racial and gender gaps in WTB. A greater
proportion of men and White students who know their willingness to borrow report a WTB of
greater than $5,000 than women and Black and Hispanic students, who are more represented in
the lower end of the positive WTB categories. Importantly, however, men are also overrepresented
among those with zero WTB. All of these differences are individually statistically significant at
the 1% level, and the WTB categories are jointly significant predictors of both gender and race and
ethnicity at the 1% level.
28Parents respond to an analogous question, but due to low parental response (33.1%), parental WTB is not incor-
porated in the empirical model.
29The racial component of this analysis focuses on Black and Hispanic students and White students due to the
small sample size of other racial and ethnic groups.
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The second research question of interest in this analysis involves how debt aversion impacts
students’ college choices. Specifically, do more debt-averse students 1) enroll in college at lower
rates, 2) actually borrow less than their less debt-averse counterparts if they do enroll, and 2)
make college choices that reduce the net cost of attendance? The 2013 follow-up offers detailed
information on enrollment, borrowing, and college cost as of their first year post-graduation. Table
3.2 reports average unweighted outcomes for these variables of interest by gender and by race and
ethnicity. Net cost of attendance is defined as the difference between the total cost of attendance
(tuition, fees, and room and board) and any merit- or need-based grants or scholarships. Net cost
may be negative if grant funding exceeds the cost of attendance. Both borrowing and net cost
of attendance refer to expenses for the 2013-2014 academic year only.30 Continuous variables are
essentially top- and bottom-coded, with sparse values being approximated to similar values to limit
disclosure risk.
Women and White students are the most likely to be enrolled in college and have higher costs of
attendance. This gap is particularly large by race and ethnicity, with Black and Hispanic students
attending colleges and universities that are on average 25% less expensive than those of White
students. However, Black or Hispanic students borrow more: Their total borrowing is equal to
42% of the net cost of attendance on average, compared to 27.5% for White students, 29.9% for
Women, and 26.6% for Men. Although the generalizability of these summary statistics is limited
because sample weights are not used (see Section 3.4.1), this result is in line with previous work
noting that Black students (and particularly Black women) borrow more for college than White
students on average (AAUW 2017).
30Sample sizes vary by outcome for two reasons. First, questions relating to the net cost of attendance and total
borrowing are conditional on enrollment. Second, there is significant non-response to particular questions. While
some respondents do not respond to any questions in a particular wave (“item non-response”), others indicate that
they “don’t know” the answer to a particular question or simply skip questions altogether (“missing”). For example,
43.05% of respondents in the full analytical subsample have a missing value for the amount borrowed for the 2013-
2014 academic year: 14.19% skipped the question “legitimately” (i.e., they were not enrolled in college), 2.33% had
“short interviews” that skipped this question (e.g., they agreed to complete abbreviated paper-and-pencil questionnaires
rather than the web survey), 24.82% did not know the amount borrowed, and 1.71% were marked as missing. The
HSLS imputes values for some variables to mitigate the data loss of non-response.
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3.4.3 Identification strategy and empirical model
The theory outlined in Section 3.3 points to an immediate identification problem when connect-
ing stated WTB as a measure of debt aversion to outcomes. Consider two students who have the
same utility function, expect the same earnings premium, attribute the same non-pecuniary ameni-
ties to college enrollment, but experience different non-pecuniary costs to holding debt. The model
illustrates that in the ex ante decision-making process, students simultaneously optimize over fi-
nancing options and total cost. The relatively more debt-averse student will optimally choose
lower total borrowing, possibly by choosing lower-cost educational options. Causality runs from
exogenously determined and unobserved debt aversion to both borrowing and educational options.
However, in the HSLS data, the researcher does not observe the decision-making process, but
rather the ex post outcome of that decision as embodied in willingness to borrow. It is possible
that eleventh-grade students have already begun choosing lower-cost (higher-cost) options and
that this choice is reflected in a lower (greater) need to borrow. To the extent that this stated
WTB reflects existing plans that are driven by debt aversion, the negative correlation between
WTB and outcomes is not spurious. By contrast, if (as theory suggests) WTB simultaneously
reflects existing plans that are driven by the student’s expected benefits from college, valuation of
a college education, or exogenously determined probability of college enrollment, the correlation
will be spurious as well as negative. Students who do not value higher education will be more
likely both to not attend college and to report a low willingness to borrow.
An ideal identification strategy would develop an instrument to estimate the effect of WTB on
outcomes: a student characteristic that is a determinant of debt aversion while being uncorrelated
with the error term of the regression (i.e., uncorrelated with other college preferences). Neither the-
ory nor previous empirical work suggest a valid instrument due to the strong interrelation between
parental income and values, student income and values, and student college enrollment. In their
study of the effect of debt aversion on observed borrowing among undergraduates, Oosterbeek and
van der Broek (2009) use parental debt aversion as an instrument for student debt aversion and
find a negative relationship between debt aversion and observed borrowing. As they note, this
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strategy assumes that parental attitudes towards debt only influence student borrowing through the
transmission of debt aversion.
Two considerations discourage the use of an analogous instrument in this case. First, high
parental non-response means that use of this instrument would reduce the sample dramatically at
the cost of statistical power. Second, the identifying assumption seems unlikely to hold among
high school students. If parental WTB is influenced by their own views of the earnings premium
or non-pecuniary amenities premium that will accrue with education, it is likely that parental WTB
similarly confounds college preferences with debt aversion.
As a second-best, I adopt a propensity score matching approach. Typically, this approach cor-
rects for non-random allocation of study participants to treated and untreated groups by matching
individuals by their probability of being treated (propensity score). When the treatment is binary
(treated or untreated), the propensity score is generated using predicted probabilities from a logit
regression in which the covariates are factors that influence both probability of treatment and the
outcome of interest. The average difference in outcomes between matched treated and untreated
individuals is an estimate of the average treatment effect if the appropriate conditions hold, dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 3.5 below. The advantage of the propensity scoring model is that
it makes less restrictive assumptions about how the covariates affect the outcome of interest and
provides a single-dimensional basis for identifying “similarly situated” respondents.
In this study, the “treatment” is psychological debt aversion as measured by having a relatively
low or high WTB. Low or high WTB is defined in terms of the four aggregated WTB categories
discussed above. The four treatment groups are students with WTB of zero, $1 to $2,000, and
more than $15,000 as well as those students who “don’t know” their WTB. The control group in
each case is made up of students with a WTB of $2,001 to $15,000. While formal dose-response
models with ordinal treatments have been developed (Imai and Van Dyk 2004), they have not been
operationalized, and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) note that a series of binomial models can be
used to avoid the computational intractability of a multinomial model. 31
31The four treatment groups were chosen in part on the basis of sample size. However, an alternative specification
has been tested with additional treatment categories (i.e., zero WTB; $1 to $1,000; $5,001 to $15,000; $15,001 to
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For each binomial model, I calculate propensity scores using a logit regression model with
covariates discussed below. Treated (more or less debt-averse) individuals are then matched to
the five untreated observations who are “nearest neighbors” in terms of propensity score with
replacement using the STATA module teffects psmatch.32 The difference in outcomes (e.g., college
enrollment) between treated and untreated individuals in the matched sample is the estimate of the
average treatment effect on the treated.
Comparing students’ stated WTB with their other plans for paying for college provides a first
sense of the empirical relevance of confounding factors such as parental contributions. Table 3.1
reports the responses of students to a series of questions on how they will or would pay for college,
disaggregated by WTB category. Students with low WTB are more likely than their control group
and high WTB counterparts to report that they will pay for college out of their own earnings. We
would expect students with low WTB to rely more on earnings or savings than those willing to
take on more debt. However, this relationship does not hold for those with zero WTB. They are,
by contrast, as likely as or more likely than other groups to rely on parental contributions and the
least likely to use any form of loans. This suggests that students with zero WTB disproportionately
includes students who have sufficient family resources to fund their education without incurring
debt. This variation would confound the determinants and effects of debt aversion without the
propensity score matching procedure to correct for family background. Students who do not know
their WTB generally have plans that are reminiscent of those of the students with the lowest WTB,
except that they are more likely to be be uncertain of their payment plans than to respond negatively
to each potential payment option.
3.4.4 Propensity scoring model covariates
In selecting variables for the propensity scoring model, I draw from the theory outlined in
Section 3.3 and from previous empirical work regarding debt aversion, college enrollment, and
$35,000; more than $35,000; and “don’t know” as the treatment groups, and $1,001 to $5,001 as the control group)
that produces many of the same results as the preferred specification.
32A small number of observations in some models are matched to six nearest neighbors instead of five.
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other college-related choices. Controls are listed in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. All controls are drawn
from the base year or 2012 follow-up unless otherwise indicated.
Family background is expected to be an important determinant of overall pecuniary and non-
pecuniary value attributed to college by students. Students from high-income families or whose
parents have advanced degrees may be more likely to attend college and may place higher value on
certain aspects of college choice (e.g., private over public, living on campus over living at home).
These students may also have greater access to college and greater knowledge about college and
financial aid opportunities. Subsequently, controls for family income, household size, parental
education levels, and parent citizenship status are also included.
Theory suggests that the expected pecuniary benefits of college enter into students’ financing
and educational cost decisions. The HSLS includes rich data relevant to this point. I use students’
expected earnings to construct two net expected return variables. First, expected return from higher
education is calculated as expected earnings after graduation with a bachelor’s degree minus ex-
pected earnings after receiving a high school degree. This assumes that all students would seek
a four-year degree, when in fact some students may pursue two-year degrees or more advanced
degrees which may influence their willingness to borrow. I also test specifications with a second
measure of expected benefit that incorporates students’ expectations about the highest degree they
will pursue, although this narrows the sample to students who report plans to attend college. For
a student who expects to earn a master’s degree, the net return to education would be calculated
as the difference between expected earnings with a master’s degree and expected earnings with a
high school diploma.
GPA plays an important mediating role on the influence of the expected earnings premium.
Students with higher GPAs will likely have improved access to college and lower financial need
due to scholarship funding. They also have a higher subjective expected probability of success.
Therefore, students with high expected earnings premium and low GPA will likely continue to per-
ceive lower need to borrow and be less likely to enroll in college than students with high expected
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earnings premium and high GPA. I consequently include GPA as well as the interaction of GPA
and expected earnings premium as covariates in the propensity scoring model.
The large proportion of students who report that they “don’t know” their WTB speaks to the
importance of controlling for college knowledge. Burdman (2005) reports that many students do
not complete the FAFSA and thus do not borrow because they do not know how to complete the
form or what subsidized borrowing is available. Therefore, a lack of institutional and financial
knowledge can be associated with greater hesitancy in borrowing. Moreover, female and male stu-
dents exhibit important differences in college preparedness, as illustrated in the summary statistics
below, which may confound observed differences in debt aversion. In the HSLS, students an-
swer various questions relating to financial and college knowledge. I use students’ eleventh-grade
(2012) responses to whether they have searched the Internet for college information.
When conducting the propensity score matching analysis for net cost of attendance and college
borrowing, I also account for two additional sources of variation. The amount of merit- and need-
based grant and scholarship funding captures variation in need to borrow. With this control, a
reduction in the net cost of attendance, for instance, that is found to be associated with a particular
debt aversion treatment can more readily be attributed to cost-reduction measures than to a larger
financial aid package. I also include a binary control for whether the 2013 survey is completed
by the parent or the student. Parents who answer the survey and are able to provide a (non-
missing) response to the borrowing or net cost questions are more likely to have been involved in
the student’s process of financial decision-making and even to have contributed to their financial
costs through borrowing or out-of-pocket spending, all else equal.
Finally, I introduce geographic information in two dimensions (region of the U.S. and type of
locality) in order to control for differences in community attitudes towards college as well as the
cost of living. Locales are categorized according to the following Census Bureau definitions:
• City: territory inside an Urbanized Area (50,000 people or more) and inside a Principal City
(largest incorporated place in a Census Bureau Statistical Area)
• Suburb: territory outside a Principal City and inside an Urbanized Area
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• Town: territory inside an Urban Cluster (at least 2,500 but less than 50,000 people)
• Rural: Census-defined rural territory (i.e., not inside an Urbanized Area or a Urban Cluster)
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present summary statistics of these controls by gender and by race and eth-
nicity. There are significant differences between male and female students that may be confound-
ing the difference in unconditional mean WTB for men and women. Relative to male students,
female students have, on average, higher GPAs, greater college preparation in terms of searching
for college information, and lower self-predicted expected earnings premium. Most characteristics
of Black and Hispanic students in the sample are statistically distinct from those of their White
counterparts: Black and Hispanic students come from lower income families on average, are less
likely to have parents with graduate or bachelor’s degrees, are more likely to be in high schools in
cities and suburbs, and have lower high school GPAs.
These covariates result in the following propensity scoring model:










+ βCKCKi + βEBExpBeni + βGPAGPAi + βExpGPAExpBeni ×GPAi)
The variables of interest for demographic differences are Genderi and RaceEthi; FamBGi
and Geoi are row vectors of family background and geographic controls, respectively; CKi is a
dummy for having searched for college information; GPAi is high school GPA; and ExpBeni is
the expected earnings premium. For propensity score matching regressions corresponding to net
cost and borrowing outcomes, grant/scholarship funding and whether the parent responded to the
survey are included as covariates. The outcome variable WTBi is a binary variable representing
treatment status relative to the control group. The link function F (·) is the CDF of the logistic
distribution. For each outcome, a separate logit regression is run for the three treatment groups
previously discussed. The gender (race) analysis follows the same empirical model, but the sample
is divided by gender (race and ethnicity).
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3.5 Results
The results are presented in three sections. I first report results from the propensity scoring
model on the determinants of willingness to borrow. This is followed by diagnostics to assess the
quality of matching in the sample and then presentation of results on the effect of debt aversion on
college outcomes from the matched and unmatched samples.
3.5.1 Logit regression results
Table 3.5 reports unweighted results from the logit regressions used to estimate propensity
scores. Results are reported for the full sample of high school students as well as for the narrowed
sample of students who enroll in college immediately after high school. The regression results for
enrolled students presented here are those estimated using the sample of students with non-missing
information regarding the net cost of attendance. There is some variation in sample size for the
other outcome conditional on college enrollment due to apparently random non-response to the
outcome-related survey question (see Section 3.4.2). The sample size shrinks by 8% to 17% if
respondents with non-missing responses for the amount borrowed are used instead, and the results
of the logit regressions are generally similar. As a result, these other regressions are not shown
but are available upon request. In addition, results estimated using sample weights are included in
Appendix C below.
The logit regression results suggest that female students in the sample are 8 to 10 percentage
points more likely to have a low, positive WTB rather than to fall into the control group (relative
to a mean proportion of students in the full sample with a low WTB of 25.4% when compared to
the control group only). Notably, the estimate may be subject to selection bias, as female students
in the sample are significantly less likely to report a known WTB. African American and Hispanic
students in the sample are also more likely to report a low but positive WTB, in line with findings
in the existing literature (Institute for Higher Education Policy 2008). These results are generally
robust to the use of sampling weights, although the estimated effect of Hispanic ethnicity is smaller
in magnitude and less precisely estimated.
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Parental education and family income are also important predictors of WTB as theory would
predict, but have differing effects across the WTB distribution.33 In general, students with parents
who have advanced degrees are more likely to have very high or zero WTB. These students may
have a combination of strong college interest and high ability to pay that leads to low need but
high willingness to pay, independent of concerns about indebtedness. Surprisingly, students from
families with advanced degrees were more likely to be uncertain about their willingness to borrow.
These students may not lack college information or financial confidence but may be waiting to
learn about scholarship or grant funding. For example, students of parents in higher education may
not have to pay for college if they enroll in the college where their parent is employed. The same
result does not hold among students whose parent or parents have at most a bachelor’s degree.
These students are generally more likely to have a lower positive WTB rather than zero or high
WTB.
Income plays a particularly important determining role in the middle of the WTB distribution.
As family income increases, students become less likely to report a low but positive WTB rather
than the control WTB (up to 10 percentage points less likely among the highest income groups),
but this effect largely disappears when the sample is limited to students who enroll in college.
Students from high-income backgrounds are also more likely to report zero WTB but not high
WTB (above $15,000). These results are less robust to the use of weights than other estimates (see
Appendix C), although students from very high-income families remain more likely to have very
low WTB.
Expected college benefits and college knowledge are also relevant. Students who actively
searched for college information were significantly less likely to report a zero, low, or unknown
WTB and were more likely to report a high WTB than a median WTB. In all cases, the estimate is
of a greater magnitude among the full sample and appears to be less relevant among those who do
enroll in college. Students who did not search for college information may have already had little
33Parental education controls are collapsed for the enrolled regressions to avoid perfect prediction due to the smaller
samples associated with those outcomes.
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intention of enrolling. Students with a greater high school GPA were slightly less likely to report
a low positive WTB than a median WTB, but GPA is less relevant to being at the high or low ends
of the distribution.
3.5.2 Balance diagnostics
Two assumptions must be valid for the propensity score matching strategy to produce an un-
biased estimate of the real treatment effect (i.e., for non-random selection into the treatment and
control groups to be “strongly ignorable” [Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983]). First, the overlap con-
dition (also called the common support assumption) requires that for every set of possible values
of the covariates, there is a positive probability of being either treated or untreated in the un-
matched sample. In other words, no combination of covariates can perfectly predict treatment or
non-treatment in the sample.
The validity of this assumption can be tested by visual inspection of the density functions de-
scribing the distribution of propensity scores among the treated and untreated groups. The overlap
condition may be violated if the maxima and minima of the distributions differ before matching
or if the distribution of treatment and control groups are skewed in different directions (Caliendo
and Kopeinig 2008). Trimming observations that fall outside of the range of common support is
advised as long as dropped observations represent a small portion of the total sample.
Figure 3.2 presents these density plots estimated using the STATA teffects psmatch mod-
ule’s default triangle kernel density, with density estimates calculated for every point in the un-
matched and matched samples. Separate density functions are estimated for both of the enrollment-
conditional outcomes due to minor differences in sample size across outcomes resulting from non-
response. The densities of the unmatched (“raw”) samples illustrate that there are no major differ-
ences in the maxima, minima, or modes of the distributions. In addition, the user-created STATA
module psmatch2 reports that no observations fall outside of the region of common support for any
of the outcome-treatment combinations (Leuven and Sianesi 2003).
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The density functions for the matched samples also provide evidence of the general quality of
matching, although the relevance of this indicator with respect to misspecification of the propensity
scoring model is debated in the literature (Austin 2009). Nearly identical distributions of treatment
and control group propensity scores in the matched sample indicate that the average propensity
scores for control observations matched in nearest neighbors matching are relatively close to the
propensity score of the treated observations. Notably, in the case of the low positive ($1 to $2,000)
and zero WTB treatment groups, the quality of matching does appear to deteriorate somewhat at
the high end of the propensity score distribution.
The second identifying assumption is conditional independence, which requires that, condi-
tional on the propensity score, all covariates should be independent of the probability of treat-
ment. If differences in the covariates persist across treated and untreated groups after matching,
the propensity scoring model may be misspecified.
Several possible diagnostics for the validity of this assumption have been proposed (Austin
2009; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) and are presented in Table 3.6. First, t-tests can be used to
test the statistical significance of differences in the means of each covariate between the treated
and untreated groups. In the unmatched sample, most of these covariates should be significant,
as theory suggests that they are predictors of treatment status. In the matched sample, few if any
significant differences should be found. The number of covariates with statistically significant
differences in means in the matched and unmatched sample are presented in Column 1 of Table
3.6.
Austin (2009) critiques this approach, arguing that a t-test is inappropriate for comparing
matched and unmatched samples that have different sample sizes. Therefore, an insignificant dif-
ference in means for the matched sample may represent significant reduction in bias or simply a
loss of statistical power. As a result, the author suggests instead comparing the standardized differ-
ences in means between the treated and untreated groups in the matched and unmatched samples.
The standardized difference (also called standardized bias [Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008]) indi-
cates the difference in a covariate across treated and untreated groups, scaled by the variance of
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the covariate in both groups. Compared to t-tests, this approach avoids the problem of variation in
sample size but lacks a widely agreed upon criterion for “excessive” bias. Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008) argue that generally “a bias reduction below 3% or 5% is seen as sufficient” (15), while
Austin (2009) allows for up to 10% standardized bias. I adopt the 5% criteria as a moderately
conservative cut-off point and report the number of covariates with standardized bias exceeding
this threshold in Column 2 of Table 3.6. Column 3 presents mean standardized bias across all
covariates for a more holistic appraisal of bias in the matched sample.
Finally, Austin (2009) uses evidence from Monte Carlo simulations to argue that the variance
ratio of continuous covariates between the treated and untreated groups is a relevant criterion to
assessing whether the propensity scoring model is properly specified. Continuous covariates that
have low standardized bias in means but exhibit significant distributional differences may indicate
a misspecification of the model that may be addressed by introducing interaction terms (Austin
2009). As noted above, three or four continuous covariates are used in the scoring model of
this analysis depending on the outcome being considered (high school GPA, expected earnings
premium from a degree, the interaction of these covariates, and the amount of grant/scholarship
funding). The number of covariates with variance ratios significantly above or below one based
on the appropriate F-distribution (implemented by the STATA module psmatch2) are reported in
Column 4.
Overall, the various diagnostics suggest successful matching, with some important caveats. Re-
gardless of outcome or treatment, none of the matched samples exhibit statistically significant dif-
ferences in covariates, and mean standardized error is consistently below about 3%. As reported in
Column 2, however, there are some covariates that maintain standardized differences of more than
5% across outcomes.34 This occurs most commonly among the zero WTB group in each sample,
specifically with covariates indicating family income, household size, and student race/ethnicity.
In addition, variance ratios for some continuous covariates do exceed one, particularly for the zero
and low positive WTB groups.
34A detailed report on standardized bias by covariate for each outcome and treatment is available upon request.
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Despite these concerns, there is reason to believe that they do not pose a critical problem for
identification. First, in all these cases, the average standardized bias in the matched sample re-
mains less than 5%. Second, in some cases, the covariates with higher standardized bias are not
major predictors of treatment status. For example, household size is included in the propensity
scoring model along with income to control for households’ actual purchasing power. While the
standardized bias of household size actually increases with matching, it is not statistically signif-
icant in the logit regressions discussed in Table 3.5, and a theoretical channel by which it would
directly affect enrollment is unclear. As cited by Austin (2009), Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007)
argue that achieving balance as measured by very low standardized bias is most critical for co-
variates that are important predictors of outcomes. Third, some covariates that remain unbalanced
are also those that have been hypothesized to be related to greater debt aversion in the literature.
In some specifications, the negative bias in the representation of students whose parents are U.S.
born among those in lower WTB treatment groups remains above 5% after matching. The Institute
for Higher Education Policy (2008) report suggests that national origin may be related to cultural
differences in attitudes towards debt or variation in experience using financial services, factors that
are linked to debt aversion. As a result, some of the evidence of unsatisfactory matching may point
to persistent differences that are in fact related to the treatment of interest (debt aversion).
3.5.3 Propensity score matching results
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present three sets of estimated treatment effects for the four treatments
relative to the control group. For all estimates, bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The grey
circles represent the difference in outcomes between the treated and untreated groups without
matching or controls. This “naive” estimate should be seen as an upper bound on the true average
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) due to the likely presence of confounding factors such as
valuation of college and ability to pay.
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The grey bar represents estimates using the preferred propensity score matching method with
standard errors adjusted for the use of predicted values as described in Abadie and Imbens (2006,
2011) and operationalized in the STATA module teffects psmatch.
Finally, the third set of points (black squares) report the results from propensity score match-
ing using sampling weights but not implementing the Abadie and Imbens standard errors. The
appropriate use of sampling weights in propensity score matching techniques is not clear in the
econometric literature, with few papers (Austin, Jembere and Chiu 2016; DuGoff, Schuler, and
Stuart 2014) making explicit recommendations. The estimates presented here draw on the rec-
ommendations of DuGoff, Schuler, and Stuart (2014) by running the propensity scoring model
without weights. Sample weights are not relevant to the matching procedure because the focus
in that stage is on comparing attributes within the sample to form a counterfactual group rather
than making population-level inferences. The regression of treatment group on outcomes in the
matched sample is then conducted with sampling weights.
The estimates with sampling weights are the most conservative, generally with the smallest
effect size and largest standard errors, although the direction of the estimated effect agrees in most
cases with the unweighted estimates. In some cases (e.g., Figure 3.8), some of the results with
sampling weights have been omitted to maintain the clarity of the diagrams. Such cases were lim-
ited to situations where the estimate was large but extremely imprecisely estimated and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The limited literature regarding sampling weights in propensity score
matching leads me to prefer the Abadie and Imbens robust standard error (AI) estimates to the
weighted estimates.
Much as the naive estimates can be seen as an upper bound on the effect size of debt aversion
on each outcome, the AI estimates can be seen as a lower bound. The use of the matched sample
has the advantage of mitigating the impact of confounding factors. However, as noted in Section
3.5.2, it may also eliminate some of the variation of interest. For example, family income is
clearly correlated with ability to pay and thus need to borrow for education. Income may also
be a predictor of pure debt aversion, if students from lower income families are more likely to
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worry about debt or to be unfamiliar with financial services. As a result of these overlaps, the
propensity score matching approaches should primarily capture idiosyncratic psychological debt
aversion–any debt aversion that remains after matching on observables.
Figure 3.3 reports results for college enrollment outcomes. The naive estimates suggest that
students with zero and low but positive WTB are about four percentage points less likely to be
enrolled in college during the first year following high school graduation. Those with a high WTB
are more likely than the control group to enroll in college in the unmatched sample. The negative
effect on college enrollment for the zero WTB treatment group is robust to using the AI matched
estimates, but the magnitude of the effect shrinks and becomes only marginally significant for the
low WTB group. The mean proportion of enrolled students in the zero WTB treatment group
compared to the control group alone is 84.0%, resulting in a relative treatment effect size for the
zero WTB group of 5.6% of the mean.
Figure 3.4 reports results for the ATET of WTB on the net cost of attendance and amount bor-
rowed, conditional on college enrollment. As expected, the naive estimates suggest that students
with zero WTB attend higher-cost colleges, likely due to their family’s ability to pay.35 When fam-
ily background is accounted for, however, the effect size falls to zero. By contrast, students with
a low but positive WTB do appear to enroll in colleges with a net cost of about $1,500 less than
the control group, and those in the high WTB group pay about $3,400 more than control group
students. Students who did not know their WTB also attend higher-cost colleges.
Borrowing follows the expected pattern, with the most debt-averse students borrowing the least
and the most debt averse borrowing more than the control group. These results are robust to
matching. Students who do not know their WTB are similar to the control group, suggesting that
their borrowing on average is similar to that of a student with a median WTB.
35Family ability to pay may also reduce financial aid availability and lead to a higher net cost.
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3.5.4 Analysis by gender and race and ethnicity
The same propensity score matching analysis as described above is conducted on the male and
female subsamples separately as well as on the Black or Hispanic and White subsamples. Selected
balance statistics are available in Appendix D. While the matching overall appears to be of good
quality and average standardized bias remains below 5%, there are some subgroups in which there
are several specific variables above the 5% standardized bias threshold. The quality of matching is
worst for the zero WTB treatment group of Black and Hispanic students.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 graphically present the propensity score matching results for college atten-
dance by gender and by race and ethnicity. Female students’ college attendance is less sensitive to
strong debt aversion than that of male students. Men are 7.8 percentage points less likely to enroll
in college if they report no willingness to borrow, even after matching on observed characteristics,
while women exhibit no statistically significant effect. Similar results hold by race and ethnicity,
with Black or Hispanic students showing less responsiveness to strong debt aversion than White
students. However, the results are less precisely estimated, so the effect size for Black or Hispanic
and White respondents overlap significantly. Together, the results suggest that Black and Latina
women may be the least sensitive to stated debt preferences. Small sample size precludes a joint
analysis of race and gender.
This result points to several possible interpretations. Female students and students of color who
report a low willingness to borrow may experience more change in their preferences than other stu-
dents between survey waves or may interpret the question differently. Alternatively, these students
may be using different strategies to accommodate their debt preferences than male students. If fe-
male, Black, or Hispanic students have an overriding preference for college attendance or perceive
greater gains from college attendance (e.g., marriage market or non-pecuniary benefits), then they
may instead adopt cost-minimizing measures once enrolled or simply incur the psychological cost.
The unobserved benefits of incurring debt may also extend to employment. Although the expected
earnings premium is observed, White male students may feel more confident that they will be able
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to obtain employment without a degree, compared to similarly situated women and students of
color.
To investigate the possibility that these demographic groups adopt different cost-minimizing
measures, the gender- and race-disaggregated propensity score matching analyses are repeated for
the borrowing and net cost outcomes, and results are presented in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Most effects
are statistically indistinguishable by gender and by race and ethnicity. However, women with zero
WTB who do enroll in college cut their borrowing by more relative to the control group than
men: Women borrow about $3,600 dollars less for their first academic year than the control group,
compared to $1,300 for men. There is suggestive evidence of a similar difference by race and
ethnicity, but the gap is smaller. The average treatment effect of strong debt aversion (zero WTB)
on the net cost of attendance is large in magnitude for Black or Hispanic students (about $3,200),
but is very imprecisely estimated.
For women with zero WTB, the reduction in borrowing is accompanied by an increase in the
net cost of attendance of about $1,800. The same effect does not hold for men, nor is there evidence
of similar heterogeneity by race and ethnicity. If the goal of highly debt-averse students is to reduce
borrowing conditional on college enrollment, it is not clear why debt-averse female students–who
exhibit the largest response in terms of reduced borrowing–would also attend more costly colleges
than female students in the control group after accounting for grant and scholarship funding. One
possibility is that the treatment effect is capturing parental willingness to borrow or pay out of
pocket for college. The effect may differ by gender if the parents of female students are more
willing to contribute to their education financially than to that of male students (see Section 3.3.4).
As a result, female students who appear to be very debt averse may actually have a low need to
borrow due to unobserved parental contributions.
3.6 Conclusions and discussion
This analysis used longitudinal data on student willingness to borrow to isolate an ordinal
measure of debt aversion, identify determinants of debt aversion, and examine the relationship
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between debt aversion and college outcomes. While rising levels of student debt merit concern
and research into their implications, some students may benefit from taking on moderate levels of
debt to fund their education. The literature is as yet unclear on the measurement, prevalence, and
impacts of debt aversion on the “marginal student” who would otherwise attend college if not for
concern about indebtedness. Some evidence suggests that female students and Black or Hispanic
students may be disproportionately likely to experience debt aversion, generating a potential barrier
to college access.
In addition to being closely related to actual borrowing behavior, debt aversion was found to
influence the probability of college enrollment immediately following high school and the net cost
of attendance. Students with zero or low WTB are less likely to enroll in college at all, even
compared to otherwise similar students. Borrowing responds as expected to variation in WTB and
to debt aversion narrowly defined. The net cost of attendance is higher for those with high WTB
and lower for those with low but positive WTB.
Female students and Black students exhibit a lower positive willingness to borrow on average
than similarly situated White and male students, while the latter groups are more likely to have zero
or high WTB. This demographic variation is not explained by the observed differences in college
preparedness, expected net benefits of college attendance, or other covariates. The propensity
score matching results from the gender and race analyses indicate that White and male students
who report zero WTB drive the relationship between WTB and college enrollment. By contrast,
female students and students of color with zero WTB may cut their borrowing by more than other
students, and female students in the same treatment group attend higher-cost institutions.
These results raise the question of how variation in debt aversion and in responses to debt aver-
sion relate to the observed trends of growing college enrollment among women and Black and
Hispanic students. First, the high level of sensitivity to debt aversion among male students may be
one contributor to this trend: Highly debt-averse men are more likely to avoid borrowing altogether
by foregoing college enrollment. Although the analysis controls for expected earnings premiums,
White men may feel more confident about their employment or marriage market prospects with-
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out a college degree than other groups, increasing their responsiveness to their debt preferences.
Alternatively, they may face less social pressure to enroll in college than other groups. As a col-
lege degree becomes an increasingly critical determinant of employment prospects, debt aversion
may become a source of worsened economic outcomes for men. These students may benefit from
initiatives that provide high school students with additional information about college enrollment,
labor market outcomes, and student borrowing.
On the other hand, women and some students of color appear more likely to be debt averse in
this study, despite other evidence indicating that these groups borrow more than others on average.
There is circumstantial evidence suggesting that women who appear to be debt-averse may actu-
ally have low need to borrow due to unobserved parental contributions. Women’s higher rates of
success in college and greater college preparedness on average may be driving greater willingness
to pay among parents. At the same time, this effect does not hold for students of color. It has been
noted in previous work that the families of Black students contribute less to their education due to
lower levels of wealth and less liquid wealth (Addo, Houle, and Simon 2016). Instead, these stu-
dents may be making unobserved debt-minimizing decisions, such as working more hours during
college, for example, which may negatively impact their probability of college success (Institute
for Higher Education Policy 2008).
Although additional work in this area is needed, these results regarding women and particularly
students of color point to high school students’ need for more information about the costs and
benefits of student borrowing. They also suggest that gendered and racialized stereotypes about
financial literacy need to be challenged, as they may be contributing to lower willingness to borrow
among these students. In addition, colleges should provide additional resources to help students
find high-paying employment post-graduation. If women or students of color feel that they will be
unable to repay student debt immediately after graduation due to insufficient early-career earnings,
they may be less likely to enroll in college or make debt-minimizing choices that threaten their
college completion or job market prospects.
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The study is affected by data and identification limitations. The strong predicted relationship
between willingness to borrow, college plans, and financial need pose challenges for identification
that may not be fully addressed by matching on observables. Additional work is also needed to
understand the attitudes towards debt of the large portion of students who “don’t know” their WTB.
Without more qualitative or quantitative evidence about this group, it is difficult to explain results
such as the higher net cost of attendance for this group relative to the control group. High parental
non-response rates also preclude fully modeling the parent-student dynamic in educational finance
choices. Nonetheless, the results provide some evidence that student choices are influenced by
their financial plans and aversion to borrowing.
Additional information on student outcomes later in their college careers in subsequent waves
of the HSLS promise to shed more light on this topic. In particular, the 2016 wave of the HSLS
was released in mid-2018. This wave describes student outcomes three years after graduation,
allowing researchers to assess differences in attrition rates, GPA, and delayed enrollment. As noted
previously, students who take on debt in excess of their stated willingness to borrow may make
cost-minimizing decisions or face greater psychological costs that are not conducive to successful
college completion.
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Maximum amount willing to borrow per year
Students Enrolled in College (2013) All Students
Figure 3.1: Unweighted histogram of willingness to borrow responses by sample
Notes: Proportions are unweighted and conditional on student knowing their WTB. Sample sizes are 7,599




















































































Maximum amount willing to borrow per year
Male Female
Figure 3.2: Histogram of stated willingness to borrow by gender
Notes: Proportions are unweighted and conditional on student knowing their WTB. Sample sizes are 3,744




















































































Maximum amount willing to borrow per year
White Black and Hispanic
Figure 3.3: Histogram of stated willingness to borrow by race/ethnicity
Notes: Proportions are unweighted and conditional on student knowing their WTB. Sample sizes are 1,641
for Black or Hispanic students and 4,650 for White students.
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Table 3.1: Student plans for paying for college by stated willingness to borrow
Willingness to Borrow: Zero WTB Low WTB Control High WTB Don’t Know
Pay with own earnings/savings
Yes 48.78% 73.44% 69.18% 61.79% 53.73%
No 39.18% 15.07% 19.43% 24.57% 22.81%
Don’t Know 12.04% 11.50% 11.39% 13.64% 23.46%
Pay with parents’ earnings/savings
Yes 60.98% 58.63% 60.36% 58.04% 55.19%
No 24.39% 22.09% 22.11% 25.32% 14.84%
Don’t Know 14.63% 19.28% 17.54% 16.64% 29.97%
Pay with grants/scholarships
Yes 71.49% 72.13% 78.81% 79.20% 69.05%
No 19.35% 13.49% 8.95% 8.40% 7.80%
Don’t Know 9.16% 14.38% 12.24% 12.39% 23.15%
Pay with government loans
Yes 7.36% 29.00% 47.43% 55.11% 28.04%
No 76.69% 38.30% 23.11% 21.59% 23.95%
Don’t Know 15.95% 32.70% 29.46% 23.30% 48.01%
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Pay with private loan
Yes 4.09% 14.11% 26.04% 33.38% 12.40%
No 80.98% 54.65% 40.14% 36.66% 33.50%
Don’t Know 14.93% 31.24% 33.82% 29.96% 54.10%
Pay with private loan in parents’ names
Yes 5.11% 13.53% 23.14% 27.49% 14.18%
No 79.35% 53.47% 41.78% 40.03% 31.04%
Don’t Know 15.54% 33.00% 35.09% 32.48% 54.79%
Approximate N 490 895 2645 700 2755
Notes: All proportions are unweighted. Sample sizes are approximate due to minor variation in response rates by question.
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Table 3.2: Unweighted summary statistics of selected college outcomes by gender and race/ethnicity
Women Men Total
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
[Max, Min] [Max, Min] [Max, Min]
Enrolled in 3744 0.889 0.3143 3855 0.828 0.3772 *** 7599 0.858 0.349
College (2013) [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
Net Cost of 1874 15337.51 13850.87 1690 15127.22 14993.79 3564 15237.79 14402.49
Attendance (2013) [-59000,64000] [-60000,64000] [-60000,64000]
Total Amount 1865 4745.31 7393.02 1685 4253.41 6925.50 ** 3550 4511.83 7178.11
Borrowed (2013) [0,32000] [0,32000] [0,32000]
Black or Hispanic White Total
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
[Max, Min] [Max, Min] [Max, Min]
Enrolled in 1641 0.834 0.373 4650 0.859 0.348 ** 6291 0.852 0.355
College (2013) [0,1] [0,1] [0,1]
Net Cost of 599 11722.04 13774.79 2345 15637.1 13935.34 *** 2944 14840.52 13989.59
Attendance (2013) [-59000,62000] [-60000,64000] [-60000,64000]
Total Amount 613 5130.51 7546.54 2340 4490.171 7196.051 * 2953 4623.10 7273.53
Borrowed (2013) [0,32000] [0,32000] [0,32000]
Notes: All proportions and means are unweighted.
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Table 3.3: Unweighted summary statistics of controls by gender
Variable Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD
Race/ethnicity
African-American 9.19% 8.22%
Hispanic 13.62% 12.19% *
Asian 7.93% 8.15%
White 60.39% 61.97%
Other race/ethnicity 8.87% 9.47%
Highest parental education
Graduate degree 24.63% 25.81%
Bachelor’s degree 27.54% 28.51%
Associate’s degree 15.04% 15.56%
Occupational training 3.31% 3.06%
High school or less 29.49% 27.06% **
Parents U.S. born 75.83% 75.93%
Family income in 2012
Less than $15000 7.29% 6.87%
$15000 to $55000 30.64% 27.86% ***
$55001 to $115000 37.13% 35.93%
$115001 to $175000 14.10% 17.07% ***
$175001 to $235000 5.42% 6.04%
Greater than $235000 5.42% 6.23%





6 or more 15.36% 15.46%
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Region of high school residence
Northeast 16.43% 14.71% **
Midwest 26.79% 29.60% ***
South 39.56% 40.73%
West 17.23% 14.97% ***





Searched for college info 93.19% 0.252 85.01% 0.357 ***
High school GPA 3.343 0.777 3.074 0.835 ***
[0.25, 4.75] [0.25, 4.75]
Expected earnings 29.268 29.614 32.156 29.871 ***
premium (in $1000s)† [-145, 145] [-140, 145]
Grants and scholarships 9601.92 11473.26 8798.52 11172.16 **
received (in $1000s)‡ [0, 60] [0, 60]
Parent respondent‡ 52.00% 58.46% ***
N 3,744 3,855
Notes: All proportions and means are unweighted. Bracketed numbers indicate min/max for continuous
covariates, and standard errors are listed for continuous covariates only. † Based on expected earnings for
four-year degree in full sample and expected earnings for expected degree in enrolled sample (not shown).
‡ Reported for students who were enrolled in college in the 2013 Follow-Up (n = 3, 564).
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Table 3.4: Unweighted summary statistics of controls by race and ethnicity
Variable Black or Hispanic White Non-Hispanic
Mean SD Mean SD





Graduate degree 16.39% 26.47% ***
Bachelor’s degree 21.08% 30.17% ***
Associate’s degree 17.37% 15.31% *
Occupational training 4.20% 2.88% ***
Parents U.S. born 55.58% 92.73% ***
Family income in 2012
Less than $15000 12.74% 5.18% ***
$15000 to $55000 40.95% 24.97% ***
$55001 to $115000 31.32% 38.75% ***
$115001 to $175000 8.96% 17.96% ***
$175001 to $235000 3.72% 6.41% ***
Greater than $235000 2.32% 6.73% ***
Household size in 2012
Two 8.17% 6.62% **
Three 23.64% 26.90% **
Four 28.82% 32.24% **
Five 19.93% 20.17%
6 or more 19.44% 14.06% ***
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Region of high school residence
Northeast 14.56% 16.00%
Midwest 25.05% 29.76% ***
South 41.38% 40.49%
West 19.01% 13.74% ***
Locale of high school residence
City 31.38% 27.94% ***
Suburb 32.36% 28.02% ***
Town 8.23% 14.92% ***
Rural 28.03% 29.12%
Searched for college info 88.42% 88.88%
High school GPA 2.858 0.824 3.290 0.775 ***
[0.25,4.75] [0.25,4.75]
Expected earnings 30.140 32.658 30.625 28.448
premium (in $1000s)† [-140, 145] [-145, 145]
Grants and scholarships 10536.73 12720.48 8748.20 10560.63 **
received (in $1000s)‡ [0, 60] [0, 60]
Parent respondent‡ 47.25% 60.85% ***
N 1,641 4,650
Notes: All proportions and means are unweighted. Bracketed numbers indicate min/max for continuous
covariates, and standard errors are listed for continuous covariates only. †Based on expected earnings for
four-year degree in full sample and expected earnings for expected degree in enrolled sample (not shown).
‡Reported for students who were enrolled in college in the 2013 Follow-Up (n = 2, 944).
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Table 3.5: Propensity score matching logit regression results: average marginal effects
Dependent = Zero $1 to $2,000 More than $15,000 Don’t Know
Pr(treatment) Full Sample Enrolled Full Sample Enrolled Full Sample Enrolled Full Sample Enrolled
Female 0.00837 0.0193 0.0873*** 0.105*** -0.0123 0.00165 0.0252* 0.0265
(0.0133) (0.0186) (0.0147) (0.0202) (0.0143) (0.0208) (0.0138) (0.0199)
Race/ethnicity (Reference group: White)
African-American 0.0174 -0.00616 0.0734*** 0.0784* 0.00491 0.0147 -0.000675 -0.0381
(0.0258) (0.0391) (0.0276) (0.0452) (0.0272) (0.0436) (0.0258) (0.0423)
Hispanic 0.0186 0.00601 0.0447* 0.101** 0.0165 0.00370 -0.0209 -0.0749*
(0.0239) (0.0359) (0.0261) (0.0420) (0.0258) (0.0389) (0.0243) (0.0383)
Asian -0.0104 0.0172 -0.00296 0.0163 0.0379 0.0220 -0.0703** -0.0616
(0.0286) (0.0410) (0.0336) (0.0477) (0.0328) (0.0453) (0.0300) (0.0423)
Other race/ethnicity -0.00935 -0.00111 0.0251 0.0337 -0.0421* -0.0621* -0.00382 -0.0796**
(0.0232) (0.0338) (0.0265) (0.0381) (0.0240) (0.0342) (0.0243) (0.0365)
Highest parental education (Reference group: high school or less)
Bachelor’s degree 0.0291 0.0387* 0.0400* 0.0805***
or higher (0.0217) (0.0227) (0.0233) (0.0233)
Graduate degree 0.0428* 0.00464 0.0475** 0.0945***
(0.0219) (0.0227) (0.0237) (0.0210)
Bachelor’s degree -0.00620 -0.0403** 0.0199 0.0341*
(0.0183) (0.0192) (0.0205) (0.0192)
Associate’s degree -0.00511 -0.0118 0.0184 0.0514**
(0.0210) (0.0213) (0.0237) (0.0213)
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Occupational training -0.0577* -0.00384 0.0439 -0.00239
(0.0338) (0.0376) (0.0438) (0.0405)
Parents U.S. born 0.0294 0.0264 0.0131 0.0563** 0.0148 0.0204 -0.00667 0.0153
(0.0185) (0.0261) (0.0213) (0.0275) (0.0209) (0.0304) (0.0202) (0.0299)
Family income in 2012 (Reference group: less than $15000)
$15000 to $55000 -0.0135 -0.110** -0.0523* -0.0324 -0.0459 -0.0468 -0.0244 -0.0408
(0.0267) (0.0548) (0.0300) (0.0557) (0.0316) (0.0588) (0.0291) (0.0550)
$55001 to $115000 0.00870 -0.0485 -0.0622** -0.0397 -0.0368 -0.0731 -0.0275 -0.0388
(0.0272) (0.0551) (0.0309) (0.0553) (0.0318) (0.0577) (0.0294) (0.0536)
$115001 to $175000 0.0222 -0.0442 -0.0771** -0.0475 -0.0354 -0.0549 -0.00773 -0.0226
(0.0308) (0.0578) (0.0352) (0.0586) (0.0353) (0.0608) (0.0328) (0.0564)
$175000 to $235000 0.0532 0.00654 -0.103** -0.109* -0.0304 -0.0922 -0.0286 -0.0158
(0.0390) (0.0644) (0.0429) (0.0629) (0.0423) (0.0660) (0.0402) (0.0627)
Greater than $235000 0.185*** 0.145** -0.0894* -0.0191 -0.0396 -0.0619 0.0401 0.0699
(0.0443) (0.0706) (0.0464) (0.0689) (0.0445) (0.0698) (0.0410) (0.0630)
Household members in 2012 (Reference group: Two)
Three -0.00785 0.00211 -0.00662 0.0593 0.00332 0.0112 -0.0187 0.0700*
(0.0290) (0.0387) (0.0304) (0.0398) (0.0308) (0.0426) (0.0290) (0.0423)
Four -0.0166 0.0175 -0.00620 0.0287 -0.0302 -0.0274 -0.0171 0.0519
(0.0286) (0.0379) (0.0300) (0.0386) (0.0301) (0.0411) (0.0285) (0.0416)
Five -0.00606 0.0144 -0.00640 0.0456 -0.0187 0.00324 -0.0145 0.0625
(0.0299) (0.0402) (0.0317) (0.0416) (0.0316) (0.0438) (0.0299) (0.0438)
Six or more -0.0151 0.00812 0.00808 0.0324 -0.0321 -0.0269 -0.0105 0.0513
(0.0311) (0.0425) (0.0327) (0.0438) (0.0326) (0.0457) (0.0310) (0.0461)
Region of high school residence (Reference group: Northeast)
Midwest 0.0357* 0.0314 0.0329 0.0115 -0.0372 -0.00524 -0.0383* -0.0471
(0.0189) (0.0252) (0.0221) (0.0296) (0.0229) (0.0317) (0.0211) (0.0293)
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South 0.0723*** 0.0815*** 0.0859*** 0.0717** -0.0890*** -0.0599* -0.0262 -0.0151
(0.0186) (0.0261) (0.0215) (0.0300) (0.0218) (0.0309) (0.0202) (0.0289)
West 0.0541** 0.0453 0.0799*** 0.0558 -0.0299 -0.0183 -0.0187 -0.0151
(0.0225) (0.0317) (0.0256) (0.0361) (0.0266) (0.0387) (0.0241) (0.0353)
Locale of high school residence (Reference group: City)
Suburb -0.0275 0.0000183 -0.00976 0.00286 0.0229 0.0291 -0.0173 -0.0166
(0.0176) (0.0244) (0.0197) (0.0269) (0.0187) (0.0267) (0.0179) (0.0252)
Town -0.0477** -0.0470 -0.0188 0.000262 -0.00693 0.00432 -0.0463** -0.0570*
(0.0216) (0.0302) (0.0242) (0.0340) (0.0233) (0.0342) (0.0231) (0.0338)
Rural -0.0303* -0.0191 -0.0298 0.00198 0.0200 0.0378 -0.0351* -0.0584**
(0.0174) (0.0246) (0.0191) (0.0267) (0.0190) (0.0276) (0.0181) (0.0265)
Searched for -0.158*** -0.0949** -0.0503** -0.0157 0.0515** -0.0185 -0.0964*** -0.0114
college info. (0.0265) (0.0463) (0.0257) (0.0464) (0.0233) (0.0471) (0.0218) (0.0440)
High school GPA -0.00271 -0.00340 -0.0276*** -0.0230 0.00401 -0.0126 0.0149 0.00325
(0.00892) (0.0154) (0.00973) (0.0173) (0.00988) (0.0174) (0.00942) (0.0170)
Expected earnings 0.00023 0.00048 -0.0009*** -0.00067* -0.000063 0.000061 -0.00046** -0.00062*
premium ($1000s)† (0.000208) (0.000307) (0.000255) (0.000381) (0.000245) (0.000373) (0.000231) (0.000354)
Grants and scholarships 0.000552 -0.000315 -0.000461 0.000712
($1000s) (0.000817) (0.000977) (0.000981) (0.000926)
Parent responded to -0.000895 -0.0126 -0.0109 0.0104
questionnaire (0.0188) (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0202)
N 3181 1540 3573 1662 3370 1665 5470 2588
Pseudo R-squared 0.051 0.060 0.037 0.040 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.019
Notes: Stars indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Estimates are unweighted. “Enrolled” sample refers to observations with non-
missing responses for net cost of attendance. Regressions also include interaction of GPA and expected earnings premium (not shown). †Based
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Figure 3.2: Estimated density functions for matched and unmatched samples
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Table 3.6: Selected balance statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates with statistically Covariates with Mean standardized Continuous covariates
significant difference standardized difference difference (%) with variance ratio
at 5% level (#) > 5% (#) 6= 1 (#)
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
College enrollment
Zero 6 0 16 2 7.79 2.10 2 0
$1 to $2,000 13 0 17 0 7.96 1.44 0 2
More than $15,000 4 0 10 0 4.21 1.18 0 0
Don’t know 6 0 6 0 3.41 1.04 0 0
Net cost
Zero 8 0 18 6 9.76 3.14 3 2
$1 to $2,000 6 0 15 3 6.94 1.79 0 0
More than $15,000 1 0 9 0 3.95 1.95 0 1
Don’t know 7 0 10 0 5.01 1.28 0 1
Amount borrowed
Zero 9 0 21 4 9.90 2.93 3 2
$1 to $2,000 3 0 17 1 6.86 1.91 0 0
More than $15,000 1 0 11 2 4.06 2.12 0 1
Don’t know 8 0 11 0 5.22 1.15 0 1
Total covariates 28/30 28/30 28/30 28/30 28/30 28/30 3/4 3/4
Notes: Sample size for “College Enrollment” outcomes differs from sample size for other outcomes, which are conditional on college enrollment.












































































Abadie and Imbens Robust SEs Sampling Weights
Unmatched Sample (Unweighted)
Figure 3.3: WTB and college enrollment: average treatment effect on the treated
Notes: Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Students with reported willingness to borrow between




























































































































Abadie and Imbens Robust SEs Sampling Weights
Unmatched Sample (Unweighted)
Figure 3.4: WTB and college outcomes conditional on enrollment: average treatment effect on the treated
Notes: Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Students with reported willingness to borrow between










































































































Abadie and Imbens Robust SEs Sampling Weights
Unmatched Sample (Unweighted)
Figure 3.5: WTB and college enrollment by gender: average treatment effect on the treated
Notes: Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Students with reported willingness to borrow between













































































































Abadie and Imbens Robust SEs Sampling Weights
Unmatched Sample (Unweighted)
Figure 3.6: WTB and college enrollment by race and ethnicity: average treatment effect on the treated
Notes: Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Students with reported willingness to borrow between




































































































































































































Abadie and Imbens Robust SEs Sampling Weights
Unmatched Sample (Unweighted)
(b) Men
Figure 3.7: WTB and college outcomes by gender: average treatment effect on the treated
Notes: Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Students with reported willingness to borrow between












































































































Abadie and Imbens Robust SEs Sampling Weights
Unmatched Sample (Unweighted)











































































































Abadie and Imbens Robust SEs Sampling Weights
Unmatched Sample (Unweighted)
(b) White Non-Hispanic
Figure 3.8: WTB and college outcomes by race and ethnicity: average treatment effect on the treated
Notes: Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Students with reported willingness to borrow between
$2,001 and $15,000 serve as control group for all treatments.
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Chapter 4
Pushed into the Red? Female-headed Households
and the Pre-Crisis Credit Expansion
4.1 Introduction
Household debt in the United States doubled in the lead up to the 2008 Financial Crisis, grow-
ing from $6.26 trillion at the start of 2002 to $12.68 trillion in the third quarter of 2008 (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York 2017).36 Despite claims that expanded subprime lending would provide
new opportunities for many borrowers (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 2006), household
financial health suffered in the aftermath of the crisis due to overleveraging, the collapse of home
equity, and falling incomes.
Concerns about these outcomes has been widespread (Bricker et al. 2012; Emmons 2009), and
some work has studied the prevalence of high-cost credit and high indebtedness in predominately
minority neighborhoods. However, less attention has been directed to differences in household
debt trajectories by gender and among female-headed households in particular.37
Identifying groups that emerged from the credit expansion and 2008 Financial Crisis heavily
indebted is important for several reasons. A large literature has established a link between high
household leverage in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis and persistent unemployment driven by
decreased consumption expenditures (e.g., Mian and Sufi 2012). This excessive household lever-
age may be a source of ongoing sluggish growth as households pay off existing debt (Krugman
2014). Identifying groups that are suffering from debt overhang can provide guidance for develop-
ing debt forgiveness or renegotiation policies to address these problems. Previous work has shown
such policies to be effective at increasing debt pay down rates and reducing foreclosures (Agar-
36This chapter is based on a previously published article (Long 2018).
37See Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty (2013) for a survey of work relevant to race and gender in the area of
mortgage debt.
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wal et al. 2012). While no direct short-run effects on consumption were found, increases may be
observed from such policies in the long run.
Secondly, growing indebtedness among female-headed households is a phenomenon of inher-
ent concern for its impact on household financial fragility. There have long been concerns about
the high poverty rates and low wealth accumulation of women in the United States and of female-
headed households specifically (Pressman 1988; Schmidt and Sevak 2006). Female household
heads not only have lower wages on average due to occupational segregation, but they are also
more likely to have care obligations that further decrease earning potential and increase expenses
(Pressman 2003). As a result, these households often rely on borrowing. Borrowing may be a
means of coping with income shortfalls but can also result in financial fragility, with income shocks
potentially leading to further debt or to default. One report found that female-headed households
had longer than average poverty spells and the highest probability of returning to poverty within
four years of ending a spell (50% compared to an average probability of 36%) (Stevens 2011). In-
come and expenditure shocks can lead to a cycle of increasing debt or to default, with concerning
implications for the wellbeing of the women and children in these households.
This analysis uses Survey of Consumer Finances data and a difference-in-differences empirical
strategy to investigate whether female-headed households experienced a greater increase in mort-
gage and educational debt in the lead-up to the crisis and greater persistence in that debt post-crisis
relative to male-headed households. I also assess whether growing indebtedness was accompanied
by proportional increases in household wealth or income.
The results provide evidence that relatively low-income and younger female-headed house-
holds experienced disproportionate growth in mortgage and educational debt, respectively, during
the credit expansion. Post-crisis, the evidence also points towards greater persistence in lower in-
come women’s mortgage debt and additional growth in educational debt among older women. For
lower income female-headed households, these increases in debt also resulted in disproportionate
growth in household leverage and financial fragility. These trends are consistent with explanations
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focusing on exploitative mortgage lending and both secular and cyclical changes in educational
investment.
I first discuss the existing literature on the growth in mortgage and educational indebtedness
among female-headed households. The data and empirical strategy are discussed in Section 4.3,
followed by results in Section 4.4. Conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section
4.5.
4.2 Background and literature
This analysis focuses attention on two components of household debt: mortgage debt and edu-
cational debt. Mortgage and educational debt together represent a major portion of all household
debt (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2017) and are of key policy relevance. Homeowner-
ship is widely perceived to be a powerful tool for social mobility, raising concerns about ensuring
equal access to mortgage loans, although critics have pointed to limitations of homeownership
for low-income households (Shlay 2006). Work in educational finance has also become increas-
ingly concerned with the effects of student debt burden on future educational attainment and labor
market outcomes (Choi 2014). Student loans are notoriously difficult to discharge in bankruptcy,
potentially allowing them to have longer-lasting effects on household financial health.
This section begins with a discussion of institutional changes to mortgage lending that may be
connected to growth in borrowing among female-headed households. Secular and cyclical trends
in the growth of student loan debt are then considered.
4.2.1 Mortgage debt
Growth in mortgage debt was widespread during the credit expansion and the housing bub-
ble. However, inequalities in the power and socioeconomic vulnerability of different groups may
have also affected which groups were targeted with the most exploitative and costly mortgage
debt. Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty (2013) argue that socially marginalized groups, including
minorities and female-headed households, experienced a shift from being “excluded” from tradi-
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tional mortgage markets to being “superincluded” in those markets via high-cost mortgages. They
attribute this apparent paradox to financial deregulation, new financial products that changed lender
behavior, and the continued lack of “social power" of low-income communities. The development
of securities in the 1980s laid the foundation for an explosion of high-cost mortgage products in
the 1990s and 2000s that brokers pushed on borrowers with few alternative choices.
While they focus much of their argument on racial segregation and discrimination in mortgage
markets, Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty (2013) also argue that gender exacerbated racial differ-
ences in mortgage lending. Existing literature on gendered trends to subprime lending is limited.
Wyly and Ponder (2011) fit quantitative evidence to anecdotal reports of predatory subprime loan
pushing to African-American widows. Such borrowers constituted a vulnerable “cash-poor and
equity-rich” group (Wyly and Ponder 2011, 533). Limited income flow meant that these borrowers
were more willing to take on high-cost loans collateralized by existing assets. Anecdotes suggest
that lenders would visit the homes of such individuals, unsolicited, and push high-cost loans (Wyly
and Ponder 2011).
Female-headed households have also become increasingly reliant on debt, with social safety
nets eroding and care obligations continuing to fall disproportionately on women (Baker 2014).
In the 1990s, welfare reform further reduced resources available to these households by limiting
access to social safety nets, of which the primary recipients were female headed-households with
children (Rose 2000). Immediately prior to the Financial Crisis, women and particularly single
mothers were more likely to report economic insecurity due at least in part to lower incomes
combined with greater financial responsibilities (Lovell, Hartmann, and Williams 2008).
A disproportionate rise in indebtedness during the credit expansion would be less concern-
ing moving forward if there was evidence that this trend reversed post-crisis–i.e., if female-headed
households deleveraged more quickly than male-headed households. This outcome seems unlikely.
Although women’s unemployment rates remained lower during the recession, their responsibility
for dependents may have made it more difficult for them to walk away from underwater mortgages
or to foreclose on a home. Gender trends in bankruptcy behavior may also lead to greater persis-
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tence in debt. Calandra (2008) notes that women are more likely to file Chapter 13 bankruptcy
than male filers. Under Chapter 13, debtors establish a payment plan rather than discharging debt.
The empirical evidence testing these arguments regarding the growth in indebtedness among
women is relatively sparse. Some work has focused on differences in denial or origination rates
in mortgage and other credit markets (Awoonor-Williams 2004; Dietrich and Johannsson 2005;
Lindsey-Taliefero 2015), finding no independent effect of gender. However, denial rates are only
indirectly related to the exclusion-to-superinclusion hypothesis. No studies have studied gender
differences in the level of mortgage debt or originations during the credit expansion.
One direct test of the superexclusion hypothesis is to examine whether the average cost of
mortgage loans among female borrowers was higher than during the credit expansion period. In
one of the first studies to do this, Fishbein and Woodall (2006) use 2005 HMDA data and find that
female mortgage borrowers are disproportionately likely to receive a subprime loan regardless of
income. The discrepancy is greatest for women of color relative to White male borrowers. Wyly
and Ponder (2011) test the hypothesis of predatory lending towards African American widows
in particular. Analyzing a rich combination of data sources ranging from 1994 to 2008, they
find strong evidence of a “feminization of risky credit” (543), particularly among older African
American women, although evidence of gender differences within race and ethnicity is limited.
Most other studies find no independent effect of gender on the cost of credit. Using 2004 Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances data, Cheng, Lin, and Liu (2011) find that female mortgage borrowers
have interest rates that are unconditionally 40 basis points higher. This difference disappears when
the researchers control for variation in loan search efforts. Women in the sample are more likely
to choose lenders based on “recommendation,” while men and dual-headed households are more
likely to report shopping for the lowest rates. Similarly, Sen (2012) reports that female mortgage
borrowers pay more for mortgages due to differences in the types of lenders they access. The em-
pirical results provide no substantive evidence of discrimination among female and male borrowers
using the same lenders.
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Three important caveats should be raised concerning the apparent contradiction between these
results and the exclusion-to-superinclusion hypothesis. First, the findings of Cheng, Lin, and Liu
(2011) and Sen (2012) arguably do not contradict this hypothesis at all. Dymski, Hernandez, and
Mohanty (2013) define the use of racial power (and, more broadly, social power) as a situation in
which “[o]ne set of agents... can restrict the choices, constrain the freedoms, and/or impose addi-
tional costs on” another group (139). Minority or female borrowers who lack social power as well
as economic resources may be subject to such constraints in the search for mortgage products. With
few local branches available and predatory lending common in some low-income neighborhoods,
individuals are faced with higher search costs and less access to mainstream mortgage products.
In line with this interpretation, Sen (2012) appropriately terms differences in the types of lenders
used as “institutional discrimination.”
Second, econometric specifications that seek a true counterfactual in comparing men and women’s
outcomes risk shifting the focus of analysis towards sex as biologically defined rather than gender
as socially defined. In other words, the question of whether female-headed households left the
credit expansion more indebted than male-headed households should not be truly ceteris paribus
question. As Wyly and Ponder (2011) note, the socioeconomic characteristics of female-headed
households may themselves be the result of gender inequality, not differences to be controlled
away. Nonetheless, it is important to identify and recognize which mechanisms may be driving
gender differences, for which a robust identification strategy can be helpful, as discussed further in
Section 4.3.
Finally, and on a related point, the superinclusion hypothesis implies that certain observable
characteristics are themselves mediating factors. It would not be reasonable to assume that all
female-headed households were equally vulnerable to or targeted for high-cost loans. Wyly and
Ponder’s 2011 emphasis on how the “cash-poor and asset-rich” were targets of subprime lending
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supports the notion that income or class could play a mediating role.38 I return to this mediating
variable in the empirical strategy of the paper.
4.2.2 Educational debt
Trends in student indebtedness are likely gendered for several reasons, many of which are un-
related to the dynamics of the credit expansion. One primary driver is growing college enrollment
among women. The representation of women among college students grew from 48% in 1976 to
57% in 2014 (American Association of University Women [AAUW] 2017). All else equal, this en-
rollment difference should lead a greater proportion of women to hold student debt. It is not clear
a priori whether enrolled female students take on more or less debt on average than male students.
Single mothers were more likely to attend costlier for-profit institutions than other groups, and
non-traditional students have lower average ability to pay (AAUW 2017; Institute for Women’s
Policy Research 2017b). At the same time, women have higher high school GPAs on average
(Buddin 2014), possibly resulting in greater scholarship funding.
While this long-run trend is unsurprising, it is less immediately obvious how changes in educa-
tional debt could be related to the credit expansion. Most student debt held today is federal student
debt. In 2012, federal student loans made up 88% of outstanding educational debt, and 93% of all
student loans originated in 2010-11 were federal loans. Access to federal loans is based on ability
to pay, cost of attendance, and federally mandated yearly and aggregate borrowing limits. This
debt is not directly affected by the changes in lending behavior discussed in regards to mortgage
debt.
However, the volume of outstanding private student loan (PSL) debt and PSL originations in-
creased dramatically during the credit expansion. These loans made up 25% of all outstanding
student loans in 2007-08 before sharply declining to 12% in 2008-09 (College Board 2017b). This
38Interestingly, Fishbein and Woodall (2006) find that the disproportionate representation of women among sub-
prime borrowers increases at higher income levels. They attribute this heterogeneity to variation in loan negotiation
behaviors. Specifically, they suggest that gender and racial differences in borrowers’ self-perceived financial literacy
and in lenders’ self-perceived bargaining power are more salient at higher levels of income. The direction of the
relationship between class and gender differences in debt growth is therefore an empirical question.
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growth is linked to the same dynamics as subprime mortgage lending (Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau and U.S. Department of Education 2012). PSLs were packaged in the form of
student loan asset-backed securities and sold to investment banks. Lenders reduced underwriting
criteria and shifted to “Direct-to-Consumer” lending, marketing loans to students instead of work-
ing through financial aid offices. As a result, the number of students with private loans increased,
despite the fact that average interest rates on these loans were higher than Stafford rates. Many
students used PSLs despite being eligible for additional lower-cost federal loans, suggesting that
students who took on these loans did not have full information about their potential options.
The connection between PSLs and the debt burden of female-headed households may result
from the disproportionate enrollment of women (and particularly single mothers) in for-profit col-
leges. For-profit colleges served as an important nexus for PSL lending prior to the crisis. Under-
graduates at for-profit colleges were three times more likely to hold a private student loan than the
average undergraduate (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and U.S. Department of Education
2012).
Although the volume of PSL originations plummeted with the Financial Crisis, educational
debt overall increased at an even faster rate post-crisis. This increase may be tied to individuals re-
turning to education in response to a tight labor market and may again show gendered dynamics. In
a decomposition of labor force participation trends following the Financial Crisis, Van Zandweghe
(2012) finds that 60% of the reduction in men’s labor force participation is explained by long-run
trends, while the entirety of the reduction among women is attributable to the economic downturn.
Other work has shown working-age women’s labor force participation to be more sensitive to cycli-
cal changes (Aaronson et al. 2006). Such differences have been attributed to the lower opportunity
cost of household work for women facing relatively lower wages than men and high childcare
costs. Some of these women may have also been returning to school. Rampell (2011) highlights
young women in their early 20s choosing to enroll in college as job growth proved stagnant, while
men were more likely to remain in employment or to continue searching for employment due in
part to breadwinner mentalities.
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In attempting to distinguish between these long-run and cyclical patterns, age may be a relevant
mediating factor. To the extent that long-run trends mainly explain gendered changes in educational
indebtedness, most of the growth should occur among traditionally aged female students. Evidence
of growing indebtedness among older female students in this period could be indicative of growing
PSL debt or for-profit college enrollment, where these students are more prevalent. Post-crisis,
growth of educational debt among female, non-traditionally aged students would be consistent
with increased enrollment of this group in response to labor market conditions.
4.2.3 Household leverage and financial fragility
Indebtedness does not necessarily worsen long-run financial health. Borrowing can enable
households to accumulate wealth and to acquire productive assets. However, the debt accumulated
during the credit expansion is concerning if it did not lead to sustained wealth creation. The
collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 combined with falling incomes during the recession and the
prevalence of high-cost mortgage loans meant that many borrowers who had taken out mortgages
during the credit expansion were left with assets that fell dramatically in value or lost their homes
to foreclosure. As a result, growth in mortgage debt among female-headed households may not
have funded lasting wealth.
The relationship between debt and wealth alone provides an incomplete picture of household
financial health by overlooking financial fragility. In his analysis of firm leveraging and financial
instability, Minsky (1977) argues that firms increase their debt commitments during periods of high
economic confidence. As a result, any shock to cash flows or financing costs can push the firm into
increasingly fragile financing models, culminating in Ponzi finance and potentially default. A
similar notion of financial fragility can applied to households. Households with a high debt-to-
income ratio are at greater risk of defaulting in the case of an income shock. Because households
may be unable to sell assets to address these shortfalls, the comparison of liabilities to income
flows is an important additional measure of financial health.39
39See Chapter 5 for a more extensive review of measures of financial fragility.
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4.3 Data and empirical strategy
The data used in this analysis comes from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a triennial
cross-sectional survey conducted since 1983 that includes detailed information on the financial
situation of households. I pool information from seven years of the SCF, between 1995 and 2013.40
Two main truncations are made to the sample. First, I exclude all dual-headed households.
Debt holdings are reported at the household level, so the gender of the loan signatory cannot be
identified for dual-headed households. Second, I omit household heads under 18 and over 65 years
of age. Notwithstanding the conclusions of Wyly and Ponder (2011), I expect older household
heads to be less likely to borrow overall and to be unrepresentative of the gender dynamics of
interest.
Three time periods are defined in order to identify possible differences in the growth of indebt-
edness by gender. The reference time period includes SCF surveys from 1995, 1998, and 2001.
The period that arguably best captures the credit expansion leading up to the Financial Crisis ex-
tends from 2002 to 2007 and includes the 2004 and 2007 surveys. The 2009 SCF panel survey is
not used in this analysis. Finally, the post-crisis period is 2008 and onward, which includes survey
years 2010 and 2013.
The main dependent variable of interest is the total outstanding debt (in dollars) held by house-
holds as well as mortgage debt and educational debt specifically. Total debt may be higher in one
household than another for many reasons beyond the ability or decision to take on a new loan.
Lower ability to service debt or higher interest costs can lead to greater growth in outstanding debt
over time.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present histograms of average total outstanding debt as well as mortgage
and educational debt holdings for single-headed households. Overall, the increase in household
debt during the credit expansion is clearly visible, as is the primary role played by mortgage debt.
Post-crisis, there is clear evidence of a slowing in the growth of this debt and some deleveraging
40The SCF uses a multiple imputation procedure to account for missing values. For this analysis, I do not adjust
for the minor additional variance introduced by this technique and only use the first of the five implicates for each
observation.
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in mortgage debt, but educational debt continues to rise at a faster rate than during the credit
expansion.
Household leverage is measured using the ratio of total household debt to gross household
wealth. While debt-to-equity ratios are often used, many households in the sample report negative
net wealth. The meaning of a one-unit change in the debt-to-equity ratio would subsequently
be ambiguous in an empirical analysis. Financial fragility is measured using the ratio of total
household debt to annual income. Summary statistics for these ratios are presented in Table 4.1.41
As the standard deviations suggest, very low wealth and income values combined with high
debt result in inordinately large debt-to-wealth and debt-to-income ratios for a small number of ob-
servations. Regression results based on the full sample exhibit low explanatory power as measured
by R-squared (see Table 4.7). As a result, a trimmed sample is also used in which observations in
the top 0.5 percent of the debt-to-wealth ratio or debt-to-income ratio distributions are dropped, or
about 1 percent of total observations.
The sample is separated by gender of household head in Table 4.2. In the pre-expansion pe-
riod, male-headed households had more total and mortgage debt than female-headed households.
Female-headed households experience a similar percent increase in mortgage and educational in-
debtedness as male-headed households in the credit expansion period. However, this similarity
could be misleading due to significant income and wealth outliers among male-headed house-
holds (see Table 4.3 below). Educational debt increases much more quickly for female-headed
households during this period. Post-crisis, female-headed households show a continued increase
in mortgage debt, compared to a slight decrease for male-headed households. Educational debt
again increases significantly for both groups.
As noted above, an analysis of the institutional constraints faced by female-headed households
should arguably not strive for estimating a truly ceteris paribus treatment effect of sex, which
41This focus on debt-to-wealth and debt-to-income ratios neglects the role of educational borrowing on increased
future income through human capital investment. The cross-sectional structure of this dataset precludes an analysis of
the relationship between educational debt and income trajectories.
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uproots gender from its social context. Nonetheless, two questions are relevant to constructing a
robust empirical test of the institutional mechanisms described above.
First, are changes in indebtedness possibly explained by changes in observable characteristics
of female- or male-headed households that might suggest alternative mechanisms? For example,
if male-headed households were more likely to be unemployed or increasingly likely to leave the
labor force during the credit expansion or post-crisis periods, they may exhibit a decline in demand
for credit. Notably, if all such observable variation is controlled for, the resulting estimate of the
gender difference in the rise in indebtedness may be conservative from the standpoint of structural
gender inequality. Household size is one such example. The care obligations faced by female-
headed households are part of what may make them vulnerable to predatory, high-cost lending, but
it can also be seen as an exogenous source of greater credit demand.
Second, are the effects of gender on the growth of indebtedness mediated by other factors?
Section 4.2 above suggests hypotheses for gendered trends in mortgage and educational debt. Rel-
atively low-income women would be more likely to be “cash poor” Wyly and Ponder (2011) and
to lack social power (Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013). If securitization led to dispro-
portionate growth of (private) student loan debt among female-headed households, this should be
primarily notable among non-traditional (older) students who are disproportionately represented
at for-profit colleges (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and U.S. Department of Education
2012; Institute for Women’s Policy Research 2017b).
These two considerations and the nature of the research question lead me to adopt a difference-





where for individual i, yi is the debt outcome of interest (total, mortgage, or educational debt;
the debt-to-wealth ratio; or the debt-to-income ratio), X ′
i
is a vector of credit demand and credit
access controls, and Expi and PostCrisisi are dummy variables indicating whether the individual
is observed during the 2004/2007 or 2010/2013 surveys, respectively (with the 1995/1998/2001
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surveys being the reference group). The interaction terms with coefficients δexp and αpost are the
DID estimators. The coefficients αexp and αpost are the time trend estimates of the average change
in indebtedness relative to the reference period for male-headed households, and αexp + δexp and
αpost + δpost estimate the changes in indebtedness for female-headed households.
I test the predictions discussed in Section 4.2 by allowing parameters to vary by income and
age. For mortgage debt, debt-to-wealth ratios, and debt-to-income ratios, separate regressions are
run for observations reporting above median income (calculated by year) and for those reporting
below median income. For educational debt, separate regressions are run for the full sample and
for a non-traditionally aged sample, 25 to 65.
The DID approach has the advantage of eliminating the time-invariant heterogeneity that was
discussed above. However, time-variant heterogeneity by gender could still confound the results.
The vector of controls X ′
i
attempt to account for this concern. Controls and summary statistics
are shown in Table 4.3. The controls are drawn from the literature on credit scoring variables
and determinants of credit demand (e.g., Crook 2001). Controls not shown in the table are the
interaction of race and gender and a quadratic age term. Wealth and income controls are omitted
from the debt-to-wealth ratio and debt-to-income ratio regressions, respectively.
Two controls merit additional comment. Risk aversion is included in light of work suggesting
that women may be more risk averse in their financial behavior on average (Charness and Gneezy
2012; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). I also control for being “unbanked.” The opportunities
for mainstream financial institutions to market new financial products to potential borrowers were
likely mediated by the extent to which those borrowers were already incorporated into formal
lending markets.42
Note that income and wealth show significant variation, particularly among male-headed house-
holds. The standard deviation of wealth in the male subsample is 8.44 times larger than the mean.
This may point to the presence of significant outliers in the distribution, although it is also well
known that wealth tends to be more unequally distributed than income (e.g., Saez and Zucman
42See Chapter 2 for a review of the literature on financial exclusion.
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2014). To reduce this variation, income and wealth are transformed into logs, which also drops
observations with zero income or wealth.43
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Mortgage debt
Results from OLS regressions of the covariates on total household debt and mortgage debt
specifically are reported in Table 4.4, with separate regressions for single-headed households with
above and below median income.44 Focusing first on the above-median-income group, there is ev-
idence of a strong time trend. Average mortgage debt increased by about $15,800 dollars between
the credit expansion and reference periods. The coefficient for the post-crisis period is slightly
larger at about $20,600, suggesting that household debt continued to increase slightly between the
credit expansion and post-crisis periods. There is no evidence of gender-differentiated trends in
this subsample.
By contrast, the below-median-income group shows no sign of an increase in average mort-
gage debt among male-headed households in either of the periods of interest. To the extent that
average household debt did increase among the relatively low-income group, it is driven entirely
by changes in indebtedness among low-income, female-headed households. Average mortgage
debt increased by about $7,500 dollars for female-headed households between the reference and
the credit expansion periods. The level of average indebtedness did decline for this group in the
post-crisis period, but there is no evidence of a “catching up” by male-headed households.
Importantly, growth in mortgage debt during the credit expansion is a significant portion of
the growth in total household debt for the below median income sample (72.8%). This finding
suggests that growth in other forms of debt (i.e., educational debt, non-revolving consumer debt,
automobile debt, credit card debt, etc.) contribute to the growth of indebtedness among these
43Results are qualitatively robust to use of original values in regressions where convergence was not precluded by
high variance of income and wealth.
44For all debt level and extensive margin regressions, results listing estimates for controls are listed in Appendix E.
Analogous results for the leverage and financial fragility regressions are available upon request.
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households. In the above-median-income sample, the overall trend in household debt growth is
positive but insignificant, suggesting that the increase in mortgage debt was accompanied by a
decrease in other forms of debt. Growing reliance on other forms of debt may be a sign of financial
distress among these households or of correlations between various types of borrowing.
4.4.2 Educational debt
Results from the educational debt regressions are reported in Table 4.5. Column 1 reports
results from a regression of the full sample 18 to 65, and Column 2 reports analogous results for
an older sample, 25 to 65. In both regressions, the period dummies reflect the time trends visible
in Figure 4.2. There was an increase in educational debt during the credit expansion of almost
$776 on average among male-headed households and an increase of $3,631 between the credit
expansion and post-crisis periods. The magnitudes are similar when the sample is limited to older
household heads.
Returning to the younger sample, there is evidence of gendered differences in growth both pre-
and post-crisis. During the credit expansion period, educational debt increased by more than twice
as much for female-headed than male-headed households. The magnitude of the DID coefficient
corresponding to the post-crisis period is in turn $600 (53%) greater than that of the DID coefficient
for the credit expansion period, suggesting that women continued to see a faster rate of increase in
dollar terms.
When the sample is narrowed to households 25 to 65, the magnitude of the DID coefficient
for the credit expansion period falls by about 35% and is no longer statistically significant. This
finding is consistent with the claim that most of the rapid increase in educational debt among
female household heads is driven by growing enrollment of female recent high school graduates.
The post-crisis DID estimator indicates a slightly greater or approximately equivalent amount of
educational debt growth among women in the older sample. Because the coefficient on credit
expansion growth is statistically indistinguishable from zero, most of the $1,958 estimate for post-
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crisis growth relative to the reference period may actually represent debt growth relative to the
credit expansion period.
Overall, these results and differences by age group do not provide quantitative evidence in
support of increased private student borrowing among older female household heads, but they
are consistent with the secular increase in female enrollment and a return to college by female
household heads of non-traditional college age.
4.4.3 Extensive margin
Implicit in the discussion of Section 4.2 is a distinction between the intensive and extensive
margins of indebtedness. At the extensive margin, the outcome of interest is whether households
hold a certain type of debt at all (e.g., to rent or to sign a mortgage). At the intensive margin,
the relevant outcome is the magnitude of indebtedness conditional on holding debt (e.g., how
expensive of a house to finance with how large of a down payment).
Determining whether the previous results are driven by differences on the extensive or inten-
sive margins can shed some light on the mechanisms at play. For instance, if lenders primarily
marketed new loans to customers by encouraging home purchases or the refinancing of a previ-
ously paid-off home, this should be reflected as an increase in the proportion of households holding
debt regardless of magnitude. If the cost of loans increased on average as well, then the average
magnitude of debt should increase conditional on holding a loan.
Table 4.6 reports results and selected marginal effects from logit regressions where the depen-
dent binary variable equals one if the household holds the type of debt in question (the extensive
margin).45 The increase in indebtedness among lower income, female household heads appears to
have occurred at the extensive margin. Among above median income borrowers, there is again no
indication of gender differentiated trends on the extensive margin.
45A regression on changes along the intensive margin is also possible by limiting the for each debt type to the
subsample of individuals with non-zero debt of that type. However, comparisons to the previous result are problematic
because sample size falls significantly depending on the prevalence of each type of borrowing.
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Interestingly, the extensive margin results suggest that the relative increase in indebtedness
among lower income female-headed households may be due at least in part to a decrease in the in-
debtedness of male-headed households. The net change in the probability of being a mortgage debt
holder for male-headed households falls over time, while the net change is zero or slightly positive
for female-headed households, independent of observable changes in household composition.
The explanation of the decline among male-headed households is unclear. As shown in Table
4.3, homeownership increased for both male- and female-headed households between the pre-
expansion and credit expansion periods, and household size remained relatively constant. One
possibility is that female-headed households mostly experienced an increase in the magnitude of
mortgage debt already held (e.g., by refinancing), suggesting a change along the intensive margin.
Post-crisis, the results suggest that both men’s and women’s likelihood of holding mortgage
debt falls, although men experience a slightly greater decrease. Due to greater mobility and less
reliance on social networks (see discussion in Chapter 2), men may have been more readily able to
foreclose on or walk away from homes and mortgage debt.
The results for educational debt suggest a general increase in the probability of holding educa-
tional debt during both periods, but particularly post-crisis, with no differences in growth trajec-
tories by gender or age. Such a general increase that is not specific to the traditional college age
population points to the growing enrollment of non-traditional students. Furthermore, these results
suggest that most of the gender difference in educational debt is driven by differences along the
intensive margin. Non-traditional students, who are disproportionately female heads of household,
may have borrowed more on average than traditional students. Parental borrowing for children
attending college could also play a role in the differences: If female heads of household are more
likely to have children of college age and take on student loans for their children (e.g., PLUS loans
which can be used by parents to fund their child’s undergraduate education), these households
could have accumulated a greater college debt burden than other households holding their own
debt. For instance, the latter group may have already paid off part of their student loans or may be
better equipped to pay off that debt quickly.
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4.4.4 Household leverage and financial fragility
Table 4.7 presents regression results for leverage and financial fragility ratios by income group
and sample. Among the lower income group, female-headed households experienced an average
increase in leverage. In the post-crisis period, the average debt-to-wealth ratio in the trimmed sam-
ple of female-headed households increased by 130 percentage points relative to the pre-expansion
period. Compared to the low-income sample mean of 1.77 (debt equal to 177% of gross wealth),
this result is economically significant. Moreover, these female-headed households appear to have
experienced increasing financial fragility. In the trimmed sample, the average debt-to-income ratio
increased by 39 percentage points for women in the credit expansion period. The gender difference
grows in the post-crisis period and is more precisely estimated.
The above-median-income group does not exhibit gender-differentiated trends in either ratio.
There is evidence of growing indebtedness among all households relative to incomes during the
credit expansion and post-crisis period.
4.5 Conclusions
This analysis used evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances to test various mecha-
nisms for the growth in indebtedness among female-headed households prior to and following the
Financial Crisis. The results point to a growing debt burden among female-headed households that
accelerated during the credit expansion and showed greater persistence post crisis. Subsample anal-
yses by income and age provide some evidence that this gendered growth in indebtedness stems
from institutional changes in lending markets and less deleveraging of mortgage and other debt
post-crisis among female household heads. This growing mortgage indebtedness is combined with
investment in education among young women pre-crisis and particularly among non-traditionally
aged female household heads post-crisis.
The evidence also suggests that lower income, female-headed households saw an increase in
debt-to-wealth ratios post-crisis. Although debt and wealth rose at similar rates during the credit
expansion, the collapse of home equity in the post-crisis period left these households more lever-
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aged than pre-crisis. Debt-to-income ratios also rose for female-headed households, raising con-
cerns about the financial fragility of these households moving forward.
This difference-in-difference analysis using successive waves of the Surveys of Consumer Fi-
nances faces several limitations. First, the observed changes in indebtedness over time may reflect
unobserved variation in the composition of the female-headed households and male-headed house-
holds sampled (e.g., changes in the number of college students) or other unobserved, time-variant
characteristics of these households. Second, the SCF oversamples high-wealth households, who
are less likely to be impacted by some of the debt dynamics that are the focus of this paper. The
University of Michigan’s Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) offers a promising alternative
dataset to address both of these concerns. Since 1968, the PSID has followed a sample of American
households and “splitoff” households formed from that original sample in a series of yearly and
(since 1997) biennial surveys. The sample includes an oversampling of low-income households
and can be made nationally representative through use of sampling weights. Chapter 5 applies an
extension of the present analysis to the PSID.
Debt is not necessarily problematic. It can enable households to acquire assets and invest in
human capital. However, the debt accumulated in the context of the credit expansion is concerning.
Equity funded with mortgage debt disappeared the collapse of the housing bubble. Educational
debt is potentially beneficial in the long run, but the promise of increased future income is premised
on degree completion and on a reasonable earnings premium. Neither of these is guaranteed,
particularly when women are concentrated in lower-paying industries and must juggle education
with care responsibilities. Further research should investigate the continued consequences of this
growth in debt for the financial stability and economic security of female-headed households.
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Figure 4.1: Average total household debt, 1995 - 2013
Source: 1995 to 2013 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Notes: Sample is limited to first implicate set and to single-headed households with household heads aged
18 to 65 and non-zero wealth and income. Bars indicate standard errors. Means and standard errors are
calculated using sampling weights. Black lines separate time periods of interest (the pre-expansion or



























































































Mortgage Debt (L) Educational Debt (R)
Figure 4.2: Average household mortgage and educational debt, 1995 - 2013
Source: 1995 to 2013 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Notes: Sample is limited to first implicate set and to single-headed households with household heads aged
18 to 65 and non-zero wealth and income. Bars indicate standard errors. Means and standard errors are
calculated using sampling weights. Black lines separate time periods of interest (the pre-expansion or
reference period [1995-2001], the credit expansion period [2002-2007], and the post-crisis period
[2008-2013]).
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Table 4.1: Debt-to-wealth and debt-to-income ratio summary statistics by household type
Full sample Female-headed households Male-headed households
Debt-to-wealth ratio 7.258 (161.744) 3.478 (46.938)
Debt-to-income ratio 1.531 (7.933) 2.573 (76.698)
Observations 4986 3578
Trimmed sample Female-headed households Male-headed households
Debt-to-wealth ratio 1.521 (7.511) 1.168 (7.473)
Debt-to-income ratio 1.265 (2.073) 1.082 (2.003)
Observations 4936 3544
Source: 1995 to 2013 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Notes: Sample is limited to first implicate set and includes all single-headed households with household
heads 18 to 65 years of age and with non-zero wealth and income. The trimmed sample drops the top 0.5
percent of the distribution for each variable.
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Table 4.2: Average total, mortgage, and educational debt by gender










Total Debt $27505.94 $49575.90 80.24% $56311.24 13.59%
Mortgage $19389.17 $37342.88 92.60% $41857.27 12.09%
Education $1578.52 $3191.73 102.20% $6652.62 108.43%
Observations 1752 1264 1970
Male-Headed Households
Total Debt $35566.37 $60827.57 71.03% $61973.26 1.88%
Mortgage $21962.34 $43189.08 96.65% $41064.82 -4.92%
Education $1399.63 $1939.69 38.59% $4657.85 140.13%
Observations 1273 878 1427
Source: 1995 to 2013 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Notes: Sample is limited to first implicate set and includes all single-headed households with household heads 18 to 65 years of age and with
non-zero wealth and income.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of controls by gender
Control Female-headed households Male-headed households
Wealth (dollars) 136171.60 (874999.90) 215125.40 (1815515.00)
Income (dollars) 33742.95 (64882.78) 48862.67 (235895.30)
Age 43.267 (12.361) 40.925 (13.278)
Non-White 0.366 0.254




Risk averse* 0.493 0.324
Unbanked 0.090 0.086
Household size 1.864 (1.159) 1.241 (0.664)
Major expense in 5 to 10 yrs 0.585 0.567
Unemployed** 0.159 0.168
Observations 4986 3578
Source: 1995 to 2013 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables. Sample is limited to first implicate set
and to all single-headed households with household heads 18 to 65 and non-zero wealth and income. Means
and standard deviations are calculated using sampling weights. *Defined as being unwilling to take “any
financial risks.” **Except for 1995, defined as not working and “looking for work in past 12 months.”
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Table 4.4: Mortgage regression results
Below median income Above median income
Dependent (dollars): Total debt Mortgage Total debt Mortgage
Female 720.8 -238.6 3299.8 4407.2
(1783.7) (1538.6) (4930.2) (2717.6)
Expansion -187.1 -701.4 9077.1 15762.8***
(2026.1) (1762.6) (7303.5) (4352.2)
Post-Crisis 6269.2** 1868.1 16965.3** 20606.3***
(2514.4) (2014.9) (7134.3) (4174.5)
Expansion # Female 10267.3*** 7478.5*** -3832.7 -2078.3
(2758.9) (2414.6) (8263.9) (5419.6)
Post-Crisis # Female 7259.8** 5530.6** -5101.3 394.5
(2969.1) (2440.3) (9944.4) (5547.5)
Observations 3847 3847 4717 4717
R-squared 0.168 0.174 0.094 0.273
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels.
Controls not shown. All regressions use sampling weights and first implicate set.
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Table 4.5: Educational debt regression results
18 to 65 years of age 25 to 65 years of age
Dependent (dollars): Total debt Educational Total debt Educational
Female 194.3 941.2*** 110.6 988.6***
(2901.9) (314.4) (3232.6) (328.4)
Expansion 13049.1*** 775.7** 13539.3*** 947.0**
(4439.3) (373.6) (5047.0) (417.4)
Post-Crisis 21412.1*** 3631.2*** 23491.7*** 3403.4***
(5126.8) (573.6) (5777.0) (600.2)
Expansion # Female -140.9 1169.6** -889.6 762.5
(5026.8) (523.8) (5639.4) (541.1)
Post-Crisis # Female -4742.3 1786.1** -6471.8 1958.4**
(6239.8) (767.9) (7016.3) (796.4)
Observations 8564 8564 7782 7782
R-squared 0.078 0.051 0.079 0.054
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is limited to all single-headed households with household
heads 18 to 65 and non-zero wealth and income. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and ***
1% levels. Controls not shown. All regressions use sampling weights and first implicate set.
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Table 4.6: Extensive margin regression results
Mortgage debt Educational debt
Logit parameter Below median Above median 18 to 65 25 to 65
estimates income income
Female -0.157 0.0115 0.453*** 0.565***
(0.256) (0.124) (0.130) (0.148)
Expansion -0.700** 0.292** 0.384*** 0.408**
(0.320) (0.132) (0.148) (0.171)
Post-Crisis -0.803*** 0.201* 0.672*** 0.699***
(0.289) (0.119) (0.127) (0.146)
Expansion # Female 0.890** 0.0608 0.0222 -0.0520
(0.362) (0.180) (0.184) (0.207)
Post-Crisis # Female 0.723** 0.0615 0.251 0.149
(0.329) (0.160) (0.158) (0.176)
Observations 3847 4717 8564 7782
Marginal effects
Expansion # Female 0.0736** 0.0112 0.0155 0.00826
(0.0296) (0.0323) (0.0206) (0.0209)
Post-Crisis # Female 0.0553** 0.0113 0.0643*** 0.0508***
(0.0270) (0.0287) (0.0188) (0.0190)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is limited to all single-headed households with household
heads 18 to 65 and non-zero wealth and income. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and ***
1% levels. Controls not shown. All regressions use sampling weights and first implicate set.
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Table 4.7: Leverage and financial fragility regression results
Less than median income More than median income
Dependent: Debt-to-wealth ratio Debt-to-income ratio Debt-to-wealth ratio Debt-to-income ratio
Full Trimmed Full Trimmed Full Trimmed Full Trimmed
Female 5.668 -0.0213 -2.609 0.0531 0.514 0.0263 0.0851 0.0987
(8.838) (0.381) (2.121) (0.144) (0.578) (0.437) (0.0653) (0.0609)
Expansion 2.622 0.577 -1.366 -0.0486 -0.234 -0.179 0.239*** 0.260***
(5.105) (0.662) (1.756) (0.172) (0.540) (0.526) (0.0859) (0.0818)
Post-Crisis 6.663 0.196 7.296 0.120 2.732 0.244 0.272*** 0.288***
(5.093) (0.339) (7.887) (0.154) (1.951) (0.639) (0.0798) (0.0761)
Expansion # Female -6.800 0.0420 1.900 0.385* 1.795 0.513 0.0915 0.0758
(12.76) (0.768) (1.752) (0.211) (1.149) (0.638) (0.111) (0.109)
Post-Crisis # Female -8.538 1.308** -6.022 0.489** -1.487 0.203 0.145 0.134
(13.10) (0.564) (7.641) (0.197) (1.802) (0.730) (0.103) (0.101)
Observations 3847 3776 3847 3776 4717 4704 4717 4704
R-squared 0.007 0.023 0.003 0.125 0.007 0.014 0.181 0.199
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is limited to all single-headed households with household heads 18 to 65 and non-zero wealth and
income. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. Controls not shown. All regressions use sampling weights and first
implicate set. Trimmed sample drops observations with debt-to-wealth or debt-to-income ratios in the top 0.5% of the distributions.
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Chapter 5
Personal Indebtedness, Social Inequality: The
Gendered and Racialized Effects of the 2008
Financial Crisis on Household Debt
5.1 Introduction
Since the 2008 Financial Crisis, a substantial literature has emerged examining changes in
household net worth in the lead-up to and aftermath of the crisis, with particular attention to in-
equality in net worth by class, race, and household structure (Baker, West, and Wood 2017; Mcker-
nan, Ratcliffe, Steuerle, and Zhang 2010; Pfeffer, Danziger, and Schoeni 2013; Weller and Hanks
2018; Zhang and Feng 2017). This work has shown that Black and Hispanic and low-income
households experienced smaller gains in net worth pre-crisis and greater relative losses in the re-
cession than more advantaged groups. According to one study, households with White household
heads lost 32% of their wealth on average, compared to 45.7% for household heads of other racial
identities (Pfeffer, Danziger, and Schoeni 2013).
Part of this rising inequality in net worth around the 2008 Financial Crisis has been traced to
differences in the types of investments made by each group. More affluent households tend to
hold a larger portion of their wealth in liquid assets such as stocks and bonds. The wealth held by
less affluent households is generally concentrated in housing, which experienced a slower recovery
post-crisis (Zhang and Feng 2017).
Yet changes in asset values only explain a portion of the changes in net worth. Figure 5.1
follows Pfeffer, Danziger, and Schoeni (2013) in tracking relative changes in the distribution of
net worth and gross asset values between 1999 and 2015.46 The distribution of net worth experi-
46Net worth in the PSID is defined as total asset values (home equity, farm/business value, checking/savings account
value, non-residential real estate, vehicles, annuities/IRAs, and other assets) net of mortgage debt, consumer debt, and
any debt owed on the previously listed assets. The debt corresponding to the last category is not listed separately by
asset, so it is not possible to determine a true measure of gross asset values. The measure of “gross assets” in this
analysis is therefore gross in terms of “reversing” the netting out of consumer and mortgage debt only.
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enced a greater divergence than gross asset values during this time, pointing to the role of debt in
contributing to net worth inequality. Without careful attention to both sides of household balance
sheets, it is difficult to disentangle the mechanisms driving net worth. How much of economically
marginalized households’ smaller gains in net worth came from slower growth in asset values, and
how much came from greater reliance on debt financing of consumption and investment?
In addition, an analysis of changes in household debt provides a more complete understand-
ing of households’ financial health. Two households may have a net worth of $20,000, but their
financial fragility–their probability of becoming insolvent in the case of an income or expenditure
shock–may differ depending on the dollar value of their debt. Even with offsetting wealth, a more
indebted household may nonetheless be more financially fragile. That household may have illiquid
assets, a low level of income, limited access to additional credit, or high financing costs on their
debt. In light of the rising household debt burden in the United States, attention to the indebtedness
of households is important for understanding the true extent of intergroup inequality.
A small body of literature focused primarily on mortgage lending has started to raise these types
of questions about the role of credit markets in shaping U.S. race and gender inequality (Baker
2014, 2018; Dwyer 2018; Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty 2013; Fishbein and Woodall 2006;
Long 2018; Wyly and Ponder 2011). This work has included valuable assessments of how social
power and the tasks of social reproduction have pushed vulnerable households into indebtedness.
This paper contributes to this literature by applying wide-scale quantitative evidence to examine
gender and race inequality in the growth of both mortgage and consumer debt surrounding the
2008 Financial Crisis.
Using a rich longitudinal dataset–the Panel Study of Income Dynamics–I apply a difference-in-
differences empirical strategy to assess whether economically marginalized groups such as female
household heads and Black or Hispanic household heads experienced greater increases in indebt-
edness and financial fragility between 1999 and 2015 than other types of households. I focus
attention on changes in mortgage principal, total mortgage expenditures, and non-mortgage, non-
vehicle consumer debt at the intensive and extensive margins. I summarize the changes at both
182
margins with an analysis of how the Financial Crisis affected households’ probability of becoming
“financially vulnerable” as measured by their debt burden relative to income, with and without
income adjustments that account for household size.
The results provide mixed evidence that these groups–particularly households with Black house-
hold heads–experienced disproportionate growth in the magnitude of mortgage debt burden relative
to income. There is robust evidence that consumer debt grew both in dollar terms and relative to
household income among women and Black heads of households during the Great Recession and
the recovery. This growing inequality is even more stark when income is scaled to household size
as an “ability to repay” adjustment. A decomposition of household debt between 2011 and 2015
suggests that much of the divergence in consumer debt is driven by educational borrowing.
This analysis matters for developing a richer picture of economic inequality in an increasingly
financialized U.S. economy. Debt allows households to invest in assets and smooth across income
shocks, but if the debt is unsustainable or leads to short-lived wealth creation, then households
suffer a net loss. Some have also argued that rising consumer debt is of concern from the perspec-
tive of macroeconomic volatility and even long-run growth (Krugman 2014; Mian and Sufi 2012).
In the concluding section of the paper, I will address the implications of rising student loan debt
specifically.
Section 5.2 introduces the theory and empirical literature from economics, political economy,
and sociology relating to changes in debt and net worth before and during the Financial Crisis.
Section 5.3 introduces the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, discusses its limitations and advan-
tages, and describes the empirical strategy. Results are presented in Section 5.4, and Section 5.5
concludes.
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5.2 Background and literature
5.2.1 Theory
Much has been written on the causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis and on the implications of
the housing bubble for rising mortgage and consumer indebtedness (e.g., Bricker et al. 2012).47
But why would some groups of households–particularly those headed by women or minorities–be
expected to experience faster growth in household debt pre- or post-crisis, a priori?
Couching the argument first in the terms of individual choice within a neoclassical framework,
relevant factors include increased credit supply and variation in search effort. The early to mid-
2000s was characterized by a credit expansion during which high-cost credit was increasingly
marketed to borrowers who previously would have been credit constrained (Chomsisengphet and
Pennington-Cross 2006; Smith and Hevener 2010). Even in the absence of predatory lending or
variation in the demand for credit, this expansion would have disproportionately increased borrow-
ing among the previously credit constrained. Low-to-moderate income households and prospective
Black and Hispanic borrowers are more likely than White borrowers to be credit constrained and
to lack access to financial services more broadly (Crook 2001; FDIC 2015; Shapiro 2006).
Time poverty and transaction costs may also impact the search efforts of households for low-
cost loans. For example, women and female-headed households in particular are more likely than
other households to be time poor as a result of their care obligations (Turner and Grieco 1998).
This may limit these households’ incentive to dedicate extended search efforts towards finding
the lowest-cost mortgage or consumer loans. Within communities with lower levels of financial
inclusion, knowledge of low-cost lending options may also be less widely available. Cheng, Lin,
and Liu (2011) present evidence that women are less likely to search for the lowest mortgage rate
than men on average and are more likely to make a decision based on someone’s recommendation.
Others have argued that financial literacy plays an important role in differences in households’
financial outcomes (Lusardi and Scheresberg 2013).
47Much of this section draws from the literature review in Long (2018).
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Work in political economy and sociology attributes variation in indebtedness to persistent in-
equality in social power. Dwyer (2018) has suggested that as Western economics financialize,
access to credit and the terms under which credit is accessible for different groups play an impor-
tant role “in shaping social inclusion and exclusion,” determining “life chances,” and reinforcing
“oppressive social relations” (237). The power of credit in the U.S. results in part from the late-
20th-century movement away from the direct provisioning of public goods and social safety nets.
Instead, economic risk has become increasingly “individualized” for households (Dwyer 2018,
255). Households are expected to borrow to cope with unexpected shocks–whether idiosyncratic
in nature or market-wide–and to afford those same public goods that were previously publicly pro-
visioned, such as higher education. Empirical work has confirmed that households with low levels
of wealth rely on unsecured debt as a safety net during unemployment, while wealthier households
do not (Sullivan 2007).
In the context of the 2008 Financial Crisis specifically, subprime lending may have had gen-
dered and racialized dimensions. Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty (2013) note that financial
actors leveraged the pre-expansion financial exclusion and continued economic vulnerability of
Black and Hispanic households as well as female-headed households to extract rents from those
same households during the lending expansion. Securitization, the externalization of risk for fi-
nancial actors that resulted, and deregulation encouraged banks to target these previously excluded
communities as potential customers for high-cost mortgage products. Rather than simply repre-
senting a neutral expansion of credit access, Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty (2013) point to the
role of existing racial and gender inequality in enabling predatory lending by financial institutions.
Other work has argued that specific subgroups within these social categories, such as African-
American widows, were targeted for similar reasons (Wyly and Ponder 2011). Anecdotal accounts
suggest that these “cash-poor and equity-rich” groups had enough assets to generate additional
leverage, while their limited income flows left them vulnerable to predatory lending. Outside of
the subprime context in particular, there is evidence that Black and Hispanic borrowers and low-
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to-moderate income households are more likely to rely on high-cost lending (e.g., from payday
lenders) (e.g, Carr and Schuetz 2001).
Social reproduction tasks may also contribute to gender and intersectional inequality. Baker
(2014) argues that the dismantling of social safety nets in the 1990s pushed female heads of house-
hold in particular towards debt as an alternative risk-coping mechanism. In a subsequent qualitative
study, Baker (2018) interviews older women who lost their homes in the aftermath of the Financial
Crisis. Many women experienced this loss of wealth in part because their position as homeowners
made them central in their social networks. One participant stated, “Everyone’s living with me
again. My daughter dropped out of college, my brother’s living upstairs getting himself together
and my Mom can’t be alone anymore” (32). Women in the study reported taking second mortgages
to put children through college and then serving as the safety net if those children left school or if
another friend or family member lost a job.
Previous research has found that care work and financial responsibility for friends and family
have economically significant impacts on households’ financial security. Many households used
home equity to support their children in college, in turn shifting to student debt when housing prices
plummeted post-2008 (Amromin, Eberly, and Mondragon 2016). Chiteji and Hamilton (2002)
report that Black households’ greater tendency to provide financial assistance to family members
with low incomes explains part of the persistent racial wealth gap. These care responsibilities
may therefore contribute to inequalities in mortgage and consumer debt if households with limited
wealth must borrow to meet the needs of their friends or family.
Yet the centrality of women in social networks can also lead to forms of indebtedness that less
often appear in household surveys. Women–especially women of color–appear more likely than
men to rely on borrowing from friends and family in the case of an unexpected emergency expense
(Lusardi et al. 2011).48 There is important slippage in many cases between “loans,” “financial assis-
tance,” and “gifts” exchanged within friend and kinship networks (Morduch and Schneider 2015),
so much of this borrowing may not appear in household surveys that ask about loans specifically.
48See Chapter 2 for a review of this literature and an empirical analysis of gender differences in informal borrowing.
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5.2.2 Empirical literature on net worth and debt
The studies on Americans’ net worth pre- and post-2008 broadly agree that these periods
were characterized by rising inequality in net worth. Based on both PSID and SCF data, Pfef-
fer, Danziger, and Schoeni (2013) show that median wealth increased by about 12% between 2003
and 2007 and fell by 50% between 2007 and 2011, but the authors note that this change in me-
dian wealth is misleading. Wealth at the 95th percentile of the distribution increased by more than
twofold between 1984 and 2007 and remained 60% higher in 2011 than in 1984. Meanwhile, the
25th percentile of wealth saw virtually no gains during the credit expansion and an almost complete
loss of wealth by 2011 (about 16% of 1984 levels).
Focusing on household characteristics specifically, the same study finds that the most “disad-
vantaged” groups experienced greater relative losses in wealth post-2008 than other groups (albeit
smaller absolute losses). These groups included Non-White respondents and households with
children. Another SCF study uses a synthetic control approach to determine the extent to which
the Financial Crisis eroded household wealth relative to pre-crisis trends (Mckernan, Ratcliffe,
Steuerle, and Zhang 2010). They conclude that the average loss in wealth was about 28%, with
younger households and those with Black household heads experiencing losses closer to 47% of
pre-crisis wealth. A range of other studies using the SCF document similar inequality in wealth
losses and recovery, attributing this inequality in part to variation in the type of assets owned by
different households (Weller and Hanks 2018; Zhang and Feng 2017).
Compared to this body of work, there is a much smaller empirical literature on debt inequality
surrounding the 2008 Financial Crisis. The most attention has been paid to subprime lending.
Fishbein and Woodall (2006) analyze patterns in subprime (3 points or more above the Treasury
yield threshold) and high-cost subprime lending (5 points or more above) as revealed in HMDA
data. Women were disproportionately likely to receive both categories of subprime loans regardless
of income. The magnitude of the gender gap grew with income, which the authors attribute to the
greater impact of gender differences in self-perceived bargaining power and financial confidence
at higher levels of income.
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These gaps in borrowing costs varied by race and ethnicity as well. White women were about
1.25 times as likely to receive such loans as White men, and the ratio rose to 4.75 for African Amer-
ican women with incomes more than 200% of median income (Fishbein and Woodall 2006). Wyly
and Ponder (2011) find mixed evidence of a “feminization of risky credit,” particularly among
older Black women (543). There is also ample evidence of racial inequality in subprime lending as
surveyed by Dymski, Hernandez, and Mohanty (2013), with Smith and Hevener (2010) reporting
double-digit differences between Black and White borrowers in the probability of receiving sub-
prime loans, even after controlling for observable characteristics. Women were also more likely to
receive such loans independent of other factors.
Finally, educational debt has received some attention as well, albeit less frequently in the con-
text of the Financial Crisis specifically. Women are enrolling in college at a greater rate than men,
now representing a majority of enrolled students and earning 57% of all bachelor’s degrees as
of 2017 (American Association of University Women [AAUW] 2017). These enrollment trends
alone suggest that women are more likely to hold student debt. Moreover, female students more
frequently borrow for college and hold greater levels of student debt than male students. Borrow-
ing is greatest among Black women in particular, and they repay that debt more slowly than other
groups (AAUW 2017). This gap in student debt by race and ethnicity has been attributed partly to
Black families’ lower average ability to pay and partly to the less liquid nature of the wealth that
Black families hold compared to White families (e.g., home equity vs. savings or stocks) (Addo,
Houle, and Simon 2016).
There are several possible linkages between these long-run gendered and racialized trends in
student debt and the 2008 Financial Crisis. Amromin, Eberly, and Mondragon (2016) find that
about 40% of the rise in student loan debt following the Financial Crisis can be attributed to the
loss of home equity, which families had previously leveraged to fund educational expenses. As
noted above, if the main source of wealth for Black families was home equity, they may have
disproportionately had to shift towards student loans post-crisis compared to other families. In
addition, there is some anecdotal and quantitative evidence indicating that women may have been
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more likely than men to pursue or resume post-secondary education during the recession, all else
equal (Aaronson et al. 2006; Rampell 2011; Van Zandweghe 2012). Finally, during the credit
expansion of the early 2000s, private student lending ballooned in volume, driven largely by for-
profit colleges (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and U.S. Department of Education 2012).
Women and particularly single mothers are disproportionately likely to attend for-profit colleges
and thus may have been more frequent recipients of high-cost student loans (Institute for Women’s
Policy Research 2017b).
The present analysis builds on a previous paper exploring these gendered and racialized mecha-
nisms in household debt using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (Long 2018).49 The earlier
paper tracks differences in average mortgage and educational debt growth as reported in the trien-
nial SCF surveys administered during the pre-expansion (1995 to 2001), credit expansion (2003 to
2007), and post-crisis (2010 and 2013) periods. The results suggest that lower income women ex-
perienced faster growth in mortgage debt and overall financial fragility during the credit expansion
than men and male-headed households. Educational debt grew more quickly for women pre- and
post-crisis, with the gender differences primarily being driven by young women (18 to 25 years of
age) pre-crisis and older women (25 and up) post-crisis. However, as discussed below, the SCF
has several limitations compared to the dataset used in this analysis, the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics (PSID).
5.3 Data and empirical strategy
5.3.1 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The PSID is a longitudinal survey of American households founded on an initial, representative
sample of 1968 households. This initial sample included a low-income oversample as part of the
Survey of Economic Opportunity, which was then combined with an additional subsample to form
a representative sample of the U.S. population. The children of these households and the split-off
families that formed as a result were followed as well. The result is a representative “family tree”
49See Chap 4 for an extended version of this article.
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of American households. Surveys were administered annually every year until 1997, at which
point the survey was administered biennially. Adjustments were made to the sample in later years,
such as the addition of an immigrant sample in 1997 and 1999 and a reduction in the low-income
sample at the same time.
Every household contains at least one “sample member.” A sample member is either a member
of the original 1968 sample (or 1997-1999 Immigrant Sample) or a direct descendent of those indi-
viduals. Therefore, the sample member of a household is most often 1) a child within a household
headed by one or two sample members, 2) the head of a household, or 3) the spouse or partner
of a household head. If the non-sample spouse or partner of the sample member were to leave
the household, they would not be followed in subsequent surveys.50 Children of sample members
(“born-in sample members”) are always followed. Like the SCF and most other U.S. household
finance surveys, household head status is defined mechanistically on the basis of gender and house-
hold structure. All men in households with an opposite-sex couple (married or cohabiting for more
than one year) are defined as household head unless incapacitated. Otherwise, women are only
defined as household head if they are a sample member and 1) have no partner or spouse or 2) are
living with a female partner or spouse.
The PSID includes detailed information on households and specific household members, in-
cluding their employment status, consumption, health, marital status, and fertility choices. Begin-
ning in 1984, the PSID began collecting data on household assets and debts. In 1999, detailed
mortgage information including multiple mortgages and total mortgage expenditures became con-
sistent parts of the wealth supplement. As a result, the time period used in this analysis starts at
1999. I also make two truncations to the analytical sample within this time frame: I drop the top
1% of wealth holders within each time period of interest, and I drop household heads below the age
of 18 (less than 0.1% of the sample). Previous work has noted that the PSID does not accurately
50In more recent surveys, the children of sample members who have moved into households headed by non-sample
members while being under 18 years of age have been followed as part of the survey. Because I drop all respondents
18 years of age and under as discussed in more detail below, this very small group of observations is not included in
my analytic subsample.
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describe the wealth holdings of the top few percent of the net worth distribution (Hurst, Luoh,
Stafford, and Gale 1998).
I pool nine waves of the PSID and categorize them into four different time periods:
• Pre-expansion period: 1999, 2001
• Credit expansion period: 2003, 2005, 2007
• Recession: 2009, 2011, 2013
• Post-recession: 2015
The major expansion in the U.S. supply of consumer and mortgage credit can be traced to ap-
proximately 2003. The Case-Shiller housing price index had been increasing since the 1990s, but
the early 2000s saw an acceleration of that growth (S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC 2019). In addi-
tion, the volume of subprime lending increased significantly beginning precisely in 2003 (Smith
and Hevener 2010).
In light of these stylized facts, I define the “credit expansion” as the period from 2003 to
2007. There was notable slowing in housing price growth and a dramatic reduction in subprime
mortgage originations in 2007, even though the collapse of Lehman Brothers did not occur until
September 2008. This was triggered by early signs of destabilization in housing markets, including
rising foreclosures rates. However, the relevant PSID surveys were conducted only in 2005, 2007,
and 2009. Of these, 2007 is the most reasonable end to the credit expansion, and the negative
employment and growth effects of the recession had not yet begun.
I define the recession period as including the three surveys of 2009, 2011, and 2013. Even
though the official end of the recession occurred in 2009, recovery was notoriously slow in terms of
employment and incomes. Employment growth only turned weakly positive in the second quarter
of 2010 and only returned to pre-crisis levels after 2014. Moreover, housing values did not begin
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to recover until 2012 and were closer to pre-crisis levels in 2015. As a result, I set the recovery or
“post-recession” period to include only the 2015 survey year.51
5.3.2 Comparison of the PSID and the SCF
As noted in Section 5.2 above, this analysis builds on Long (2018), which used the Survey of
Consumer Finances. The SCF shares one key shortcoming with the PSID that has already been
commented upon. The SCF, PSID, and all other major U.S. household finance surveys apply a
unitary household assumption for wealth- and debt-related questions. Both datasets maintain a
roster of household members with individual-level information on educational attainment, income,
and employment status. Yet all questions about wealth holdings, debt, and credit (e.g., applications,
rejections, and discouragement) are reported at the household level. The implicit assumption is
that all adults in the household pool responsibility for debts and share wealth. As a result, it is not
possible to distinguish between the indebtedness of individuals within the same household, and
gender and household structure become intertwined for both empirical surveys.
Empirical work has cast serious doubt on the applicability of the unitary household assumption
for household finances. Pahl (2008) notes a trend towards increasing individualization of house-
hold finances in the United Kingdom. Many couples are choosing to only partially pool their
financial accounts. Within households, some individuals–especially women with lower earnings
and bargaining power–may not even hold savings or checking accounts under their name despite
their spouse or partner holding such accounts (Klawitter and Fletschner 2011).
However, the PSID does address two of the major shortcomings of the SCF. First, the SCF over-
samples the high end of the wealth distribution. The PSID has the opposite challenge and is known
for providing a less than representative picture of the wealth holdings of the top several percent
of the wealth distribution (Hurst, Luoh, Stafford, and Gale 1998). Much of the work discussed in
Section 5.2 anticipating gender and racial differences in household debt focuses attention on low-
51Specifications in which the post-recession period is defined to include both 2013 and 2015 have also been esti-
mated. The results are qualitatively consistent with those presented in Section 5.4 and are available upon request.
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to-moderate income communities and households with relative low wealth. Therefore, the PSID is
expected to provide greater insight on the debt dynamics of these households than the SCF.
Second, the PSID’s panel structure allows researchers to address selection issues that may arise
when evaluating changes in outcomes within social groups over time. Specifically, the composition
of households (including whether they are dual-, female-, or male-headed) may change over time
in response to an economic shock. For example, households with high levels of debt post-crisis
may have had a higher probability of divorce than other households, leaving the single-headed
households that emerge with more debt than otherwise predicted. High levels of debt can also
represent a financial burden that discourages individuals from forming households. Addo (2014)
argues that student loan debt can encourage women in particular to delay marriage, although co-
habitation outside of marriage may in fact be more common among indebted graduates.
However, an empirical approach that fully leverages the PSID’s longitudinal nature is not itself
unproblematic. First, it would be necessary to specify what represents a consistent “household”
over time. Second, household debt and wealth variables are already extremely variable (see Sec-
tion 5.3.4 below). Changes in those variables are even more widely distributed and make inference
difficult. As a result, this analysis is cross-sectional, although a longitudinal analysis is an im-
portant direction for future work. To account for some of the effects of household formation and
dissolution, all specifications control for whether each household observed in a given year ex-
perienced a change in household structure that year (i.e., whether the household head changed
or spouse/partner left). As discussed in Section 5.3.3, I also test specifications with controls for
observable household characteristics that may vary over time within groups.
5.3.3 Empirical strategy
This analysis seeks to address the research question, “Compared to other households, did
female-headed or minority households experience greater growth in household debt surrounding
the 2008 Financial Crisis?” Two issues are key to addressing this question: defining the social
groups of interest and choosing an empirical approach to identifying changes in growth.
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It was previously noted that the PSID combines gender and household structure by imposing a
unitary household assumption on the household finance components of the survey. This means that
any researcher attempting to understand the role of gender in household debt is limited to consid-
ering a minimum of three categories: dual-headed households, women with no spouse or partner,
and men with no spouse or partner. However, the literature suggests that it may also be important
to distinguish between single women with and without dependents. Those with dependents are
the most likely to experience high levels of economic risk (Weller and Tolson 2017) while having
low income and low levels of liquid wealth to fall back upon (Pressman 2003; Schmidt and Sevak
2006).
This results in four groups of interest:
1. Dual-headed households: households with or without children and headed by a married or
cohabiting couple
2. Single women: households composed of one female adult
3. Female-headed households: households composed of a female head of household with other
non-spouse/non-partner members in the household (children, other kin, etc.)52
4. Single men and male-headed households: analogous to Groups 2 and 3 above, but with a
male adult
To recognize the multiple characteristics linked with each group beyond gender, these groups
will be referred to broadly as “household types” in the analysis. The other dimension of household
identity that has been linked to debt accumulation in the literature is race and ethnicity. I again
distinguish between four groups:
1. White, Non-Hispanic
52Note that this category would not generally include adult female sample members who are living with their
parents, because the parents would be sample members themselves and would be considered head of household unless





The last group results from inconsistencies in the aggregation of certain racial/ethnic groups.
Most notably, the race and ethnicity questions in the 1999, 2001, and 2003 surveys allow respon-
dents to select “Asian, Pacific Islander” as one option. Subsequent waves of the survey distinguish
between “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander.” Individuals who identify as Native
American or as Alaska Natives face similarly shifting options between survey years. In addition,
sample sizes for these groups are extremely small. As a result, these racial and ethnic identities are
aggregated into “Other Race/Ethnicity.” Asian heads of household represent the largest portion of
this category in every survey year.
The theory surveyed above speaks to the possibility of gender and racial differences in the
growth of household debt, not in the relative levels of household debt. Therefore, a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach is necessary. The effect of the “treatment” (household type or race and
ethnicity) is determined by comparing outcomes in two time periods (e.g., the pre-expansion and
credit expansion periods) with and without the treatment. DID eliminates time-invariant hetero-
geneity between treated and untreated groups, such as differences in the demand for credit between
female- and dual-headed households, all else equal.














where yit is one of several continuous or binary debt outcomes of interest (discussed in Section
5.3.4), Groupit is a vector of dummy variables indicating the individual’s household type or race
and ethnicity, Periodit is a vector of dummy variables indicating the period of which year t is
a part (Pre-Expansion, Credit Expansion, Recession, or Post-Recession), and Xit is a vector of
control variables. The vector of parameters β3 represents the DID parameter estimates, where a
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positive value for each parameter would indicate a faster rate of growth for the relevant group
compared to the reference group. The specific estimation technique used and the assumptions
made about the error terms (e.g., the possible correlation of error terms between years for the same
household head) will vary by outcome of interest and are discussed in Section 5.3.4.
It should be noted that identification of causal effects is conditional on a “parallel trends as-
sumption.” This assumption is violated if time-variant heterogeneity between groups exists prior
to the treatment. In the case of the present analysis, if various household types already showed
divergent trends in an outcome of interest (e.g., total mortgage principal) prior to the credit ex-
pansion, then the actual “effect” of a particular treatment (e.g., being a female-headed household)
will be conflated with other time variant differences between the treated and untreated groups. For
example, perhaps female-headed households have been experiencing a long-term increase in the
demand for credit that began prior to 1999.
I take two approaches to this identification concern and the set of controls Xit. First, I ar-
gue that a ceteris paribus approach is not appropriate from the perspective of political economy.
A “causal” interpretation of gender or race and ethnicity risks shifting the focus of analysis to-
wards discrimination narrowly defined rather than cumulative differences in outcomes. As Wyly
and Ponder (2011) note, the socioeconomic characteristics of female heads of household or mi-
nority household heads that impact indebtedness may themselves be the result of gender or racial
inequality, not differences to be controlled away.
This is not to say that there is no room for attempting to control for unobserved, time-invariant
heterogeneity. As noted previously, household formation and dissolution are not the focus of this
paper, and all specifications control for a change in household status having occurred. Second,
any analysis of household saving or borrowing behavior over time risks conflating time-specific
effects with life-cycle effects. This is doubly important when comparing household types, many
of which are highly heterogeneous in terms of age composition. For example, the group of single
women in the analytical subsample for this study is starkly bimodal, with about 35% of single
women being under 30 years of age and another 30% being over 65 (in contrast to dual-headed
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households, where almost 70% of [male] household heads are under 30 and only 8% over 65).
Finally, geography is particularly relevant to developments in housing markets surrounding the
Financial Crisis. Certain states and cities experienced greater growth in housing prices as part of
the housing bubble (Garriga, Ricketts, and Schlagenhauf 2017). To the extent that certain racial
and ethnic groups are disproportionately represented in these areas, failure to control for state
of residence may conflate geographic effects with the effects of interest. As a result of these
considerations, all specifications control for age, changes in household composition, and state of
residence.53
Despite the previous concerns about controlling away the economic and social context in which
household structure, gender, and race/ethnicity operate, it may be valuable to assess whether spe-
cific mechanisms can be identified as contributing to a particular group’s disproportionate change
in indebtedness. For example, it may be the case that lower levels of liquid wealth among female-
headed households or households with Black household heads led these households to rely more
on borrowing during the recession. By testing specifications that include net worth and comparing
the results with those specifications that do not, the role of wealth inequality in leading to debt
inequality can be addressed. The controls used are discussed in Section 5.3.4 below and are analo-
gous to those used in Chapter 4. The results of these specifications are not presented in this chapter
but are available upon request. The DID estimates are qualitatively robust in every case to the
inclusion of these control variables, suggesting that unexplained variation plays a more important
role in the gender and racial debt gaps.
5.3.4 Variables of interest and summary statistics
As previously noted, the PSID has included information on household wealth and debt since
1984, but certain categories of debt (especially regarding mortgage principal and expenditures)
have only been consistently available since 1999. Of these variables, I consider two measures of
the level of outstanding debt:
53The public-use PSID dataset does not include information on city of residence or urban/rural residence.
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1. Mortgage principal remaining ($): the sum of total mortgage principal remaining for the
first two mortgages held. It includes both mortgages for home purchases as well as home
equity loans, line of credit loans, land contracts, and other types of mortgages.
2. Consumer debt ($): non-vehicular, non-mortgage debt, or the sum of “credit card charges,
student loans, medical or legal bill, or loans from relatives.”54
At the same time, it is clear that a certain dollar value of debt does not represent the same debt
burden across households or pose the same risk of financial instability. Three additional measures
of “financial fragility” are also considered:
1. Annual mortgage expenditure as a percent of annual income (%): Previous work has sug-
gested the use of consumer debt repayment-to-income ratios as a measure of over-indebtedness
(D’Alessio and Iezzi 2013; DeVaney 1994; Fondeville, Özdemir, and Ward 2010; Gibbons
and Vaid 2016). Unfortunately, PSID data does not provide sufficient information on bor-
rowing costs to generate meaningful estimates of these ratios, especially for the purpose of
intergroup comparisons. Mortgage expenditures are the only category for which repayment
burden information is available. This variable provides helpful insight into whether varia-
tion in borrowing costs (e.g., prime vs. subprime loans) may drive differences in mortgage
indebtedness that would not be visible when considering mortgage principal alone.
2. Consumer debt-to-income (DTI) ratio: The ratio of outstanding consumer debt to annual in-
come has also been proposed as a measure of over-indebtedness.55 Gibbons and Vaid (2016)
argue that it captures “vulnerability to debt problems in the event of income or expenditure
shocks” (26, emphasis original). However, unobserved factors do complicate the relationship
between the DTI ratio and the likelihood of experiencing financial difficulties (Fondeville,
54The consumer debt question changed from a single question in the 1999 through 2009 waves to a set of questions
about each category of consumer debt separately beginning in 2011. This does introduce the risk of variation in the
reporting of debt due to imperfect recall. However, as long as this variation is not heterogenous by race/ethnicity or
household type, it should not introduce bias into the estimation.
55Total income is the sum of the household head’s (and, if present, spouse’s/partner’s and other family members’)
taxable income, Social Security income, and transfer income.
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Özdemir, and Ward 2010). These factors include the availability of credit to help households
service existing debt and the level of other necessary expenses (e.g., housing) relative to in-
come. Despite these limitations to the DTI ratio and its interpretation, I argue that the DTI
ratio is the best available measure of relative debt burden in the PSID.
3. Consumer debt-to-equivalent income ratio: An income figure alone does not indicate how
much of that income can be dedicated to servicing debt. Although it provides far from a
full accounting of “ability to pay,” using LIS or OECD equivalency scales to adjust income
1) recognizes that the same level of income represents less purchasing power for a larger
household while 2) acknowledging household economies of scale.56
Summary statistics for the variables of interest are presented by household type and by race/ethnicity
in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and average consumer and mortgage debt over time is presented in Figure
5.2. Before discussing suggestive differences between groups and across time, several empirical
challenges associated with these variables of interest should be noted. Wealth and debt variables
are notoriously noisy and widely distributed (Pfeffer and Griffin 2012), raising issues in using both
OLS and median regression. The issues can be observed in the summary statistics reported in Ta-
bles 5.1 and 5.2: Variables such as total debt and the debt-to-income ratio have standard deviations
many times greater than their means, driven in large part by outliers. Therefore, OLS regression
can subsequently be extremely imprecise for continuous variables, and there is no clear a priori
rationale for trimming the high ends of the distribution. On the other hand, many categories of
households have median values of debt and financial fragility of zero, and this median persists
across time periods. Therefore, median regression will miss all variation among households that
do hold debt.
56Previous work has used household leverage as a measure of financial fragility (DeVaney 1994). This measure
poses several challenges. If defined in an analogous fashion to leverage in corporate finance, leverage would be
calculated as the ratio of debts to net worth. However, many households have negative net worth. The direction of the
change in leverage in response to an increase in debt can be ambiguous as a result, depending on whether net worth
is initially positive or negative. Another possibility that avoids this counterintuitive relationship is defining leverage
in terms of debt and gross asset values (e.g., Long 2018). However, the PSID data on most non-mortgage household
assets are presented already netted of debt, and the components of consumer debt cannot be matched to those asset
categories. Therefore, I do not consider leverage in the present analysis.
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To deal with these two issues, I conduct the DID estimation using three strategies:
1. Estimating effects on the extensive margin using OLS (linear probability model): The ex-
tensive margin refers to the likelihood of holding any non-zero level of debt. This ap-
proach misses variation in the magnitude of debt but captures the substantial variation in
each group’s probability of holding debt.
2. Estimating effects on the intensive margin using median (quantile) regression: The intensive
margin refers to the magnitude of debt held, conditional on holding debt. This approach
misses variation in the probability of holding debt but captures the variation in the magni-
tude of debt while avoiding the use of OLS regression that would be strongly influenced by
outliers.
3. Estimating the probability of being “financially vulnerable” using OLS (linear probability
model): This approach represents a middle ground between the first two strategies. Like
the extensive margin, it collapses the sizable variation in debt-to-income ratios into a binary
measure. Households with a DTI of x% or more are characterized as “financially vulnerable”
in the Minskian sense of having a higher probability of facing default in the case of an
unexpected loss of income or interest rate increase (Minsky 1977). Although the level of the
threshold x is clearly debatable, it has the advantage of capturing some of the variation in
household indebtedness on both the intensive and extensive margins. I follow Gibbons and
Vaid (2016), who apply a 60% threshold as constituting financial vulnerability based on a
previous report on over-indebtedness in Britain. Approximately 12% of households in their
analysis are financially vulnerable by this measure.
All OLS regressions (Strategies 1 and 3 above) use the STATA svy module to account for
complex survey design. However, median regression poses greater challenges to implementing
weighting and clustering simultaneously. All median regressions were conducted with sample
weights. Unweighted results with and without clustering were qualitatively similar, suggesting that
the omission of clustered standard errors may not be a significant concern. Alternative clustering
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approaches to account for the longitudinal structure of the data–such as clustering by household
head ID–also did not meaningfully change the OLS estimates.
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, the lead-up to the Financial Crisis–or the credit expansion period
of 2003 to 2007–was associated with growing average household indebtedness, both in absolute
terms and relative to income. This growth included both mortgage and consumer debt. Although
average mortgage principal remaining fell during the recession and the recovery, consumer debt
persisted from 2009 to 2013 and resumed rising in 2015.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the variables of interest by household type and by race and
ethnicity. Summary statistics for the control variables used in alternative specifications can be
found in Appendix F. There are several important take-aways from these tables. White and dual-
headed households have the greatest median net worth and are more likely to have positive net
worth than other groups. Female-headed households and Black, Non-Hispanic households are
the least likely to have positive net worth and have median net worth of less than $10,000. This
difference in net worth may be driven partly by consumer debt. Many of the same groups that
have low net worth are more likely to hold consumer debt. Notably, this does not hold for single
men and male-headed households, who have relatively low median wealth but are also among
the least likely to hold consumer debt. This points to a possible linkage between indebtedness
and responsibility for dependents, consistent with previous work (Fondeville, Özdemir, and Ward
2010). Households with two household heads and those with a household head who is White or
of another racial/ethnic identity than Black or Hispanic (e.g., Asian households) are most likely to
hold mortgage debt.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Extensive and intensive margins
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 present the predicted probability of holding non-zero mortgage and con-
sumer debt by household type and race/ethnicity (respectively) after controlling for the age of
household head, whether a change in household structure (household formation or dissolution)
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had occurred since the previous survey, and the household’s state of residence.57 White and dual-
headed households are among the most likely to hold mortgage debt across time periods, and
growth in mortgage debt was statistically similar across groups. During the credit expansion,
households became about 1.7 percentage points more likely to have outstanding mortgage princi-
pal relative to a sample mean of 41.2%. During the recession and recovery, households headed by
Black respondents experienced greater decreases in the probability of holding mortgage debt.
The gap at the extensive margin between dual-headed households and other groups is smaller
for consumer debt. Single women are as likely to hold consumer debt across time periods as dual-
headed households, and men are the least likely to hold consumer debt. By race and ethnicity,
households headed by Black respondents are 6.6 percentage points less likely to hold consumer
debt than other groups. All groups experienced an increase in the probability of holding consumer
debt of about 3 percentage points during the credit expansion (sample mean = 50.4%) and another
3 percentage points during the recession. Interestingly, female-headed households experienced a
greater decline in consumer indebtedness at the extensive margin than other groups post-recession.
This decline may point to faster deleveraging during the recovery or more persistently binding
credit constraints for female-headed households (even as the credit crunch eased for most house-
holds).
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present analogous results on the intensive margins. Note that these specifi-
cations are conditional on holding mortgage or consumer debt and therefore only speak to variation
in the magnitude of indebtedness. The rise in mortgage debt conditional on holding debt between
the late 90s and the credit expansion period was primarily driven by dual-headed households. By
race and ethnicity, households headed by someone with one of the “other” racial or ethnic self-
identifications (predominantly including Asian household heads) experienced a slightly faster rate
of growth than other groups.
57Regression tables showing the difference-in-differences estimates and parameter estimates for the controls are
available upon request.
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The story differs significantly regarding consumer debt. There is evidence of a rapid increase
in the magnitude of consumer debt among female-headed households after 2008. The increase
is greatest and statistically significant in the post-recession period. Predicted median debt among
the indebted for this group rises from about $5,800 in the credit expansion period to $9,000 in
the recession and $13,500 in the recovery (55% and 50% increases, respectively). Trends across
race and ethnicity are broadly parallel over time, with the exception of Hispanic households, who
exhibited a growth in average consumer debt holdings of $2,600 to about $8,000 between the
pre-expansion and credit expansion periods.
Taken together, these results at the intensive and intensive margins point to several preliminary
conclusions. First, in addition to White and dual-headed households, households headed by some-
one who identifies as Asian or another racial/ethnic identity account for the majority of growth
in mortgage principal pre-crisis at the intensive margins. This is consistent with previous work
finding that Asian households experienced the greatest rise in homeownership rates between 1994
and 2007 (Garriga, Ricketts, and Schlagenhauf 2017). The same work finds that Asian households
had lower interest rates but were more likely to hold “jumbo” mortgage loans, or loans that were
larger than the limits imposed by federal lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Differences in
the geographic distribution of these households may play a role. Garriga, Ricketts, and Schla-
genhauf (2017) note that a large share of the Asian households in their sample live in California
and specifically in “Sunbelt cities” with particularly “volatile” housing markets (163). Although
state-level controls explain away some of this variation, city-level identifiers are not available in
the public-use PSID data.
Second, the distribution of consumer debt appears to be particularly wide for female-headed
households. At the same time that these households experienced the greatest post-2008 growth
in the magnitude of consumer debt, they also experienced the largest decrease in the probability
of holding such debt during the recovery. This suggests that the Financial Crisis prompted het-
erogeneous responses in borrowing between groups of female-headed households. The result is a
smaller group of more highly indebted women with dependents.
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5.4.2 Financial fragility
Results for mortgage expenditures relative to income and consumer debt-to-income ratios are
presented in Figures 5.7 and 5.8. These financial fragility measures are again conditional on in-
debtedness. Although dual-headed and White, Asian, and other non-Hispanic households hold
the greatest levels of mortgage principal across time periods, these groups do not spend the most
on mortgage repayment relative to income. Rather, households with female, Black, or Hispanic
household heads have the greatest mortgage repayment burdens. As the figure illustrates, there is
also suggestive evidence that Black households experienced a faster increase in mortgage expen-
ditures between the pre-expansion and credit expansion periods, although the difference between
Black and White households (an increase of about two percentage points during this time compared
to one percentage point) falls short of being statistically significant.
The consumer debt-to-income ratio results mirror those of consumer debt in levels, although the
trends are even clearer. The median DTI ratios among female-headed households and households
with Black household heads approximately doubled between the pre-expansion and post-recession
periods, with the majority of the growth occurring after 2008.
The final measure of financial fragility–a binary indicator of financial vulnerability–is not con-
ditional on debt holding. Predicted probabilities of being financially vulnerable (a DTI ratio of
60% or more) are presented in Figures 5.9 and 5.10. Results are shown using standard income
(top) and using income adjusted for household size via the LIS Equivalence Scale (bottom). In
both cases, largely the same trends over time are evident: Female-headed households and Black
heads of household experience greater increases in financial vulnerability, especially post-crisis.
Although it appears that single men and male heads of household track similarly until the recovery
period, the trends are more distinct when household size is taken into account.58
58The results are qualitatively robust to using alternative cut-offs for financial vulnerability (70%, 80%, and 90%).
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5.4.3 Student debt
To understand the implications of rising financial vulnerability, it is important to identify what
type of debt is driving the increase. One likely candidate is student loan debt, which is one of
the largest and the fastest growing components of non-mortgage debt (Federal Reserve Bank of
New York 2017). Unfortunately, the decomposition of consumer debt into separate categories is
only available for the 2011, 2013, and 2015 PSID waves. Since much of the observed divergence
in indebtedness outcomes occurs in these survey years, I compare DTI ratios with and without
student debt for these periods. The results by household type are presented in Figure 5.11. Student
debt explains much of the consumer debt burden, both in levels and in terms of between-group
differences. A similar impact of student debt is observed by race and ethnicity (not shown). In
fact, when student debt is omitted, the median consumer DTI ratio appears to fall more for Black
household heads than for other groups post-recession, while the opposite is true when student debt
is included.
5.5 Conclusions
This analysis used longitudinal data from the PSID to identify gendered and racialized trends
in the growth of household debt prior to and following the 2008 Financial Crisis. Previous work
in sociology and political economy has argued that economically marginalized groups, such as
female-headed households and women of color, may have been targeted for high-cost loans. Others
have pointed to the role of social reproduction in heightening women’s exposure to market risk
through their social networks. I have sought to assess whether the large-scale quantitative evidence
on household debt available in U.S. household finance surveys is consistent with these arguments.
The results suggest that women with dependents and households with Black household heads
did in fact experience a faster increase in their debt burden than other groups. Specifically, these
groups experienced a two-fold increase in the probability of holding high levels of consumer debt
relative to incomes during the recession and recovery. The significant gap that emerges between
households in the probability of being financially vulnerable is widened when household ability to
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repay is taken into account. It also appears that this increase in consumer debt was driven largely
by rising student indebtedness. On the other hand, there is mixed evidence that these same groups–
particularly Black households–experienced a faster increase in mortgage expenditures during the
credit expansion.
This analysis faces several limitations that are themselves areas for future work. First, the
analysis has been largely cross-sectional in nature due to the extreme variation introduced by an-
alyzing changes in household debt. Despite the longitudinal nature of the dataset and attempts to
control for household formation and dissolution, I cannot reject the possibility that changes in the
types of households that are female-headed, male-headed, etc. are driving the observed changes in
household debt. Similarly, any analysis of this nature is subject to the critique that unobservable
characteristics are influencing the results. Second, the direct linkage between debt-to-income ratios
and financial difficulties has been shown to be weak in previous work (Fondeville, Özdemir, and
Ward 2010). Debt repayment-to-income ratios are generally considered a preferable measure of
over-indebtedness but are not available in the PSID. Additional mixed-methods survey work that
combines a clearer understanding of households’ sense of financial distress and their debt burden
will be necessary to elucidate this relationship.
The policy implications of this rising consumer debt burden depend in part on whether stu-
dent indebtedness is seen as a concerning development for households’ financial security. Some
economists continue to portray borrowing for college as a worthwhile investment, even if that
debt represents a major financial burden relative to income (e.g., Avery and Turner 2012). Indeed,
college graduates continue to appear to benefit from a major earnings and employment premium
relative to high school graduates. However, evidence suggests that this premium is falling (Vedder,
Denhart, and Robe 2013), and previous work has shown that student debt can cause individuals to
delay activities that may otherwise serve to enhance their financial security, such as buying a home
(Andrew 2010; Baum and O’Malley 2003). Many families also borrow to fund their children’s
education (Amromin, Eberly, and Mondragon 2016; Baker 2018). In fact, student debt is rising
more quickly among older Americans than among any other group (Brown et al. 2014). To the
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extent that female-headed or Black households are accumulating debt for children at times in the
lifecycle when they would otherwise be saving, this may be a concerning development for financial
security. Future work will need to address the specific nature of the rising student debt burden for
different groups of families.
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5.6 Tables and figures
(a) Net worth percentiles relative to 1999
(b) Asset percentiles relative to 1999
Figure 5.1: Distribution of net worth and assets, 1999 - 2015
Source: 1999 - 2015 PSID Surveys. Author’s calculations.
Notes: The vertical black lines mark the start of the Credit Expansion period, the approximate start of the
2008 Recession, and the start of the Recovery.
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Mortgage Debt (L) Consumer Debt (R)
Source: 1999 - 2015 PSID Surveys. Author’s calculations. Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Results estimated using sample weights and accounting for clustering and stratification. The
vertical black dotted lines mark the start of the Credit Expansion period, the approximate start of the 2008
Recession, and the start of the Recovery.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of variables of interest by household type
Dual-headed households Single women
mean sd median mean sd median
Net Worth $301487 (452351) $130000 $172593 (257787) $33500
Mortgage Principal $79210 (115526) $32000 $23344 (47746) 0
Consumer Debt $10359 (40928) $674 $7060 (20989) 0
Mortgage Exp. (%) .261 (37.043) 0 .0954 (1.542) 0
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 2.16 (56.307) 0 14 (515.934) 0
Consumer DTI Ratio 2.77 (648.136) 0 14.4 (891.137) 0
Household-Year Obs. 36506 8094
Female-headed households Men
mean sd median mean sd median
Net Worth $91388 (289457) $9090 $148959 (312610) $15000
Mortgage Principal $30901 (88320) 0 $25397 (56358) 0
Consumer Debt $8832 (27642) $500 $8754 (27589) 0
Mortgage Exp. (%) .0832 (0.899) 0 1.45 (66.656) 0
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 40.4 (1444.852) 0 15.4 (331.902) 0
Consumer DTI Ratio .367 (5.468) 0 .581 (6.658) 0
Household-Year Obs. 10157 9139
Source: 1999 - 2015 PSID Surveys.
Notes: Means and SDs are estimated using sample weights and accounting for clustering and stratification. Medians use sampling weights.
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics of variables of interest by race and ethnicity
White (Non-Hispanic) Black (Non-Hispanic)
mean sd median mean sd median
Net Worth $263287 (360635) $95417 $66186 (300626) $7201
Mortgage Principal $56246 (83286) 0 $29624 (107693) 0
Consumer Debt $9500 (32184) $222 $9017 (39100) 0
Mortgage Exp. (%) .202 (25.684) 0 2.13 (145.059) 0
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 9.53 (427.121) 0 23.4 (1103.592) 0
Consumer DTI Ratio 5.7 (670.588) 0 .496 (12.362) 0
Household-Year Obs. 38077 18911
Hispanic Other Race/Ethnicity
mean sd median mean sd median
Net Worth $104375 (234356) $18000 $290333 (443727) $79000
Mortgage Principal $57538 (100719) 0 $76560 (122449) 0
Consumer Debt $7918 (21476) 0 $7856 (18201) 0
Mortgage Exp. (%) .0958 (0.407) 0 .1 (0.852) 0
Debt-to-Assets Ratio 5.85 (105.375) 0 3.5 (69.144) 0
Consumer DTI Ratio .188 (0.668) 0 .165 (0.526) 0
Household-Year Obs. 4442 1912
Source: 1999 - 2015 PSID Surveys.
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Female-headed Single man or male-headed
(b) Predicted probability of non-zero consumer debt
Figure 5.3: Extensive margins by household type
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights and accounting
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White (Non-Hispanic) Black (Non-Hispanic)
Hispanic Other Race/Ethnicity
(b) Predicted probability of non-zero consumer debt
Figure 5.4: Extensive margins by race and ethnicity
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights and accounting
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Female-headed Single man or male-headed
(b) Predicted median consumer debt conditional on holding consumer debt
Figure 5.5: Intensive margins by household type
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights. Controls for




















































White (Non-Hispanic) Black (Non-Hispanic)
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White (Non-Hispanic) Black (Non-Hispanic)
Hispanic Other Race/Ethnicity
(b) Predicted median consumer debt conditional on holding consumer debt
Figure 5.6: Intensive margins by race and ethnicity
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights. Controls for
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Female-headed Single man or male-headed
(b) Predicted median consumer debt-to-income ratio conditional on holding consumer
debt
Figure 5.7: Conditional measures of financial fragility by household type
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights. Controls for
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White (Non-Hispanic) Black (Non-Hispanic)
Hispanic Other Race/Ethnicity
(b) Predicted median consumer debt-to-income ratio conditional on holding consumer
debt
Figure 5.8: Conditional measures of financial fragility by race and ethnicity
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights. Controls for
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Female-headed Single man or male-headed
(b) Predicted probability of financial vulnerability (60% DTI or more), LIS Equivalency
Scale
Figure 5.9: Unconditional, binary measure of financial fragility by household type
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights and accounting
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White (Non-Hispanic) Black (Non-Hispanic)
Hispanic Other Race/Ethnicity
(b) Predicted probability of financial vulnerability (60% DTI or more), LIS Equivalency
Scale
Figure 5.10: Unconditional, binary measure of financial fragility by race and ethnicity
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights and accounting


















































Female-headed Single man or male-headed
















































Female-headed Single man or male-headed
(b) Predicted consumer debt-to-income ratio excluding student debt, conditional on
holding debt, 2011 - 2015
Figure 5.11: Consumer debt-to-income ratios with and without student debt by household type
Notes: Brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results estimated using sample weights. Controls for
age, age squared, change in household head status, and state of residence included.
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Modeling Educational Financing Choices
A.1 Constant educational costs
Assume that a student has a non-linear utility function u(·) such that u′′(·) < 0. If the maxi-
mization problem for educational funding is as given above,
maxs,d u(y1 − s) + pβu[y2 + α− d(1 + θd)] + (1− p)βu[y2 − d(1 + θd)]− βv(d|η)
s.t. TC = s+ d+ sp + dp
the corresponding first order conditions are
s : −u′(y1 − s) + µ = 0
d : −pβ(1 + θd)u
′[y2 + α− d(1 + θd)]− (1− p)β(1 + θd)u
′[y2 − d(1 + θd)]−
βv′(d|η) + µ = 0
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier for the total cost condition.
The Euler equation from these conditions is
u′(y1 − s)



























α > 0 with probability p
0 with probability 1− p
where b is the discount rate, MU(·) is marginal utility, and EMU(·) is expected marginal utility.
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If there are no psychological costs of borrowing, the re-arranged Euler equation simplifies to
u′(y1 − s)




= β(1 + θd) =
1 + θd
b
The Euler equation for the case without psychological costs illustrates that in a context where the
education funding problem incorporates only pecuniary costs, the decision to take on debt versus
pay out of pocket involves balancing the cost of borrowing 1 + θd with the discount rate. For
example, suppose that a student’s discount rate falls, so she considers the future to be relatively
more important. Then the right hand side of the Euler equation will increase. Given the assumption
of diminishing marginal utility (u′′(·) < 0), the student will shift consumption from c1 to c2 (by
reducing borrowing d and increasing out of pocket expenses s) to meet the optimality condition.
If the cost of borrowing increases, the right hand side will also increase, and the student will again
reduce borrowing d.
Comparing the solution to this problem with the problem including psychological costs illus-
trates the effect of psychological debt burden. Suppose a student chooses s∗ and d∗ with corre-














for some values of θd and b. Let c∗∗1 , c
∗∗
2
, s∗∗, and d∗∗ be the analogous optimal values for the Euler















, s∗∗ > s∗,c∗∗
2
> c2∗, and d∗∗ < d∗ if the Euler equation for the non-pecuniary


















Therefore, all else equal, greater psychological debt burden discourages students from funding
educational costs with debt, leading to a shift from current consumption to future consumption.
A.2 Variable educational costs
Consider a simple case in which p is a function of TC such that p′(TC) > 0. I assume that there
are institutional limits to how far total cost of attendance can be reduced (e.g., attending a two-year
community college with multiple cost-saving measures such as living at home may be close to the
lower bound). Suppose that TC is constrained by the condition TC ≥ sp + dp + τ, τ > 0. This
constraint may or may not be binding depending on the function p(TC). For this simple case, I
assume that the constraint is not binding. Then the Lagrangian for the financing decision becomes
L = u(y1 − s) + p(TC)βu[y2 + α− d(1 + θd)] + [1− p(TC)]βu[y2 − d(1 + θd)]− βv(d|η)+
µ(s+ d+ sp + dp − TC)
µ ≥ 0
with first order conditions
s : −u′(y1 − s) + µ = 0
d : −p(TC)β(1 + θd)u
′[y2 + α− d(1 + θd)]− [1− p(TC)]β(1 + θd)u
′[y2 − d(1 + θd)]
−βv′(d|η) + µ = 0
TC : βp′(TC)u[y2 + α− d(1 + θd)]− βp
′(TC)u[y2 − d(1 + θd)]− µ = 0
These yield one intratemporal optimality condition between increasing total educational spend-
ing and financing that spending through debt and one intertemporal optimality condition between
increasing total educational spending and financing that spending out of first-period income:
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p′(TC) {u[y2 + α− d(1 + θd)]− u[y2 − d(1 + θd)]} − v
′(d)




= 1 + θd
u′(y1 − s)







These optimality conditions illustrate the trade-offs between increasing the probability of suc-
cess via higher total costs and reducing current and future consumption.
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Maximum amount willing to borrow per year
Students Enrolled in College (2013) All Students
Figure B.1: Weighted histogram of willingness to borrow responses by sample
Notes: Proportions are weighted, account for complex survey design, and are conditional on student




























































































Maximum amount willing to borrow per year
Male Female
Figure B.2: Weighted histogram of stated willingness to borrow by gender
Notes: Proportions are weighted, account for complex survey design, and are conditional on student




























































































Maximum amount willing to borrow per year
White Black or Hispanic
Figure B.3: Weighted histogram of stated willingness to borrow by race/ethnicity
Notes: Proportions are weighted, account for complex survey design, and are conditional on student
knowing their WTB. Sample sizes are 1,641 for Black or Hispanic students and 4,650 for White students.
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Appendix C
Chapter 3 Weighted Propensity Score Matching Logit Regression Results
Table C.1: Propensity score matching logit regression results with weights: average marginal effects
Dependent = Zero $1 to $2,000 More than $15,000 Don’t Know
Pr(treatment) Full Sample Enrolled Full Sample Enrolled Full Sample Enrolled Full Sample Enrolled
Female -0.0176 -0.0154 0.0747*** 0.0767** 0.00585 0.00272 0.0298 0.0267
(0.0235) (0.0303) (0.0252) (0.0324) (0.0231) (0.0365) (0.0237) (0.0329)
Race/ethnicity (Reference group: White)
African-American 0.0372 -0.0255 0.110** 0.165* 0.0450 0.0257 0.0323 -0.113
(0.0560) (0.0819) (0.0515) (0.0934) (0.0619) (0.0892) (0.0378) (0.0724)
Hispanic 0.0445 0.0353 0.0373 0.0838 0.00628 -0.0169 -0.0334 -0.107*
(0.0422) (0.0708) (0.0479) (0.0770) (0.0377) (0.0619) (0.0362) (0.0637)
Asian -0.0741* -0.0661 0.00713 0.0871 -0.0244 -0.0320 -0.0419 -0.0572
(0.0397) (0.0558) (0.0640) (0.0982) (0.0538) (0.0862) (0.0555) (0.0703)
Other race/ethnicity 0.0216 0.0410 -0.00186 0.0582 -0.0518 -0.0929 0.0148 -0.110*
(0.0430) (0.0558) (0.0455) (0.0838) (0.0403) (0.0596) (0.0422) (0.0602)
Highest parental education (Reference group: high school or less)
Bachelor’s degree 0.0233 0.00306 0.0345 0.0700**
(0.0359) (0.0371) (0.0356) (0.0346)
Graduate degree 0.0178 0.0337 0.0600* 0.103***
(0.0393) (0.0374) (0.0361) (0.0325)
Bachelor’s degree -0.0278 -0.0436 0.0195 0.0383
(0.0306) (0.0271) (0.0268) (0.0290)
Associate’s degree -0.0181 0.0501 0.0591 0.0917**
(0.0322) (0.0423) (0.0414) (0.0364)
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Occupational training -0.0993** 0.000790 0.0202 0.00262
(0.0500) (0.0837) (0.0616) (0.0690)
Parents U.S. born 0.00702 -0.00874 0.0223 0.0782 0.0165 0.0215 0.00245 0.0188
(0.0352) (0.0432) (0.0436) (0.0483) (0.0352) (0.0515) (0.0320) (0.0481)
Family income in 2012 (Reference group: less than $15000)
$15000 to $55000 0.0321 -0.0610 -0.00727 0.0342 0.0121 -0.0282 0.0296 0.0681
(0.0379) (0.0873) (0.0468) (0.0838) (0.0431) (0.0924) (0.0445) (0.0890)
$55001 to $115000 0.0908* -0.0109 -0.0630 -0.0134 0.0167 -0.0928 0.0213 0.0582
(0.0501) (0.0895) (0.0426) (0.0802) (0.0424) (0.0871) (0.0424) (0.0775)
$115001 to $175000 0.0951* -0.0106 -0.0399 0.0114 0.0347 -0.0425 0.0415 0.0639
(0.0484) (0.0930) (0.0487) (0.0879) (0.0452) (0.0884) (0.0476) (0.0882)
$175000 to $235000 0.111 0.0268 -0.0183 -0.00895 0.0210 -0.115 -0.00837 0.0605
(0.0680) (0.111) (0.0872) (0.120) (0.0587) (0.101) (0.0645) (0.0988)
Greater than $235000 0.239*** 0.144 -0.0461 0.0633 -0.0257 -0.116 0.0873 0.160*
(0.0726) (0.109) (0.0730) (0.113) (0.0624) (0.110) (0.0568) (0.0966)
Household members in 2012 (Reference group: Two)
Three 0.00930 0.0276 -0.00827 -0.00141 0.0804* 0.0374 -0.00505 0.0143
(0.0432) (0.0522) (0.0435) (0.0753) (0.0414) (0.0672) (0.0429) (0.0611)
Four 0.0275 0.0783 0.0310 -0.00599 0.0173 -0.00839 0.00373 -0.0175
(0.0415) (0.0522) (0.0442) (0.0806) (0.0408) (0.0697) (0.0392) (0.0584)
Five -0.00884 -0.00616 -0.00179 -0.0105 0.00582 -0.00191 -0.00156 -0.0123
(0.0394) (0.0457) (0.0449) (0.0820) (0.0448) (0.0754) (0.0470) (0.0634)
Six or more 0.0239 0.0229 0.0117 -0.0400 0.0101 -0.0120 -0.0276 -0.00635
(0.0513) (0.0560) (0.0456) (0.0836) (0.0407) (0.0819) (0.0430) (0.0685)
Region of high school residence (Reference group: Northeast)
Midwest -0.0129 -0.00520 0.0786** 0.00220 -0.0761** -0.0184 -0.0365 -0.0147
(0.0486) (0.0505) (0.0354) (0.0499) (0.0313) (0.0514) (0.0324) (0.0409)
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South -0.000196 -0.0123 0.110*** 0.0752 -0.141*** -0.0869 -0.0510* -0.0141
(0.0501) (0.0508) (0.0328) (0.0552) (0.0312) (0.0539) (0.0300) (0.0449)
West -0.000149 -0.00882 0.128*** 0.0812 -0.0764** -0.0245 -0.0153 -0.00332
(0.0583) (0.0629) (0.0471) (0.0741) (0.0334) (0.0636) (0.0357) (0.0558)
Locale of high school residence (Reference group: City)
Suburb -0.0456 -0.0272 0.00936 0.0480 0.00714 0.00285 -0.0186 -0.00928
(0.0314) (0.0398) (0.0337) (0.0424) (0.0291) (0.0496) (0.0265) (0.0416)
Town -0.0331 -0.0515 0.0166 0.126 0.00105 0.0334 0.00943 0.00130
(0.0413) (0.0520) (0.0412) (0.0796) (0.0355) (0.0576) (0.0323) (0.0484)
Rural -0.0177 -0.0118 -0.00293 0.0521 -0.0142 -0.0279 -0.0332 -0.0552
(0.0332) (0.0414) (0.0364) (0.0469) (0.0290) (0.0444) (0.0265) (0.0422)
Searched for -0.131*** -0.0199 -0.0404 0.00836 0.0968*** 0.0897 -0.115*** 0.0112
college info. (0.0410) (0.0636) (0.0535) (0.0768) (0.0349) (0.0635) (0.0370) (0.0720)
High school GPA 0.00159 -0.0198 -0.0203 -0.00800 -0.00916 -0.0565* 0.0140 -0.00613
(0.0148) (0.0281) (0.0146) (0.0279) (0.0170) (0.0308) (0.0159) (0.0249)
Expected earnings -0.000225 0.000195 -0.00110** -0.000391 0.000150 0.000818 -0.000330 -0.000594
premium ($1000s)† (0.000440) (0.000621) (0.000469) (0.000752) (0.000395) (0.000683) (0.000410) (0.000658)
Grants and scholarships 0.00374 -0.00182 -0.000197 0.000327
($1000s) (0.00241) (0.00196) (0.00172) (0.00171)
Parent responded to 0.0127 -0.0274 0.00946 0.0233
questionnaire (0.0258) (0.0337) (0.0325) (0.0291)
N 3181 1540 3573 1662 3370 1665 5470 2588
Notes: Stars indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Estimates are weighted and account for complex survey design. “Enrolled”
sample refers to observations with non-missing responses for net cost of attendance. Regressions also include interaction of GPA and expected




Chapter 3 Balance Statistics by Gender and by Race/Ethnicity
Table D.1: Selected balance statistics by gender for college enrollment outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates with statistically Covariates with Mean standardized Continuous covariates
significant difference standardized difference difference (%) withvariance ratio
at 5% level (#) > 5% (#) 6= 1 (#)
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
Women
Zero 5 0 16 5 7.70 2.72 1 0
$1 to $2,000 9 0 15 1 7.73 1.48 0 0
More than $15,000 1 0 10 0 5.06 2.00 0 0
Don’t know 4 0 11 0 4.27 1.01 0 1
Men
Zero 8 0 21 1 9.94 1.78 1 0
$1 to $2,000 3 0 19 3 9.01 2.64 0 0
More than $15,000 3 0 13 3 5.68 2.31 0 0
Don’t know 4 0 6 0 3.62 0.95 0 0
Total covariates 27 27 27 27 27 27 3 3




Table D.2: Selected balance statistics by race and ethnicity for college enrollment outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Covariates with statistically Covariates with Mean standardized Continuous covariates
significant difference standardized difference difference (%) withvariance ratio
at 5% level (#) > 5% (#) 6= 1 (#)
Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched
Black or Hispanic
Zero 6 0 20 10 11.12 4.86 0 0
$1 to $2,000 5 0 10 2 8.90 2.48 0 0
More than $15,000 4 0 15 2 9.05 2.76 0 0
Don’t know 3 0 12 2 6.33 2.20 0 0
White
Zero 6 0 17 0 9.73 1.88 3 0
$1 to $2,000 6 0 13 1 7.14 1.34 0 1
More than $15,000 1 0 8 0 3.74 1.78 0 0
Don’t know 6 0 9 1 4.48 1.32 0 0
Total covariates* 23/24 23/24 23/24 23/24 23/24 23/24 3 3
Notes: Results are for full sample only. Balance statistics for the enrolled sample corresponding to analyses of other college outcomes are available
upon request. Total covariates are 23 for the White subsample and 24 for the Black or Hispanic subsample.
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Appendix E
Chapter 4 Estimation Results with Controls
Table E.1: Mortgage regression results with controls
Below median income Above median income
Dependent (dollars): Total debt Mortgage Total debt Mortgage
Log(Wealth) 6791.5*** 5702.6*** 26331.3*** 22416.9***
(395.3) (353.6) (1597.4) (1029.1)
Log(Income) -59.89 638.1 83315.5*** 30653.2***
(1038.9) (721.4) (13959.4) (5499.6)
Age 1311.2*** 1044.5*** 493.1 1755.4**
(298.5) (264.4) (966.1) (732.3)
Age Squared -17.42*** -12.36*** -22.62* -30.92***
(3.628) (3.220) (11.65) (8.703)
Separated 2383.7 2112.8 25848.5*** 15085.1***
(2274.1) (1895.2) (7828.8) (5396.2)
Divorced 1526.4 524.7 15126.1*** 12606.5***
(1550.7) (1363.6) (4307.3) (2627.8)
Widowed 1050.2 1306.4 -5592.9 -2554.6
(2670.6) (2532.3) (6358.9) (4940.6)
Non-White -2198.9 -1230.5 -2051.5 3804.7
(1910.6) (1502.8) (5450.5) (3972.8)
Female 720.8 -238.6 3299.8 4407.2
(1783.7) (1538.6) (4930.2) (2717.6)
Female*Non-White -729.0 -33.87 11225.4 3618.1
(2453.0) (2019.9) (6851.7) (5077.2)
More Risk Averse -2665.2** -1230.1 6799.2** 2591.5
(1326.3) (1111.9) (3092.8) (2285.7)
Unbanked -8338.4*** -5850.1*** 987.7 -5732.4
(1075.1) (920.9) (6111.3) (3861.6)
Unemployed 793.7 330.7 3609.0 -16.78
(1521.9) (1255.5) (4471.2) (3744.7)
Household Size 1253.4 2106.8*** 6210.7*** 4593.7***
(788.8) (698.7) (1477.7) (1172.3)
Expects Major Expense -895.2 -3208.6*** -7595.5** -9807.9***
(1262.9) (1097.3) (3483.2) (2470.6)
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Expansion -187.1 -701.4 9077.1 15762.8***
(2026.1) (1762.6) (7303.5) (4352.2)
Post-Crisis 6269.2** 1868.1 16965.3** 20606.3***
(2514.4) (2014.9) (7134.3) (4174.5)
Expansion # Female 10267.3*** 7478.5*** -3832.7 -2078.3
(2758.9) (2414.6) (8263.9) (5419.6)
Post-Crisis # Female 7259.8** 5530.6** -5101.3 394.5
(2969.1) (2440.3) (9944.4) (5547.5)
Observations 3847 3847 4717 4717
R-squared 0.168 0.174 0.094 0.273
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. All regressions
use sampling weights and first implicate set.
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Table E.2: Education regression results with controls
18 to 65 years of age 25 to 65 years of age
Dependent (dollars): Total debt Educational Total debt Educational
Log(Wealth) 15545.3*** 37.17 16700.0*** 65.65
(680.1) (85.66) (758.0) (91.88)
Log(Income) 25735.7*** -72.30 28243.8*** -19.22
(3100.8) (353.9) (3532.5) (411.0)
Age 84.31 -52.34 1238.2* -529.6***
(501.6) (70.81) (665.1) (116.2)
Age Squared -7.222 -1.208 -19.76** 3.791***
(6.072) (0.795) (7.735) (1.170)
Separated 13270.3*** -919.7** 14471.1*** -871.0**
(3937.9) (385.1) (4098.3) (402.9)
Divorced 7327.6*** -40.43 7087.5*** 141.3
(2640.7) (360.4) (2694.2) (367.5)
Widowed -3732.0 409.9 -3292.1 392.5
(3540.1) (428.6) (3636.0) (434.4)
Non-White -7113.0** 348.4 -6862.1* 533.0
(3395.1) (477.5) (3804.9) (511.4)
Female 194.3 941.2*** 110.6 988.6***
(2901.9) (314.4) (3232.6) (328.4)
Female*Non-White 12086.2*** -272.1 12767.1*** -258.8
(4200.1) (636.7) (4680.2) (677.4)
More Risk Averse -2222.2 -800.7** -313.2 -683.2*
(1671.1) (332.1) (1881.6) (352.5)
Unbanked -326.5 -1831.4*** 2586.8 -1723.8***
(2567.4) (297.0) (3021.4) (329.5)
Unemployed 4516.9** 505.5 3694.3 451.5
(2085.1) (489.1) (2357.7) (527.4)
Household Size 3418.0*** -404.0*** 3628.8*** -334.2**
(852.1) (127.8) (899.9) (134.1)
Expects Major Expense -5299.5*** 1445.2*** -5346.9** 1358.5***
(1999.5) (287.3) (2166.6) (305.0)
254
Expansion 13049.1*** 775.7** 13539.3*** 947.0**
(4439.3) (373.6) (5047.0) (417.4)
Post-Crisis 21412.1*** 3631.2*** 23491.7*** 3403.4***
(5126.8) (573.6) (5777.0) (600.2)
Expansion # Female -140.9 1169.6** -889.6 762.5
(5026.8) (523.8) (5639.4) (541.1)
Post-Crisis # Female -4742.3 1786.1** -6471.8 1958.4**
(6239.8) (767.9) (7016.3) (796.4)
Observations 8564 8564 7782 7782
R-squared 0.078 0.051 0.079 0.054
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. All regressions
use sampling weights and first implicate set.
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Table E.3: Extensive margin regression results with controls: mortgage debt
Dependent variable: Below median income Above median income
Pr(non-zero debt) Estimates AME Estimates AME
Log(Wealth) 1.267*** 0.112*** 0.887*** 0.159***
(0.0569) (0.00413) (0.0370) (0.00472)
Log(Income) 0.279** 0.0246** -1.092*** -0.196***
(0.116) (0.0102) (0.0635) (0.00985)
Age 0.140*** -0.00164*** 0.205*** -0.00412***
(0.0403) (0.000570) (0.0250) (0.000713)
Age Squared -0.00176*** -0.00250***
(0.000471) (0.000285)
Separated 0.530** 0.0492** 0.0348 0.00625
(0.225) (0.0218) (0.141) (0.0252)
Divorced 0.578*** 0.0523*** 0.537*** 0.0979***
(0.163) (0.0150) (0.0844) (0.0154)
Widowed 0.301 0.0274 0.0496 0.00891
(0.263) (0.0246) (0.162) (0.0291)
Minority -0.432 0.0196 -0.0298 0.00977
(0.292) (0.0122) (0.123) (0.0143)
Female -0.157 0.0526*** 0.0115 0.0159
(0.256) (0.0126) (0.124) (0.0133)
Female # Minority 0.892*** 0.161
(0.325) (0.159)
More Risk Averse 0.240* 0.0210* 0.00492 0.000883
(0.135) (0.0117) (0.0806) (0.0145)
Unbanked 0.0242 0.00214 -0.486** -0.0863**
(0.202) (0.0179) (0.242) (0.0421)
Unemployed -0.362** -0.0311** -0.412*** -0.0736***
(0.158) (0.0131) (0.123) (0.0218)
Household Size 0.237*** 0.0209*** 0.181*** 0.0325***
(0.0574) (0.00504) (0.0369) (0.00659)
Expects Major Expense -0.478*** -0.0426*** -0.527*** -0.0958***
(0.127) (0.0113) (0.0720) (0.0130)
256
Expansion -0.700** -0.00515 0.292** 0.0582***
(0.320) (0.0143) (0.132) (0.0163)
Post-Crisis -0.803*** -0.0248* 0.201* 0.0418***
(0.289) (0.0135) (0.119) (0.0148)
Expansion # Female 0.890** 0.0608
(0.362) (0.180)
Post-Crisis # Female 0.723** 0.0615
(0.329) (0.160)
Observations 3847 4717
Notes: AME coefficients indicate average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. All regressions use sampling weights and first implicate set.
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Table E.4: Extensive margin regression results with controls: educational debt
Dependent variable: 18 to 65 25 to 65
Pr(non-zero debt) Estimates AME Estimates AME
Log(Wealth) -0.0450*** -0.00578*** -0.0378* -0.00451*
(0.0173) (0.00221) (0.0195) (0.00232)
Log(Income) -0.0109 -0.00140 -0.00198 -0.000236
(0.0507) (0.00650) (0.0585) (0.00698)
Age 0.0217 -0.00640*** -0.0786*** -0.00800***
(0.0213) (0.000456) (0.0278) (0.000508)
Age Squared -0.000976*** 0.000146
(0.000268) (0.000327)
Separated -0.271** -0.0328** -0.283** -0.0317**
(0.133) (0.0151) (0.138) (0.0144)
Divorced 0.0255 0.00327 0.0667 0.00798
(0.0825) (0.0106) (0.0852) (0.0102)
Widowed 0.283 0.0386 0.245 0.0310
(0.173) (0.0249) (0.175) (0.0233)
Minority 0.0128 0.00850 0.0904 0.0157
(0.124) (0.00964) (0.139) (0.00981)
Female 0.453*** 0.0724*** 0.565*** 0.0717***
(0.130) (0.00896) (0.148) (0.00909)
Female # Minority 0.0807 0.0578
(0.151) (0.166)
More Risk Averse -0.350*** -0.0442*** -0.372*** -0.0438***
(0.0729) (0.00904) (0.0796) (0.00919)
Unbanked -0.370*** -0.0438*** -0.379*** -0.0414***
(0.130) (0.0140) (0.145) (0.0144)
Unemployed 0.258*** 0.0345*** 0.299*** 0.0378***
(0.0841) (0.0118) (0.0940) (0.0125)
Household Size -0.00391 -0.000501 0.0209 0.00250
(0.0348) (0.00447) (0.0359) (0.00429)
Expects Major Expense 0.509*** 0.0634*** 0.487*** 0.0566***
(0.0727) (0.00869) (0.0783) (0.00879)
258
Expansion 0.384*** 0.0465*** 0.408** 0.0402***
(0.148) (0.0106) (0.171) (0.0108)
Post-Crisis 0.672*** 0.110*** 0.699*** 0.0978***
(0.127) (0.0100) (0.146) (0.0102)
Expansion # Female 0.0222 -0.0520
(0.184) (0.207)
Post-Crisis # Female 0.251 0.149
(0.158) (0.176)
Observations 8564 7782
Notes: AME coefficients indicate average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. All regressions use sampling weights and first implicate set.
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Appendix F
Chapter 5 Summary Statistics for Controls by Household Type and by
Race and Ethnicity
Table F.1: Summary statistics of controls by household type
Dual-headed households Single women
mean sd median mean sd median
Age of HH Head 50.4 (15.938) 49 58.4 (15.777) 60
Number of Children in HH .829 (1.164) 0 0 (0.000) 0
Income 90158 (82322) 71000 35643 (29550) 25000
Income (LIS) 53859 (49190) 42240 35643 (29550) 25000
Income (OECD) 47547 (44430) 36700 35643 (29550) 25000
Unemployed (Last Year) .054 (0.232) 0 .0557 (0.179) 0
Banked .875 (0.339) 1 .86 (0.270) 1
Married .93 (0.262) 1 .00673 (0.064) 0
Never Married .0428 (0.207) 0 .324 (0.365) 0
Widowed .00242 (0.050) 0 .347 (0.371) 0
Divorced or Annulled .0225 (0.152) 0 .294 (0.355) 0
Separated .0024 (0.050) 0 .0284 (0.130) 0
Household-Year Obs. 36506 8094
Source: 1999 - 2015 PSID Surveys. Notes: Means and SDs are estimated using sample weights and account for
clustering and stratification. Medians use sampling weights.
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Summary statistics of controls by household type (continued)
Female-headed households Men
mean sd median mean sd median
Age of HH Head 45.4 (19.699) 43 45.5 (15.725) 43
Number of Children in HH 1.08 (1.406) 1 .0973 (0.377) 0
Income 42156 (46129) 30432 47139 (44743) 32000
Income (LIS) 26295 (28969) 18660 44026 (41114) 29870
Income (OECD) 23816 (26527) 16730 43556 (40790) 29400
Unemployed (Last Year) .109 (0.386) 0 .1 (0.264) 0
Banked .719 (0.557) 1 .811 (0.344) 1
Married .0271 (0.201) 0 .0103 (0.089) 0
Never Married .316 (0.576) 0 .498 (0.439) 1
Widowed .145 (0.437) 0 .101 (0.265) 0
Divorced or Annulled .408 (0.609) 0 .334 (0.414) 0
Separated .104 (0.378) 0 .0567 (0.203) 0
Household-Year Obs. 10157 9139
Source: 1999 - 2015 PSID Surveys. Notes: Means and SDs are estimated using sample weights and account for
clustering and stratification. Medians use sampling weights.
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Table F.2: Summary statistics of controls by race and ethnicity
White (Non-Hispanic) Black (Non-Hispanic)
mean sd median mean sd median
Age of HH Head 51.8 (15.377) 51 47.3 (24.794) 45
Number of Children in HH .482 (0.793) 0 .657 (1.709) 0
Income 71375 (63820) 51236 44530 (60100) 29400
Income (LIS) 49080 (40774) 37008 31521 (41606) 21360
Income (OECD) 45285 (37815) 34000 29254 (39731) 19280
Unemployed (Last Year) .0586 (0.201) 0 .102 (0.475) 0
Banked .896 (0.262) 1 .644 (0.753) 1
Married .518 (0.428) 1 .266 (0.695) 0
Never Married .182 (0.331) 0 .375 (0.762) 0
Widowed .111 (0.269) 0 .0942 (0.460) 0
Divorced or Annulled .17 (0.322) 0 .202 (0.631) 0
Separated .0195 (0.118) 0 .0628 (0.382) 0
Household-Year Obs. 38077 18911
Source: 1999 - 2015 PSID Surveys. Notes: Means and SDs are estimated using sample weights and account for
clustering and stratification. Medians use sampling weights.
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Summary statistics of controls by race and ethnicity (continued)
Hispanic Other Race/Ethnicity
mean sd median mean sd median
Age of HH Head 45.1 (14.415) 44 49.6 (15.329) 48
Number of Children in HH 1.13 (1.251) 1 .678 (0.975) 0
Income 53742 (48378) 37984 76665 (62968) 56360
Income (LIS) 32640 (31042) 22700 51282 (44955) 38006
Income (OECD) 28730 (28819) 19533 46767 (43056) 33267
Unemployed (Last Year) .106 (0.288) 0 .0707 (0.236) 0
Banked .644 (0.449) 1 .862 (0.318) 1
Married .573 (0.464) 1 .565 (0.457) 1
Never Married .186 (0.365) 0 .214 (0.379) 0
Widowed .0469 (0.198) 0 .0701 (0.236) 0
Divorced or Annulled .14 (0.325) 0 .131 (0.311) 0
Separated .0533 (0.211) 0 .0195 (0.128) 0
Household-Year Obs. 4442 1912
Source: 1999 - 2015 PSID Surveys. Notes: Means and SDs are estimated using sample weights and account for
clustering and stratification. Medians use sampling weights.
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